Judgment

GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I.: (On behalf of himself and Wanchoo and Ayyangar JJ.)

The short question of law which arises for our decision in the present appeal is whether the proceeding before an Income-tax Officer under S. 37 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (No. XI of 1922) (hereinafter called the Act) can be said to be a proceeding in any court within the meaning of S. 195 (1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This question arises in this way. The appellant Lalji Haridas and respondent No. 2 Mulji Manilal Kamdar are businessmen and they carry on their business in Jamnagar and Bombay respectively. They have known each other for several years past in the course of their ordinary business activities. In the income-tax assessment proceedings of the appellant for the assessment years 1949-50 and 1950-51 respondent No. 2 gave evidence on oath before the Income-tax Officer, Ward A, Jamnagar on December, 4, 1958. In his evidence he denied that he had a son named Nihal Chand and that he had done any business in the name of M/s. Nihal Chand and Co. at Jamnagar. According to the appellant, the said statements were false to the knowledge of respondent No. 2 and were made by him to mislead the Income-tax Officer and to avoid the incidence of income-tax on himself. As a result of the said false statements, the appellant was heavily taxed.

2. On November 24, 1959, the appellant filed a criminal complaint against respondent No. 2 under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code (No. 452/S of 1959) in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Bombay. At the hearing of the said complaint, respondent No. 2 raised a preliminary objection that the learned Magistrate could not take cognizance of the said complaint, because the proceedings in which he was alleged to have made a false statement on oath were proceedings before a Court within the meaning of S. 195(1)(b) Cr. P. C., and since no complaint in writing had been made by the Court of the Income-tax Officer before which the said proceedings were conducted, the provisions of S. 195(1)(b) crated a bar against the competence of the appellant s complaint. The learned Presidency Magistrate held that the Income-tax Officer was not a Court within the meaning of S. 195 (1) (b), Cr. P. C., and so, he rejected the preliminary objection raised by respondent No. 2.

3. Against the said decision of the Presidency Magistrate, respondent No. 2 preferred a Criminal Revision Application (No. 1142 of 1960) before the Bombay High Court. The State of Maharashtra was impleaded as respondent No. 1 to the said Revisions Application. A Division Bench of the said High Court reversed the conclusion of the Presidency Magistrate and held that the Income-tax Officer was a Court within the meaning of S. 195(1)(b), Cr. P. C., and so, it upheld the preliminary objection raised by respondent No. 2. In the result, the complaint filed by the appellant was ordered to the dismissed. The appellant then applied for and obtained a certificate from the Bombay High Court under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution and it is with the said certificate that he has brought the present appeal before us. That is how the narrow question which arises for our decision in the present appeal is whether the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer are proceedings in any Court under S. 195(1)(b), Cr. P. C. The question thus raised is undoubtedly a short one, but its decision is not easy, because the arguments urged in support of the two respective constructions are fairly balanced and the task of preferring one construction to the other presents some difficulty.

4. The proceedings before the Income-tax Officer during which, according to the appellant respondent No. 2 made a false statement on oath, were held by the Income-tax Officer under S. 37 of the Act. Section 37(1) deals with the powers of Income-tax authorities and provides, inter alia, that the Income-tax Officer shall, for the purposes of the Act, have the same power