1. Employer seeking permission to dismiss workmen under cl. 29 of the Order issued under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Refusal of permission by Conciliation Officer. (Para 3 , 4 , 5 )
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1962 Supreme(SC) 300
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
25th September 1962
B.P. SINHA, C.J.I., P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA AND J.C. SHAH, JJ.
Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. Meerut (In both the Appeals), Appellants
Versus
Lakshmi Chand and others (In both the Appeals), Respondents.
Civil Appeals Nos. 37 and 38 of 1961.
Advocates appeared
Mr. Veda Vyasa, Senior Advocate, (M/s. S. K. Kapur, J. B. Dadachanji, Prem Nath Chaddah and Ganpat Rai, Advocates, with him), for Appellants (in both the Appeals); Mr. A. S. R. Chari, Senior Advocate, (Mrs. R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala and P. C. Agarwala, Advocates, with him), for Respondents (in both the appeals).
Advocates:
A.S.R.CHARI, GANPAT RAI, J.B.DADACHAN, P.C.AGRAWAL, PREM NATH CHADDAH, R.K.GARG, S.C.AGRAWAL, S.K.KAPOOR, Veda Vyasa
A.S.R.CHARI, GANPAT RAI, J.B.DADACHAN, P.C.AGRAWAL, PREM NATH CHADDAH, R.K.GARG, S.C.AGRAWAL, S.K.KAPOOR, Veda Vyasa
A Conciliation Officer, despite a duty to act judicially, is not a "tribunal" under Article 136 of the Constitution as they lack the judicial power of the State and "trappings of a court," nor an "authority" under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.
Headnote:(A) Constitution of India - Article 136 - Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 - Section 2(c) and Section 4 - State Industrial Disputes Act - Scope of "Tribunal" and "Authority" - An appeal under Article 136 lies against orders of courts or tribunals. A tribunal must be constituted by the State and invested with judicial functions as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions (Paras 18, 19). To be a tribunal, the authority must possess the "trappings of a court," such as the power to compel attendance of witnesses, examine them on oath, and follow fundamental rules of evidence (Paras 19, 20). A Conciliation Officer, while acting judicially in granting or refusing permission to dismiss employees, is not invested with the judicial power of the State and lacks the trappings of a court; therefore, such an officer is not a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 136 (Para 21).
(B) Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 - Section 2(c)(iii) - Definition of "Industrial Tribunal" - An "authority" under this section must be a body constituted for the purpose of adjudication of industrial disputes under a law made by a State. A Conciliation Officer's functions are purely incidental to industrial adjudication and does not deliver a definitive judgment affecting the rights of parties; thus, such an officer is not an "authority" under the Act (Para 23).
Facts of the case:
An employer sought permission from a Conciliation Officer to dismiss several workmen found guilty of sabotage and a slow-down strike during the pendency of an industrial dispute. The Conciliation Officer granted permission for some but refused for others. The employer challenged this refusal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, which held the appeal incompetent, and subsequently approached the Supreme Court via special leave.
Findings of Court:
The Conciliation Officer is required to act judicially but is not invested with the judicial power of the State nor possesses the trappings of a court. Consequently, the officer is neither a "tribunal" under Article 136 of the Constitution nor an "authority" under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.
Issues: Whether a direction issued by a Conciliation Officer is appealable under Article 136 of the Constitution and whether such an officer constitutes an "authority" under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.
Ratio Decidendi: For an authority to be a "tribunal" under Article 136, it must be invested with the judicial power of the State and exhibit the trappings of a court. A duty to act judicially alone is insufficient. Similarly, an "authority" under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act must be constituted for the adjudication of industrial disputes, not merely for incidental functions.
Result: Appeals dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- constitutional law
- administrative law
- labour law
- practice and procedure
Table of Contents
2. Maintainability of appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution and the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 — Status of Conciliation Officer as a tribunal or authority. (Para 5 , 6 )
3. Distinction between administrative and judicial functions — Requirement of judicial power of the State and trappings of a court to qualify as a tribunal under Article 136. (Para 8 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 )
4. An authority acting judicially is not a tribunal under Article 136 unless invested with the judicial power of the State and trappings of a court. (Para 15 , 19 , 21 )
5. Appeals dismissed — Direction of Conciliation Officer not subject to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution or the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. (Para 22 , 23 , 24 )
6. What distinguishes a judicial act from an administrative act?
A judicial act involves the application of objective standards to facts based on pre-existing legal rules, declares rights or imposes obligations, and follows procedural attributes like the opportunity to present a case and evidence. An administrative act depends on the subjective satisfaction of the authority. (Para 11 , 13 )
7. When does an authority that acts judicially qualify as a tribunal under Article 136 of the Constitution?
To be a tribunal under Article 136, an authority must not only act judicially but also be invested with the judicial power of the State, typically evidenced by trappings of a court, such as the power to compel witnesses and public sittings. (Para 15 , 18 , 19 , 20 )
8. Is a Conciliation Officer exercising powers to grant permission for dismissal a tribunal under Article 136?
No. While the officer must act judicially, he lacks the judicial power of the State and the trappings of a court. His order merely removes a statutory ban on the employer's common law right to dismiss. (Para 21 )
9. Does the Conciliation Officer qualify as an authority under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950?
No. An authority under Section 2(c)(iii) must be a body constituted for the adjudication of industrial disputes. The Conciliation Officer's functions are purely incidental to industrial adjudication and do not involve delivering definitive judgments. (Para 23 )
Judgment
SHAH, J. : Two questions arise in limine in these appeals:
1. Whether an appeal may be entertained in exercise of powers under Art. 136 of the Constitution against a direction of the Conciliation Officer issued in disposing of an application under cl. 29 of the Order promulgated by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; and
2. Whether against the direction issued by the Conciliation Officer exercising authority under cf. 29 of the Order an appeal lay to the Labour Appellate Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.
(2) It would be necessary to consider the merits of the appeal in the event of an affirmative answer on either of these questions.
3. Facts which have a bearing on the preliminary questions are briefly these:-
Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. hereinafter referred to as the company - owns factories at Meerut in the State of Uttar Pradesh for manufacturing sugar and straw boards. On December 13, 1935, the Company received a notice relating to demands for bonus, leave, retaining allowance etc. from the Action Committee of one of the Labour Unions of the workmen employed in the Sugar Factory. It is the case of the Company that on December 26, 1955 there was a meeting of the workmen and certain employees exhorted the workmen to resort to "direct action" and in pursuance thereof the workmen adopted a "slow-down strike" which resulted in great reduction in the operations of crushing sugurcane, and production of sugar. The company thereupon served charge-sheets upon sixty-three workmen charging them individually and collectively for doing acts calculated to destroy, the machinery of the factory and for deliberately adopting a policy of "go-slow" and refusing to attend work assigned to them as the pointed time.
4. The Enquiry Officer who investigated the charges against the delinquent workmen, by his order dated January 9, 1958 held that all the workmen were guilty of "sabotage and slow-down strike" and were therefore liable to be dismissed: But at that time a dispute relating to payment of bonus was pending before the Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Tribunal in which the Company and the workmen were concerned, and the conditions of service of the workmen could not, by virtue of. cl. 29 of the Order issued in 1954 by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, be altered, and the workmen could not be discharged without the previous permission of the Conciliation Officer.
5. An application was accordingly submitted by the Company to the Regional Conciliation Officer, Meerut, for permission to dismiss the workmen who were on the finding of the Enquiry Officer, concerned with "slow-down strike and other illegal tactics adopted by them with a view to cause loss to the Company. The Conciliation Officer granted permission in respect of only eleven workmen, for in his view, the remaining fifty-two workmen were more "passive participants in the go-slow compaign", and that it "would not be fair and justifiable to grant permission to dismiss those workmen from service". The company preferred an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow against the direction of the Conciliation Officer refusing to grant permission to dismiss fifty-two workmen, but the appeal was rejected, because in the view of the Appellate Tribunal the Conciliation Officer was not an "authority" within the meaning of S. 2(c) cl. (iii) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, and the appeal was therefore incompetent. The Company has, with special leave, preferred appeals against the direction of the Conciliation Officer, and the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The order of the-Conciliation Officer is challenged on the ground that in refusing permission to dismiss fifty-two workmen, the Conciliation Officer ignored the principles settled by this Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal in cases dealing with applications for granting permission t
