1. Suit for specific performance — Decree by State High Court — Transfer of administration — Appeal to United State High Court — Subsequent Act providing appeal to Full Bench. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 )
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1958 Supreme(SC) 36
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Madhya Bharat : AIR 1951 Madh-B 1 FB)
28th March 1958
S.R. DAS, C.J.I., T.L. VENKATARAMA AYYAR, S.K. DAS, A.K. SARKAR AND VIVIAN BOSE, JJ.
Gulab Chand, Appellant
Versus
Kudilal and another, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1953.
Advocates appeared
M/s. N. C. Chatterjee and S. C. Isaacs, Senior Advocates, Mr. J. D. Patel, Advocate and M/s. J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley and Rameshwarnath Advocates of M/s. Rajinder Narain & Co. with them, for Appellant ; Mr. M. P. Amin, Senior Advocate, (M/S. C. B. Sanghi and I. N. Shroff, Advocates, with him), for Respondents.
Advocates:
C.B.SANGHI, I.M.SHROFF, J.B.DADACHAN, J.D.PATEL, M.P.AMIN, N.C.CHATTERJI, RAJINDAR NARAIN, Rameshwar Nath, S.C.ISAACS, S.N.ANDLEY
C.B.SANGHI, I.M.SHROFF, J.B.DADACHAN, J.D.PATEL, M.P.AMIN, N.C.CHATTERJI, RAJINDAR NARAIN, Rameshwar Nath, S.C.ISAACS, S.N.ANDLEY
A statute's presumption against retrospective operation applies only when its language is ambiguous. Plain language explicitly applying a law to proceedings pending or arising from a certain date overrides vested rights, including the finality of a judgment, without requiring express mention of such disturbance.
Headnote:(A) United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya-Bharat) High Court of Judicature Act, 1949 - Sections 2(b) and 25 - Retrospective operation of statutes - Where the language of a statute plainly gives it retrospective operation, the rule of presumption against such operation has no application, and the legislature is competent to make provisions retrospective even if they disturb vested rights. (Paras 12 and 13)
(B) Interpretation of Statutes - Reference to repealed laws - It is an extremely hazardous proceeding to refer to provisions which have been absolutely repealed to ascertain the meaning of the new law, unless the terms of the current section are ambiguous or the object of the enquiry is to ascertain the meaning of a part that remains unchanged. (Para 14)
(C) Civil Proceedings - Scope of "proceedings arising" - Proceedings arising in the areas of an erstwhile state after its inclusion in a union include appeals filed after such inclusion. (Para 9)
Facts of the case:
A suit for specific performance was decreed by a state high court. Following the merger of the state into a union, an appeal was filed in the union's high court and subsequently dismissed by a divisional bench. Later, a High Court Act was enacted, providing for a special appeal to a full bench from decisions of a divisional bench. The Act specified that it applied to proceedings pending on the date of the state's inclusion in the union and to proceedings arising thereafter. The appellant sought to file a special appeal to the full bench against the divisional bench's judgment, which had been delivered before the Act came into force.
Findings of Court:
The court held that the appeal filed after the state's inclusion was a proceeding "arising" after the date of inclusion. Consequently, the provisions of the Act, including the right of appeal to the full bench, applied to that proceeding regardless of whether the judgment was passed before or after the Act's commencement.
Issues: Whether the right of appeal to a full bench under a new statute applies to a judgment delivered by a divisional bench before the statute's commencement, provided the proceeding falls within the category of those to which the statute explicitly applies.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the presumption against retrospective operation applies only when the language of the statute is ambiguous. When the language is plain and explicitly applies the Act to certain proceedings, it gives the statute retrospective operation. Such operation is valid even if it deprives a party of a vested right to the finality of a judgment, and no additional express words are required to state that vested rights are affected.
Result: Appeal allowed.
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2. Whether Section 25 of the Act, via Section 2(b), allows appeal from a Divisional Bench judgment delivered before the Act's commencement, affecting vested rights of finality. (Para 8 , 9 , 10 )
3. Plain language of Section 2(b) makes the Act's provisions, including Section 25, applicable to specified proceedings, overriding the presumption against retrospective operation. (Para 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 )
4. Where the language of a statute plainly provides for retrospective operation, the presumption against retrospectivity does not apply, even if vested rights are disturbed. (Para 13 , 16 )
5. Appeal allowed — Decree of the Full Bench set aside — Case remanded to the High Court for decision on merits. (Para 17 )
6. When does the presumption against the retrospective operation of a statute not apply?
The presumption against retrospective operation applies only when the language of the statute is doubtful. Where the language plainly gives the statute retrospective operation, the rule has no application, as the legislature is competent to make provisions retrospective. (Para 12 , 13 )
7. How does a provision applying an Act to certain proceedings affect a right of appeal created by that Act?
If a section makes an Act applicable to a proceeding, any right of appeal granted by the Act applies to judgments passed in that proceeding, regardless of whether the judgment was delivered before or after the Act's commencement. (Para 13 )
8. Can a statute retrospectively disturb a vested right to the finality of a judgment?
Yes, if the language of the statute is plain and clearly intends retrospective operation, it can disturb vested rights. Express words stating that vested rights shall be affected are not strictly necessary if the language is plain. (Para 11 , 16 )
Judgment
A. K. SARKAR, J. : The princely States that existed in British India, merged themselves in the Union India not very long after India became independent. Before the merger some of these States passed through certain stages which may be called transitional. The decision of this appeal depends on certain laws that came into existence during the transitional stage through which the Princely State of Indore passed before it became merged in the Indian Union.
2. Up to April 22, 1948, Indore as one of the Princely States of India enjoyed internal sovereign rights and had its own laws and courts. These laws and courts derived their authority from the Ruler of Indore in whom the sovereign power was vested. The highest court in Indore was called the High Court.
3. The suit out of which this appeal arises was filed by the appellant against the respondents in the Indore High Court on November 6, 1947. It was a suit for the specific performance of an agreement whereby it is said, Govindram Saksaria, whose heirs and legal representatives the respondents are, agreed to sell to the appellant a share in a business. The said Govindram Saksaria having died prior to the suit it was brought against the respondents.
4. On April 22, 1948, the rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States in the region known as Malwa (Madhya-Bharat) entered into a Covenant to unite and integrate their territories in one State with a common executive, legislature and judiciary, by the name of the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya-Bharat) and to include in that United State any other State the Ruler of which later agreed with the approval of the Government of India, to merge his State in the United State. Article 3 of the Covenant provided for the constitution of a Council of Rulers one of the members of which was to be its President, such President being called the Rajpramukh. It also provided that the Ruler of Gwalior would be the first Raj Pramukh of the United State. Under Art. 6 of the Covenant, the Ruler of each covenanting State was required to make over the administration of his State to the Raj Pramukh by a date not later than July 1, 1948. This article also provided that upon the administration of a State being made over to the Raj Pramukh all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to its Ruler and appertaining or incidental to its Government, would vest in the United State. Similar provision was also made in respect of the vesting of the rights, authority and jurisdiction of the Ruler of a State which by a subsequent agreement became included in the United State. Article 10 provided that as soon as practicable a Constituent Assembly for the United State would be formed in the manner indicated, for framing its Constitution and that the Raj Pramukh would by August 1, 1948, constitute an interim Legislative Assembly. It also provided that until the Constitution framed by the Constituent Assembly came into operation, the Raj Pramukh would have the power to make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good Government of the United State but such Ordinances would have force for a period not longer than six months from its promulgation and would be liable to be controlled or superseded by an Act of the interim Legislative Assembly. As a matter of interest it may be mentioned here, though nothing turns on that in this appeal, that the United State later became a Part B State as defined in the Constitution of India and lastly, merged in the territories of what is now the State of Madhya Pradesh.
5. The suit brought by the appellant was heard by a single Judge of the Indore High Court who decreed it by his judgment pronounced on June 11, 1948. It was five days after this judgment had been pronounced, namely, on June 16, 1948, that the Ruler of Indore made over the administration of his State to the Raj Pramukh of the United State in terms of the Covenant. It appears, however, that the High Court of Indore continued functioning even t
