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1962 Supreme(SC) 208

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
3rd May, 1962.
A.K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA RAO AND J.R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.
Dr. C. A. Cherian and another, Appellants
Versus
A. Menon and others, Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 426 of 1960.
Advocates appeared:
Mr. M. K. Nambyar Senior Advocate (Messrs. S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P L. Vohra Advocates, of M/s. Rajinder Narain & Co. with him) for Appellants; Mr A. V. Viswanath Sastri (Mr. Sardar Bahadur, Advocate, with him), for Respondents

A Karnavan's power of management can be restricted by a family karar and delegated to a Mukthiar, so long as the delegation is revocable and does not violate any recognized concept underlying the Marumakkatayam law.

Headnote:

MARUMAKKATAYAM LAW - KARNAVAN - POWER OF MANAGEMENT - DELEGATION - POWER OF ATTORNEY - VALIDITY - FAMILY KARAR - RESTRICTION ON KARNAVAN'S POWER - SALE OF TARWAD PROPERTY - NECESSITY - CONSENT OF MAJOR MEMBERS - MADRAS MARUMAKKATAYAM ACT, 1932, S. 33.

Fact of the Case:

A Karnavan of a Tarwad executed a power of attorney in favor of a junior member, authorizing him to manage the Tarwad property and to sell it for family necessity with the consent of the other adult members. The Mukthiar, along with the other adult members, sold a portion of the Tarwad property to the first defendant for Rs. 8,000/- to discharge a decretal debt of Rs. 5,250/-. The plaintiffs, being the Karnavan and two minor members of the Tarwad, filed a suit to set aside the sale deed, challenging its validity on various grounds, including the lack of Karnavan's consent and the inadequacy of consideration.

Finding of the Court:

The High Court held that the sale was justified on the grounds of necessity and that the consideration was adequate, but set aside the sale on the ground that the Karnavan had not joined in the execution of the sale deed. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision and upheld the validity of the sale.

Issues: 1. Whether a Karnavan can delegate his power of management to another person, including a junior member of the Tarwad, through a power of attorney. 2. Whether a family karar can restrict the Karnavan's power of management and authorize the delegation of such power to a Mukthiar. 3. Whether the sale of Tarwad property by the Mukthiar, with the consent of the other adult members, is valid and binding on the Tarwad, even if the Karnavan did not specifically consent to the sale.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. A Karnavan can delegate his power of management to another person, including a junior member of the Tarwad, through a power of attorney, provided that the delegation is revocable and does not amount to a transfer or renunciation of the Karnavan's office. 2. A family karar can restrict the Karnavan's power of management and authorize the delegation of such power to a Mukthiar, so long as the delegation is revocable and does not violate any recognized concept underlying the Marumakkatayam law. 3. The sale of Tarwad property by the Mukthiar, with the consent of the other adult members, is valid and binding on the Tarwad, even if the Karnavan did not specifically consent to the sale, provided that the sale was made in accordance with the terms of the power of attorney and the family karar, and that it was for family necessity.

Final Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's decree, upholding the validity of the sale of Tarwad property by the Mukthiar with the consent of the other adult members.

Judgment:

MUDHOLKAR, J.: This is an appeal from a decree of the High Court of Kerala by a certificate granted by it under Art. 133(1) of the Constitution.

2. The appeal arises out of a suit instituted by a Karnavan of a Tarwad along with two minor members of the Tarwad for setting aside a registered assignment deed (hereafter referred to as sale deed) executed by his Mukthiar Karunakara Menon, who is a junior member of the Tarwad and by all the other adult members of the Tarwad on 17-6-1117 (M.E.). We have not been able to ascertain the correct date according to the Gregorian Calendar; but it has been accepted before us that the document was executed in the month of Fcbruary,1942. Nothing however turns on the precise date of the execution of the document. This document is in fact a sale deed and thereunder certain property belonging to the Tarwad was sold to the first defendant to the suit, who is appellant No. 1 before us, for a consideration of Rs. 8,000/-. Out of the amount of Rs. 8,000/- a sum of Rs. 5,250/ was required for discharging the debt due under a mortgage decree against the Tarwad.

3. The grounds on which the sale is challenged by the plaintiffs are briefly these :

(1) That the sale outright of the suit properties for Rs. 8,000/- was not justified for satisfied the decretal debt of Rs. 5,250/- because the preveiling price of immovable property would be Rs. 40,000/- or so.

(2) That the sale was effected by a collusion between the first defendant and the third defendant Karunakara Menon who was the Mukthiar of the plaintiff No.1.

(3) That upon a proper construction of the power of attorney the Mukthiar could execute a sale deed only if the Karnavan in his discretion thought it to be necessary for meeting the pressing needs or for the benefit of the Tarwad to effect it and that as the Karnavan had not consented to the execution of the sale deed it is not binding upon the Tarwad.

(4) That if the power of attorney is construed as having vested in the third defendant with the discretion and judgment of the Karnavan regarding the necessity and expediency of alienating the Tarwad prosperity such a delegation is beyond the powers of the Karnavan and would be void and inoperative in law. An act purporting to be done under the colour of such authority is not valid and cannot bind the Tarwad.

(5) That the plaintiffs 2 and 3 were not represented by their legal guardian, that is, the Karnavan, and the purported representation by their mother the 5th defendant as their guardian is ineffective because she could not in law act as guardian in this transaction. The sale deed is, therefore, null and void.

(6) That the defendants 2, 4 and 5 who had joined in the sale deed had obviously done so on the footing that it was an intended conveyance of the rights of the Tarwad and that if the deed is not legally effective to pass the rights of the Tarwad as not being a valid act of the Karnavan, it cannot be regarded as having been intended to be executed by those three defendants. Further, that these defendants did not apply their minds to the propriety or necessity of the transaction but were merely misled by the statements and representation of the third defendant as to the necessity for executing the deed.

4. The transaction was challenged on three other minor grounds in the plaint but it is not necessary to refer to them because no arguments were advanced before us with regard to them.

5. The first defendant who is a woman doctor contended that the transaction was valid and operative and was not liable to be set aside on any of the grounds on which it was challenged by the plaintiffs. She contended that apart from the decretal debt there were other outstanding debts of the Tarwad which had to be satisfied and that the properties in the suit were attached in execution of a decree obtained against the Tarwad in some other suit. The defendant believed, after making due enquiry and on the faith of the representations made by the assignors, that the w






























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