1950 Supreme(SC) 37

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
14th November 1950
FAZL ALI, B.K. MUKHERJEA AND CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.
Ram Gopal - Appellant
Versus
Nand Lal and others - Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 59 of 1949.
Advocates appeared
Shri P. L. Banerjee, Senior Advocate (Shri B. Banerjee, Advocate, with him) instructed by Shri R. K. Kuba, Agent - for Appellant; Shri S. P. Sinha, Senior Advocate (Shri N. C. Sen, Advocate, with him) instructed by Shri S.P. Varma, Agent - for Respondents.

Headnote:Section 23(3)-Limits of powers of Income-tax Officer-Exercise of power by the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

       Held: (1) It is not possible to define with any precision the limitations on the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court by the constitutional provision made in article 136. The limitations, whatever they be, are implicit in the nature and character of the power itself. It being an exceptional and overriding power, naturally it has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special and extraordinary situations. Beyond that it is not possible to fetter the exercise of this power by any set formula or rule. All that can be said is that the Constitution having trusted the wisdom and good sense of the Judges of the Supreme Court in this matter, that itself is a sufficient safeguard and guarantee that the power will only be used to advance the cause of justice and that its exercise will be governed by well established principles which govern the exercise of over-riding constitutional powers. It is, however, plain that when the court reaches the conclusion that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a court or tribunal within the territory of India has not given a fair deal to a litigant, then no technical hurdles of any kind like the finality of finding of facts or otherwise can stand in the way of the exercise of this power because the whole intent and purpose of this article is that it is the duty of the Supreme Court to see that injustice is not perpetrated or perpetuated by decisions of courts and tribunals because certain laws have made the decisions of these courts or tribunals final and conclusive.

       (2) The Income-tax Officer no doubt is not fettered by technical rules of evidence and pleadings, and he is entitled to act on material which may not be accepted as evidence in a court of law, but it is equally clear that in making the assessment under sub-section (3) of section 23 of the Act, the Income-tax Officer is not entitled to make a pure guess and make an assessment without reference to any evidence or any material at all. There must be something more than bare suspicion to support the assessment under section 23 (3).1

       (3) In this case, the Tribunal violated certain fundamental rules of justice in reaching its conclusions. Firstly, it did not disclose to the assessee what information had been supplied to it by the departmental representative. Next it did not give any opportunity to the company to rebut the material furnished to it by him, and lastly, it declined to take all the material that the assessee wanted to produce in support of its case. The result is that the assessee had not had a fair hearing. The estimate of the gross rate of profit on sales, both by the Income-tax Officer and the Tribunal seems to be based on surmises, suspicions and conjectures.2

       1. Seth Gurmukh Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1944) 12 I.T.R. 393 ; A.I.R. 1944 lah. 353 (2) approved.

       2. Case remanded with direction. Hindu Law-Widow-Nature of estate-Tamliknama ill favour of widow.

       Held: (1) There is no warrant for the proposition of law that when, a grant of an immovable property is made to a Hindu female, she does not get an absolute or alienable interest in such property, unless such power is expressly conferred upon her. If an estate were given to a. man without express words of inheritance it would, in the absence of a conflicting context, carry, by Hindu law, an estate ofinheritance.1 This is the general principle of law which is recognized and embodied in S. 8, Transfer of Property Act, and unless it is shown that under Hindu law a gift to an female means a limited gift or carries with it the restrictions or disabilities similar to those,

       1. Tagore v. Tagore, I.A. sup. Vol. 47, p. 65 applied.

       that suit in a widows estate, there is no justification for departing from this principle. The position, therefore, is that to convey an absolute estate to a Hindu female, no express power of alienation need be given, it is enough if words are used of such amplitude as would convey full rights of ownership.

       (2) The mere fact that the gift of property is made for the support and maintenance of a female relation could be taken to be a prima facie indication of the intention of the donor that the donee was to enjoy the property only during her life-time. The extent of interest, which the donee is to take, depends upon the intention of the donor as expressed by the language used, and if the dispositive words employed in the document are clear and unambiguous and import absolute ownership, the purpose of the grant would not, by itself, restrict or cut down the interests. The desire to provide maintenance or residence for the donee would only show the motive which prompted the donor to make the gift, but it could not be read as measure of the extent of the gift.

       (3) In the present case the Hindu widow relinquished by a written deed all her rights in certain properties and received under a tamliknama two items, of property, house and shop, as malik, the deed containing no express words showing that she was to enjoy the property only during her lifetime. In these circumstances an absolute estate was conveyed to her by the tamliknama, though the gift was expressed to be for her maintenance and residence. Deed-Construction-Extrinsic evidence to determine effect of instrument-Interpretation of a document with reference to the interpretation of another document.

       Held: (I) Extrinsic evidence to determine the effect of an instrument is permissible where there remains a doubt as to its true meaning. Evidence of the acts done under it is guide to the intention of the parties in such a case and particularly when acts are done shortly after the date of the instrument.

       (2) Unless the language of two documents is identical, an interpretation placed on one document is no authority for the proposition that a document differently drafted, though using partially similar language, should be similarly interpreted. Deed-Construction-Intention-Surrounding circumstances bow far to be considered.

       Held: In cosntructing a document, whether in English or in vernaoular the fundamental rule is to ascertain the intention from the words used; the surrounding circumstances are to be considered but that is only for the purpose of finding out the intended meaning of the words which have actually been employed.

       "In the present case the instrument or grant has been described as a "Tamliknama" which means a document by which Maliki or ownership rights are transferred and the document expressly says that the grantee has been made a Malik or owner. There are no express words making the gift heritable and transferable; nor on the other hand is there any statement that the transferee would enjoy the properties only during her lifetime and that they would revert to the grantor after her death."