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1965 Supreme(SC) 91

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
19th March 1965
K.N. WANCHOO, J.R. MUDHOLKAR AND S.M. SIKRI, JJ.
Dr. Guranditta Mal Kapur, Appellant
Versus
Amar Dass Chela Mahant Ram Saran and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 471 of 1963.
Advocates Appeared
Mr. S. V. Gupte, Solicitor General of India (Mr. B. K. Khanna, Advocate and M/s. R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwal and M. K. Ramamurthi, Advocates of M/s. Ramamurthi & Co. with him), for Appellant; Mr. N. C. Chatterjee, Senior Advocate (Mr. M. S. Gupta, Advocate, with him), for Respondent No. 1; M/s. P. K. Chatterjee and R. H. Dhebar, Advocates, for Respondent No. 11.

Advocates:
B.K.Khanna, D.P.Singh, M.K.RAMAMURTHY, M.S.Gupta, N.C.CHATTERJI, P.K.CHATTERJI, R.H.Dhebar, R.K.GARG, S.C.AGRAWAL, S.V.Gupta

Adverse possession against an occupancy tenant commences when the landlord takes possession of the land and extinguishes the occupancy rights.

Headnote:

LIMITATION ACT - ADVERSE POSSESSION - OCCUPANCY TENANT - FORFEITURE OF OCCUPANCY RIGHTS - SUIT FOR POSSESSION BY SUCCESSOR OF OCCUPANCY TENANT - LIMITATION - COMMENCEMENT OF ADVERSE POSSESSION.

Fact of the Case:

Appellant, an owner of land, instituted a suit for possession against the respondent, the successor of the occupancy tenant, claiming that he had been in possession of the land for more than 12 years and that the occupancy rights had been extinguished by the decrees passed in the ejectment suits.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the appellant had acquired the proprietary rights in the property by operation of statute due to the extinguishment of the occupancy rights of the respondent's predecessor. The Court further held that the suit was barred by limitation as the appellant had been in adverse possession of the land for more than 12 years before the institution of the suit.

Issues: 1. Whether the appellant had acquired the proprietary rights in the property by operation of statute due to the extinguishment of the occupancy rights of the respondent's predecessor? 2. Whether the suit was barred by limitation as the appellant had been in adverse possession of the land for more than 12 years before the institution of the suit?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the occupancy rights of the respondent's predecessor were extinguished by the decrees passed in the ejectment suits and that the appellant had acquired the proprietary rights in the property by operation of statute. 2. The Court held that the suit was barred by limitation as the appellant had been in adverse possession of the land for more than 12 years before the institution of the suit. The Court rejected the respondent's contention that the adverse possession could not commence till he was appointed as Mahant, as there was always a person competent to institute a suit on behalf of the Akhara.

Final Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decrees of the courts below, and dismissed the suit of the respondent with costs in all the courts.

Judgement

MUDHOLKAR, J. : The short point which falls to be considered in this appeal by special leave from a judgment of the High Court of Punjab dismissing the appellant s appeal in limine is whether the suit for possession instituted by the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 is within time. There are ten respondents to the appeal out of whom only two, the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 Amardas and respondent No. 11 Union of India are represented. While the appeal is contested by the first respondent it is supported by the Union of India. The facts which are not disputed before us are briefly these :

2. The appellant has a share of 122 1/2 / 143 1/2 in the land in suit. The occupancy tenant of this land is Akhara Nirbansar of Sultanwind Gate, Amritsar. The second respondent Ram Saran Das was Mahant of this Akhara till the year 1950 when he was removed by virtue of an order made by a civil Court in a suit under S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure confirmed in appeal on September 11, 1950. On December 29, 1953 respondent No. 1 was appointed as Mahant in place of respondent No. 2.

3. On September 15, 1939 the appellant instituted a suit in a revenue court under Ss. 38 and 39 of the Punjab Tenancy Act (hereafter referred to as the Act) for possession of 141 kanals 8 marlas of land on the ground that he had granted a sub-lease thereof for the manufacture of bricks to someone by utilising earth dug up from that land. This, according to the appellant, was in contravention of the provisions of S. 39 of the Act and entitled him to eject respondent No. 2. The Revenue Court held that out of the land sub-leased by respondent No. 2 only a certain portion was dug up by the sub-lessee and, therefore, the ejectment of the second respondent was confined to that area of land which had been dug up. The date of the ejectment decree was June 3, 1940. The second respondent preferred an appeal before the Collector from that decree which was dismissed on October 19, 1940. Shortly thereafter the appellant obtained possession of the land from which the second respondent was ordered to be ejected. The lessee of the second respondent however, continued to dig up the rest of the land and, therefore, the appellant instituted a second suit for the ejectment of the second respondent therefrom. The Assistant Collector who tried the suit granted a decree to the appellant in respect of the entire land which was left with the second respondent after he was dispossessed from apart of the land leased to him under the earlier decree. In appeal, however, the Collector modified the order of ejectment by leaving out of the land 29 kanals and 14 marlas. This order was made on May 31, 1943. Shortly thereafter the appellant obtained possession of the land with respect to which the Collector had confirmed the order of ejectment in the appeal.

4. On March 18, 1957 the first respondent instituted a suit against the appellant and the second respondent. According to respondent No. 1 Akhara Nirbansar was not bound by the actions of Mahant Ram Saran Das, the second respondent, which were tantamount to alienation of the land which, according to him, were neither for legal necessity nor for the benefit of the estate. He contended that on the contrary the action of Ram Saran Das in alienating the land was unauthorised and illegal and because what he did was not for legal necessity nor for conferring any benefit on the estate.

5. The appellant contested the suit on two main grounds. The first was that the land in question was never attached to the Akhara but that Mahant Ram Saran Das, the second respondent, was its occupancy tenant and that as the sub-lessee of the land had dug it up and rendered it unfit for cultivation the appellant as the owner of the land was entitled to eject respondent No. 2 by forfeiting the lease. He denied that the land was wakf property and contended that the occupancy rights existing in favour of the second respondent were extinguished by the orders of the revenue cou














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