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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
18th February, 1959.
J. IMAM, A.K. SARKAR AND K. SUBBA RAO JJ.
M/s. Raman and Raman Ltd., Appellant
Versus
The State of Madras and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 37 of 1958.
Advocates appeared
Mr. G. S. Pathak, Senior Advocate (M/s. R. Ganapathy Iyer, Advocate and G. Gopalakrishnan, Advocate of M/s. Gagrat and Co. with him), for Appellant; Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Senior Advocate, (M/s. J. B. Dadachanji) and S. N. Andley, Advocates of M/s. Rajinder Narain and Co. with him); for Respondent 4.
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - S. 43A - Orders and directions issued by State Government under - Whether laws - Whether can be challenged on ground of unconstitutionality - Held, no.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, a transport company, was granted a permit to operate a bus service on a particular route by the Regional Transport Authority. The respondent, another transport company, appealed to the Central Road Traffic Board against the grant of the permit. The Board set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and granted the permit to the respondent. The appellant challenged the order of the Board on the ground that it was based on an order issued by the State Government under S. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which was unconstitutional.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the orders and directions issued by the State Government under S. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, were not laws and therefore could not be challenged on the ground of unconstitutionality. The Court further held that the Board was entitled to decide the appeal on the basis of the order in force at the time the appeal was being heard, even though the order had been issued after the date of the decision of the Regional Transport Authority.
Issues: 1. Whether the orders and directions issued by the State Government under S. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, were laws. 2. Whether the Board was entitled to decide the appeal on the basis of the order in force at the time the appeal was being heard, even though the order had been issued after the date of the decision of the Regional Transport Authority.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The orders and directions issued by the State Government under S. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, were not laws because they were not intended to affect the rights of parties. They were merely administrative directions issued to the Regional Transport Authorities and the State Transport Authority. 2. The Board was entitled to decide the appeal on the basis of the order in force at the time the appeal was being heard, even though the order had been issued after the date of the decision of the Regional Transport Authority. This was because the Board was not bound to apply the law that was in force at the time of the decision of the Regional Transport Authority. It was entitled to apply the law that was in force at the time of the hearing of the appeal.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed.
Judgment
K. SUBBA RAO J.: This appeal by Special Leave against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras raises the question of interpretation of S. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939), as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948 (Mad. XX of 1948), hereinafter referred to as the Act. On February 19, 1955, the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, Madras State, the second respondent herein, called for applications under S. 57(2) of the Act for grant of a stage carriage permit on the Saliamangalam Kodavasal route. The appellant and the fourth respondent K. M. Shanmugam, Proprietor, K. M. S. Transport, Ammapet, Tanjore District, along with others, applied for the grant of the said permit. The Regional Transport Authority at its meeting held on April 19, 1955, after hearing the representations of the applicants, granted the permit to the appellant. The fourth respondent and two others, preferred appeals against the said order to the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, the third respondent herein. The Central Road Traffic Board by its order dated June 25, 1955, set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and granted the permit to the fourth respondent. The appellant preferred a Revision Petition against that order to the first respondent, the State of Madras, but the first respondent rejected the petition by its order dated October 14, 1955. Thereafter, the appellant filed a Writ Petition (No. 852 of I955) the High Court of Madras under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash the orders of the Central Road Traffic Board and the State of Madras. Rajagopalan J. of the said High Court by his order dated May 1, 1956, duashed the order of the Government and directed the State Transport Appellate Tribunal which had been constituted in place of the Central Road Traffic Board to dispose of the appeal in accordance with law. Against the judgment of the learned Judge, the fourth respondent preferred an appeal under the Letters Patent and the appellate Bench of that High Court, consisting of Rajamannar C. J. and Ramaswami J., set aside the order of Rajagopalan J. and restored the order of the Central Road Traffic Board. The appellant with special leave filed the present appeal against that judgment of the High Court.
2. Mr. Pathak, appearing for the appellant, raised before us the following two points: (i) The appeal filed by the fourth respondent against the order of the Regional Transport Authority to the Central Road Traffic Board was barred by limitation and the Board acted illegally in disposing of the appeal without deciding the question of limitation; and (ii) the appellant had the fundamental right to carry on the business of transport subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law as on the date he applied for a permit or at any rate when the Regional Transport Authority issued the permit to him, and that the Central Road Traffic Board committed an error, evident on the face of the record, in disposing of the appeal in accordance with the new restrictions imposed by law made pending the appeal before it. Stated as a legal proposition, the contention is that the appellant had acquired a vested right to carry on the business of transport an that the same could not be defeated by a subsequent law made pending the appeal, which was only prospective in character.
3. The first argument need not detain us, for the learned Counsel, in view of the finding of the High Court that as a matter of fact the appeal to the Central Road Traffic Board was not barred, fairly did not press it before us. This leaves us with the second and the only argument in the case. To appreciate the contention it is necessary to set out some more relevant facts: On March 28, 1953 the Government made an order, G. O. Ms. No. 1037 Home, purporting to be under S. 43A of the Act. The material part of that order reads:
"(1) That additional buses should not be permitted to ply on existing routes unless there is a clear
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