Vijai Pratap Singh And Ramjiwan Misir vs Dukh Haran Nath Singh

Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

1962 Supreme(SC) 15

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
S.K DAS, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J.C. SHAH, JJ.
1. Vijai Pratap Singh (In C. A. No. 253 of 61) and 2. Ramjiwan Misir (In C.A. No.254 of 61) Appellants
Versus
Dukh Haran Nath Singh and another (in both the appeals), Respondents.
Civil Appeals Nos. 253 and 254 of 1961.
19th January, 1962
Advocates appeared
M/s. S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, Advocates of M/s. Rajinder Narain and Co., for Appellant (In C. A. No. 253 of 61) and Respondent No. 2 (In C. A. No. 254 of 61) Mr. S. P. Varma Advocate for Appellant. In C. A. No. 254 of 61) and Respondent No. 2 (in C. A. No. 253 of 61) Mr. C. B. Agarwala, Senior Advocate, (Mr. C.P. Lal, Advocate, with him), for Respondent No. 1 (In both the appeals).

Advocates:
C.B.AGARWAL, C.P.LAL, P.L.VOHRA, RAJINDAR NARAIN, RAMESHWAR NATH ROY, S.N.ANDLEY, S.P.Varma

Headnote:PAUPER APPLICATION—REJECTION TO SUE IN FORMA PAUPERIS - SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY
       -it can be treated as a plaint on payment of full court-fee - Vijai Pratap v. Dukh Haran, AIR 1962 SC 941 and it shall be deemed to have been paid when the pauper application was filed - Vijai Pratap v. Dukh Haran, AIR 1962 SC 941; Jugal Kishore v. Dhanno Devi, AIR 1973 SC 2508.
       -where the application is not rejected on the grounds see out in this Rule, the Court has under Rule 6, proceed, after giving notice to the opposite party and the Government pleader, to receive evidence as the applicant may adduce in proof of his pauperism. By Rule 7, the Court is authorised to consider whether the applicant is not subject to any of the prohibitions specified in Rule 5. The Court is enjoined to reject a petition where the prohibition mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of rule 5 exist. Even if the petition is not so rejected at the hearing of the petition, if the Court is satisfied as to the existence of these prohibitions it may be dismissed under Rule 7 - Vijai Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, AIR 1962 SC 941. By the express terms of Rule 5(d) the Court is concerned to ascertain whether the allegations made in the petition show a cause of action. The Court has not to see whether the claim made by the petitioner is likely to succeed; it has merely to satisfy itself that the allegations made in the petition, if accepted as true, would entitled the petitioner to the relief it claims. If accepting those allegations, as true no case is made out for granting relief no cause of action would be shown and the petition must be rejected. But in ascertaining whether the petition shows a cause of action the court does not enter upon a trial of the issues affecting the merits of the claim made by the petitioner. It cannot take into consideration the defences which the defendant may raise upon the merits; nor is the court competent to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. If the allegations in the petition, prima facie, show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact, or whether the petitioner will succeed in the claims made by him. By the statute, the jurisdiction of the court is restricted to ascertaining whether on the allegations a cause of action is shown; the jurisdiction does not extend to trial of issues which must fairly be left for decision at the hearing of the suit.
       -where the application is not rejected on the grounds set out in Rule 5, the Court has under Rule 6, to proceed, after giving notice to the opposite-party and the Government Pleader, to receive evidence as the applicant may adduce in proof of his pauperism – Vijai Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, AIR 1962 SC 941 : (1962) Supp. (2) SCR. 675.
       -where the application is not rejected on the grounds set out in Rule 5, the Court has under Rule 6, to proceed, after giving notice to the opposite-party and the Government Pleader, to receive evidence as the applicant may adduce in proof of his pauperism. By Rule 7, the Court is authorised to consider whether the applicant is not subject to any of the prohibitions specified in Rule 5. The Court is enjoined to reject a petition where the probabilities enjoined in clauses (a) to (e) of Rule 5 exist. Even if the petition is not so rejected at the hearing of the petition, if the court is satisfied as to the existence of these probabilities it may be dismissed under Rule 7 - Vijai Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh,

Judgment

SHAH J. : Vijay Pratap Singh, (hereinafter called the plaintiff) - a minor - by his next friend Pandit Brij Mohan Misir filed a petition in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Faizabad, for leave to sue in forma pauperis for declaration of title to the Ajodhya Raj and accretions thereso and for possession and mesne profits for years prior to the suit. The petition was rejected by the Subordinate Judge because, in his view, it disclosed no cause of action. An application by Ramjiwan Misir - father of the plaintiff - who was impleaded as the second defendant, to be transposed as a petitioner was also rejected by the Subordinate Judge. The plaintiff and Ramjiwan Misir applied to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction against the orders rejecting their respective petitions but without success. They have with special leave appealed to this Court against the orders passby the High Court.

2. The case set up by the plaintiff in his petition was briefly this. Maharaja Sir Man Singh holder of the Ajodhya Raj was a Taluqdar in lists I, II and V of the Oudh Estates Act 1 of 1869. He died in 1870 and the Raj devolved upon his daughter s son Maharaja Pratap Narain Singh, who died on November 9, 1906 leaving him surviving two widows - Suraj Kumari and Jagdamba Devi - and no lineal descendant. A will alleged to be executed by Maharaja Pratap Narain Singh on July 20, 1891 was set up but it was void and ineffective because, firstly, it was procured by undue influence, coercion an fraud practised upon the testator, and, secondly, it created a line of succession contrary to law. Accordingly on the death of Maharaja Pratap Narain Singh the Raj devolved upon Maharani Suraj Kumari - the senior widow - and on her death in 1927 upon Maharani Jagdamba Devi, and on the death of the latter on June 18, 1928 upon Ganga Dutt Misir, grandfather of the plaintiff. Ganga Dutt Misir died in 1942 and the estate devolved upon his son Ramjiwan and his grandson, the plaintiff as co-parceners in a Hindu joint family. Even if the will was valid and effective "the terms thereof along with Maharaja Pratap Singh s other acts and declarations" had the effect of taking the estate out of the purview of Act I of 1869 with the result that Maharani Jagdamba Devi enjoyed the property in suit with a life estate therein, and on her death on June 18, 1938 the entire property in suit vested in Ganga Dutt on whose death the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 became owners of the entire property in suit as their joint ancestral property". Defendant No. 1 - Dukh Haran Singh - claimed to be adopted as a son by Jagdamba Devi on February 12, 1909 but the claim was "utterly false, fictitious and untrue" for the reasons set out in the partition, and the Raj was in the wrongful possession of the first defendant - Dukh Haran Singh.

3. We plaintiff alleged that his father Ramjiwan Misir was "detained and confined" by the first defendant and was unable to join the plaintiff in the petition.

4. The first defendant Dukh Haran Singh resisted the petition inter alia contending that it did not disclose a cause of action and that, in any event the claim made by the plaintiff was barred by the law of limitation.

5. Initially Ram Jiwan Misir supported the will and the plea of adoption set up by the first defendant, but by an application dated April 21, 1951 prayed that be transposed as a petitioner submitting that his previous statement was procured by coercion and contained averments which were untrue. Ramjiwan was directed to pay the court fee payable on the plaint within ten days and in default of payment, his application was to stand dismissed. Ramjiwan did not pay the court fee as directed but on July 23, 1951, he again applied for being transposed as a petitioner in the petition for leave to sue in forma pauperis file by the plaintiff. Holding that it did not disclose a cause of action the Subordinate Judge rejected the petition of the plaintiff.

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