In order to justify committal for breach of a prohibitive order it is not necessary that the order should have been served upon the party against whom it has been granted, if it be proved that he had notice of the order aliunde, as by telegram, or newspaper report, or otherwise, and knew that it was intended to be enforced, or if he consented to the order, or if he was present in Court when the order was pronounced, or when the motion was made, although he left before the order was pronounced.

Headnote:
CONTEMPT OF COURT - Disobedience of order - Knowledge of order - Service of order - Necessity - Prohibitory order - Notice of order aliunde - Sufficiency - Contempt proceedings - Criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings - Essential requirements - Allegation against opposite party - Precision and clarity - Conviction - Basis - Admission of alleged contemner - Consideration as a whole - Incriminating part not to be taken out of context - Clear-cut finding on disputed fact - Absence - Summary proceedings for contempt of Court - Inappropriateness - Exercise of discretion - Wrong exercise - Contempt proceedings on application of party with unclean hands - Inappropriateness - Notice of prohibitive order to party concerned - Requisites - Communication by telegram or newspaper report - Sufficiency - Circumstances - Difficulties of parties against whom prohibitive order made - Information through telegram from person not connected with Court - Inadequacy - Conviction for contempt - Dependence on unimpeachable evidence of knowledge of alleged contemner about order disobeyed - Practice in urgent cases - Service of party enjoined personally with notice in writing or procurement of transcript of minutes of Order signed by Registrar and service of copy thereof - Newspaper report or otherwise - Inadequacy - Communication through applications and affidavit presented to appellants - Insufficiency - Presence of advocate on occasions of presenting application and affidavit to appellants - Significance - Request by advocate for passing necessary orders on application - No professional representation - Statement of advocate accompanying party - No greater weight - Public officers not to blame for not taking at face value statements in deliberately prepared applications and affidavits - Reliance on statements in application and affidavit - Mala fides - Absence - Precaution of obtaining orders of High Court for serving stay orders - Necessity - Absence of contempt of Court.
Fact of the Case:

The appellants, a Sub-Divisional Officer and a Naib Tehsildar-cum-Managing Officer, were alleged to have committed contempt of Court by disobeying an order of the High Court staying delivery of possession of certain land. The High Court found them guilty of contempt but instead of committing them for such contempt, administered a warning to them and directed them to pay costs. On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that they were not aware of the order of the High Court extending the operation of the stay order and that in the absence of positive evidence fixing them with knowledge of the extension of the stay order, the High Court was wrong in finding that they had wilfully disobeyed the order of the High Court.
Finding of the Court:

The Supreme Court held that the appellants had knowledge of the order of the High Court extending the operation of the stay order and that they had wilfully disobeyed the said order. The Court observed that disobedience of a judgment or order requiring a person to do any act other than the payment of money, or to abstain from doing anything is a contempt of Court punishable by attachment or committal; but disobedience, it is argued, if it is to be punishable as a contempt, must be wilful ; in other words, the party against whom a proceeding by way of contempt is taken must know the order before it can be said that he has disobeyed it. The Court further observed that in order to justify committal for breach of a prohibitive order it is not necessary that the order should have been served upon the party against whom it has been granted, if it be proved that he had notice of the order aliunde, as by telegram, or newspaper report, or otherwise, and knew that it was intended to be enforced, or if he consented to the order, or if he was present in Court when the order was pronounced, or when the motion was made, although he left before the order was pronounced.
Issues: 1. Whether the appellants had knowledge of the order of the High Court extending the operation of the stay order? 2. Whether the appellants wilfully disobeyed the order of the High Court?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the appellants had knowledge of the order of the High Court extending the operation of the stay order on the basis of the following evidence: * Applications and affidavits presented to the appellants by Didar Singh, another person whose land was also subject to the stay order, on May 20, 1958, which stated that the High Court had extended the stay order up to May 23, 1958. * A chit alleged to have been sent by the High Court advocate to the appellants, which also stated that the stay order had been extended. * The presence of Ganga Bishan, an advocate, on the occasions of the presenting of the application and affidavit to appellants nos. 1 and 2, who, although not formally representing Didar Singh, made requests to the Sub-Divisional Officer for passing the necessary orders on the application. 2. The Court held that the appellants wilfully disobeyed the order of the High Court because they had knowledge of the order and they proceeded to deliver possession of the land to Budh Singh, the allottee of the land, in defiance of the order.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed and the order of the High Court was upheld.

Judgment

S. K. DAS, J. : (majority judgments : On behalf of himself and Subba Rao J.) This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the Punjab High Court dated August 18, 1958 by which the said Court found the two appellants guilty of contempt of Court and instead of committing them for such contempt, administered a warning to them and directed them to pay Rs. 50/- each as costs of the respondent Gurbachan Singh.

2. The two appellants before us bear the same name. One of them was the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sirsa, District Hissar and the other Naib Tehsildar-cum-Managing Officer, Sirsa, same district, at the relevant time. In this judgment we shall call the Sub Divisional Officer as the first appellant and the Naib Tehsildar as the second appellant. The facts alleged against the appellants were these. One Budh Singh, a displaced person, was allotted some land in village Jagmalera, Tehsil Sirsa, District Hissar. The land allotted to Budh Singh was, it was stated by the appellants, forcibly occupied by the respondent Gurbachan Singh. The respondent was not a legitimate allottee and the appellants, who were concerned in their official capacity with the allotment and management of land for displaced persons, were naturally anxious to oust the respondent and deliver possession to Budh Singh of the land allotted to him. On May 9, 1958 appellant No. 1 made an order that Budh Singh and other allottees like him would be given possession of the lands allotted to them. The date fixed for such delivery of possession was May 20, 1958. On May 16, 1958. Gurbachan Singh and a number of other persons who were similarly threatened with dispossession filed petitions to the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the legality of the action threatened against them. These petitions were put up before the learned Chief Justice on that very day, namely, May 16, 1958, when he issued an order staying delivery of possession till May 19, 1958, when the petitions were to come up for admission before a Division Bench. On May 19, 1958 the Division Bench extended the operation of the stay order until May 23, 1958. In the High Court the appellants did not dispute that the first order staying delivery of possession up to May 19,1958 was communicated to them on May 19, 1958 on which date the notice from the High Court reached Sirsa. It appears that a notice of the second order extending the stay of delivery of possession till May 23, 1958 was not officially communicated to the appellants till May 21, 1958. The allegation on behalf of the respondent was that on May 20, 1958, which was the relevant date, the two appellants were informed by certain interested persons, to whom we shall presently refer, that an extension of the stay order up to May 23, 1958 had been granted by the High Court. In spite of this information, however, the second appellant, in consultation with and under instructions of the first appellant, formally dispossessed the respondent and handed over possession of the land to Budh Singh.

3. In these circumstances the allegation on behalf of the respondent was that the two appellants had committed contempt of Court by disobeying the order of the High Court staying delivery of possession till May 23, 1958. The respondent made an application to the High Court for taking suitable action against the two appellants. This application was made on May 27,1958. On this application the High Court issued notice and after hearing the parties, Falshaw, J. (as he then was) who dealt with the application came to the conclusion that the two appellants were aware of the order of the High Court extending the operation of the stay order and yet they disobeyed the said order by dispossessing the respondent and handing over possession to Budh Singh. He held them guilty of contempt of Court, but at the same time expressed the opinion that the appellants honestly believed that they were not bound to hold their hands in the absence of

Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1962 Supreme(SC) 59

Cases Referred (1)