A confessional first information report given by an accused is not admissible in evidence against him, except to the extent that the ban of S. 25 of the Evidence Act is lifted by S. 27.

Headnote:
CRIMINAL LAW - CONFESSION - FIRST INFORMATION REPORT - ADMISSIBILITY - S. 25 OF THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 - CONFESSION MADE TO A POLICE OFFICER - ABSOLUTE BAN - NO PART OF THE CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT RECEIVABLE IN EVIDENCE EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE BAN OF S. 25 IS LIFTED BY S. 27.
Fact of the Case:

The appellant was charged under S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code for murdering his aunt Ratni, her daughter, Chamin, her son-in-law. Somra and Dilu, son of Somra. He was convicted and sentenced to death by the Judicial Commissioner of Chotanagpur. The High Court of Patna accepted the death reference, confirmed the conviction and sentence and dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant. The appellant now appeals to this Court by special leave.
Finding of the Court:

The entire first information report must be excluded from evidence, save and except parts 1, 15 and 18 identifying the appeal land as the maker of the first information report and save and except the portions coming within the purview of S. 27.
Issues: Whether the first information report given by the accused to a police officer and amounts to a confessional statement, proof of the confession is prohibited by S. 25.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 25 of the Evidence Act is one of the provisions of law dealing with confessions made by an accused. 2. A confession made to a police officer under any circumstances is not admissible in evidence against the accused. 3. The expression "accused of any offence" covers a person accused of an offence at the trial whether or not he was accused of the offence when he made the confession. 4. Section 26 prohibits proof against any person of a confession made by him in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. 5. Section 27 is the form of a proviso, and partially lifts the ban imposed by Ss. 24, 25 and 26. 6. A confession may consist of several parts and may reveal not only the actual commission of the crime but also the motive the preparation, the opportunity, the provocation the weapons used, the intention, the concealment of the weapon and the subsequent conduct of the accused. 7. If the confession is tainted the taint attaches to each part of it. 8. If a statement contains an admission of an offence, not only that admission but also every other admission of an incriminating fact contained in the statement is part of the confession. 9. If the confession is caused by an inducement, threat or promise as contemplated by S. 24 of the Evidence Act, the whole of the confession is excluded by S. 24. 10. Similarly, Ss. 25 and 26 bar not only proof of admission of an offence by an accused to a police officer or made by him while in the custody of a police officer but also admissions contained in the confessional statement of all incriminating facts related to the offence. 11. If the first information report is given by the accused to a police officer and amounts to a confessional statement, proof of the confession is prohibited by S. 25. 12. The confession includes not only the admission of the offence but all other admissions of incriminating facts related to the offence contained in the confessional statement. 13. No part of the confessional statement is receivable in evidence except to the extent that the ban of S. 25 is lifted by S. 27.
Final Decision: Appeal allowed. Conviction and sentence passed by the Courts below are set aside, and the appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith.

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points:

A confessional first information report (FIR) given by an accused to the police is generally not admissible as evidence against him, except to the extent that the protections of Section 25 of the Evidence Act are lifted by Section 27 (!) (!) .
Section 25 of the Evidence Act prohibits proof of confessions made to police officers, covering any circumstances under which such a confession is made, regardless of whether the accused was in police custody at the time (!) .
Section 26 further restricts proof of confessions made in police custody unless the confession is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, but it does not override the absolute ban imposed by Section 25 on confessions to police officers (!) .
Section 27 provides a partial exception, allowing certain information received from an accused in police custody to be proved if it distinctly relates to a fact discovered as a consequence of that information (!) .
The law emphasizes that a confession can include multiple parts, revealing not only the commission of the crime but also motives, opportunities, preparation, weapons used, and subsequent conduct. If any part of the confession is tainted, the taint applies to all parts (!) (!) .
Each part of a confessional statement that discloses incriminating facts is considered part of the confession, and proof of any part that is protected by law (such as under Sections 24, 25, or 26) is generally barred unless Section 27 applies (!) (!) .
The entire confessional statement, including admissions of minor incriminating facts, must be excluded if it is tainted or if its admissibility is barred by law, unless Section 27 permits its use (!) .
A statement or confession must either explicitly admit the offence or substantially include all facts constituting the offence to be considered a confession. Self-exculpatory statements do not amount to confessions (!) (!) .
The definition of a confession involves an admission made by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting that he committed it. It must contain either an explicit admission of the offence or all essential facts that constitute the offence (!) (!) .
The law prohibits the separation of parts of a confession; each part that reveals incriminating facts is integral to the whole and cannot be admitted in isolation if it is protected by law (!) .
The application of Section 27 is limited to information received from an accused in police custody, and whether a person giving information to police is deemed to be in custody under this section can be complex and is subject to judicial interpretation (!) .
Overall, unless the protections of Sections 24, 25, or 26 are lifted by Section 27, or the information falls outside the scope of these sections, confessional statements or FIRs given by an accused to the police are inadmissible as evidence against him (!) (!) (!) .
The law underscores that an FIR or confession must be carefully scrutinized to determine its admissibility, especially considering the protections afforded to accused persons during police investigations (!) .
The final decision in the case was to set aside the conviction and sentence, and the appellant was to be released, primarily because the confessional statement or FIR was inadmissible under the relevant legal provisions (!) .

Please let me know if you need a more detailed explanation or assistance with any specific aspect.

Judgement

BACHAWAT, J.: The appellant was charged under S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code for murdering his aunt Ratni, her daughter, Chamin, her son-in-law. Somra and Dilu, son of Somra. He was convicted and sentenced to death by the Judicial Commissioner of Chotanagpur. The High Court of Patna accepted the death reference, confirmed the conviction and sentence and dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant. The appellant now appeals to this Court by special leave.

2. The prosecution case is that on August 11, 1963 between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m. the appellant murdered Somra in a forest known as Dungijharan Hills and later Chamin in Kesari Garha field and then Ratni and Dilu in the house of Ratni at village Jamtoli.

3. The first information of the offences was lodged by the appellant himself at police station Palkot on August 11, 1963 at 3-15 p.m. The information was reduced to writing by the officer-in-charge. Sub-Inspector H. P. Choudhury, and the appellant affixed his left thumb impression on the report. The Sub-Inspector immediately took cognisance of the offence, and arrested the appellant. The next day, the Sub-Inspector in the company of the appellant went to the house of Ratni, where the appellant pointed out the dead bodies of Ratni and Dilu and also a place in the orchard of Ratni covered with bushes and grass, where he had concealed a tangi. The appellant then took the Sub-Inspector and witnesses to Kasiari garha khet and pointed out the dead body of Chamin lying in a ditch covered with Ghunghu. The appellant then took the Sub-Inspector and the witnesses by Dungijharan Hills, where the pointed out the dead body of Somra lying in the slope of the hills to the north. The Sub-Inspector also recovered the appellant s house a chadar stained with human blood. The evidence of P. W. 6 shows that the appellant had gone to the forest on the morning of August 11, 1963.

4. The medical evidence discloses incised wounds on all the dead bodies. The injuries were caused by a sharp-cutting weapon such as a tangi. All the four persons were brutally murdered.

5. There is no eye-witness to the murders. The principal evidence against the appellant consists of the first information report, which contains a full confession of guilt by the appellant. If this report is excluded, the other evidence on the record is insufficient to convict the appellant. The principal question in the appeal is whether the statement or any portion of it is admissible in evidence.

6. The first information report reads as follows:

"My name is Aghnu Nagesia, (1) My father s name is Lodhi Nagesia. I am a resident of Lotwa, Tola Jamtoli, thana Palkot, district Ranchi. Today, Sunday, date not known, at about 3 p.m. I having come to the P. S. make statement before you the S.I. of Police, (2) That on account of my Barima (aunt) Mussammat having given away her property to her daughter and son-in-law quarrels and troubles have been occurring among us. My Barima has no son and she is a widow. Hence on her death we shall be owners of her lands and properties and daughter and son-in-law of Barima shall have no right to them. She lives separate from us, and lives in her house with her daughter and son-in-law and I live with my brother separately in my house. Our lands are separate from the time of our father. (3) Today in the morning at about 7-8 a.m. I had gone with a tangi to Duni Jharan Pahar to cut shrubs for fencing. I found Somra sitting alone there who was grazing cattle there. (4) Seeing him I got enraged and dealt him a tangi blow on the filli (calf) of right leg, whereby he toppled down on the ground. Thereupon I dealt him several Chheo (blows) on the head and the face, with the result that he became speechless and died. At that time there was none near about on that Pahar. (5) Thereafter I came to the Kesari Garu field where Somra s wife Chamin was weeding out grass in the field. (6) I struck her also all of a sudden on the head with the said tangi whereby she dropped dow

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1965 Supreme(SC) 151

A confessional first information report given by an accused is not admissible in evidence against him, except to the extent that the ban of S. 25 of the Evidence Act is lifted by S. 27.

Cases Referred (4)