The principle that a person cannot trade with himself and make profit out of dealings with himself is not inflexible and universal and permissible invasion of this principle has been recently recognized by the House of Lords in Sharkey v. Wernher, 1956 AC 58.

Judgement

P. B. GAJENDBAGADKAR, J. : These are appeals by special leave and they arise from the assessment proceedings taken against the appellants husband Seth Ganga Sagar Jatia in respect of his income for the assessment years 1943-44 and 1944-45. The said Seth Ganga Sagar died on September 22, 1944, leaving behind him his widow the appellant Shrimati Indermani Jatia. After the death of her husband, the appellant continued the assessment proceedings as his representative and administrator of his estate.The appellant as well as her husband were residents and ordinarily residents in British India for the relevant years. The sources of the assessee s income for the purposes of income-tax assessment were his business, his house property and the dividends earned by him. This business was carried on by the appellant after his death at Khurja and Aligarh which are part of India and at Chistian in the Indian State of Bahawalpur now a part of Pakistan. The central set of accounts of the assessee s business were kept at Khurja. In this set of accounts income received by the assessee from all sources were incorporated. For the accounting year relevant to 1943-44 assessment, the interest account in the said books showed credit entries of Rs. 17,132 as interest received on capital invested in the shop at Chistian. Similarly for the accounting period relevant to 1944-45 assessment Rs. 47,029 had been credited in the said books. The Income Tax Officer took the view that these two amounts represented the assessee s taxable income in India and accordingly he levied tax on them.

2. The appellant filed appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the said assessment orders for the assessment years 1943-44 and 1944-45; and on her behalf the Income Tax Officer s decision about the chargeability to tax of the aforesaid two amounts was challenged. The appellate authority, however, rejected the appellant s contention and confirmed the order under appeal.

3. The appellant then filed appeals before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The tribunal agreed with the view taken by the income-tax authorities, confirmed their conclusion and dismissed the appeals preferred by the appellant.

4. In the assessment for 1943-44; the appellant had claimed that Rs. 7,512, which had been spent in litigation, was an admissible expenditure but this claim was disallowed by the Income Tax Officer and his decision was confirmed by the appellate authority and by the tribunal. At the instance of the appellant, the tribunal stated the case and referred the following two questions to the High Court at Allahabad under S. 66 (1) :

(1) Whether, in the circumstances of the case the sum of Rs. 17,132 for 1943-44 and Rs. 47,029 for 1944-45 could be legally deemed to have been received in British India and were liable to tax under S. 4 (1) of the Act;

(2) Whether, in the circumstances of the case, the expenditure of Rs. 7,512 incurred in connection with a criminal litigation was admissible expenditure within the meaning of S. 10 (2) (xv) of the Act?

The reference was heard by Malik C. J. and V. Bhargava J. on November 14, 1950, and both the questions were answered against the appellant. The application made by the appellant under S. 66A of the Act for leave to appeal to the SC was dismissed by the High Court on April 23, 1954, Thereupon the appellant applied for and obtained special leave on December 10, 1954. That is how these appeals have come to this Court.

5. Mr. Viswanatha Sastri, for the appellant, did not challenge before us the correctness of the view taken by the High Court on the second question in respect of the expenditure of Rs. 7,512. He conceded that the finding recorded by the income-tax authorities against the appellant on this point is a finding of fact, and, having regard to the material on the record, the correctness of the said finding cannot be effectively challenged. He, however, urged that the answer given by we High Court on the first question referre