The court emphasized that the penalties were imposed for offences under the Act only and interpreted the words 'second offence' to mean any offence under the Act committed by a person after his conviction earlier for any one of the offences punishable under the Act.

Judgement

SARKAR, J. : This appeal raises a question of construction of sub-s. (1) of S. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The sub-section in providing for punishment for breaches of the Act states, "for a second offence, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and with fine". In respect of the first offence it provides for a smaller sentence. The question is whether the appellant was liable to punishment for a second offence. The order of this Court granting leave to appeal confined it only to that question.

2. It appears that on an earlier occasion the appellant kept foodstuffs for sale in a container without covering it as required by sub-r. (3) of R. 49 of the rules made under the Act and was thereupon convicted under S. 16 and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 40 as for a first offence. This time he has been convicted for selling foodstuff which had been coloured with a dye the use of which was prohibited by Rs. 28 of the same rules.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant stated that the present was not a second offence. If we have understood his arguments correctly, and we confess to some difficulty in understanding them, he said that the second offence contemplated is an offence constituted by the same kind or type of act for which he had been convicted under the Act on an earlier occasion. According to him, if the present conviction was for keeping foodstuff intended for sale in a container not covered as required by sub-r. (3) of R. 49, then only it would have been for a second offence, but as the conviction in the present case was for selling foodstuff coloured with prohibited dye, it was not for a second offence.

4. This contention does not seem to us to be acceptable. The real question is, what do the words second offence mean? Learned counsel for the appellant referred us to Webster s New World Dictionary where one of the meanings of the word second has been stated to be of the same kind as another . That meaning cannot be attributed to that word in the sub-section. It increases the penalties as the offences are first , second or third . Thus it states, "for a third and subsequent offences, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to four years and with fine". The word subsequent makes it clear that the words first second and third were intended to indicate things happening one after another in point of time. Sub-section (2) of S. 16 also leads to the same conclusion. It says, "If any person convicted of an offence under this Act commits a like offence afterwards", the subsequent conviction and the penalty imposed with his name and address may be published in a newspaper at his expense. The word "afterwards" clearly indicates that the statute was contemplating offences committed subsequently and was indicating a sequence of time. In the dictionary to which learned counsel referred, the meaning on which he relies is illustrated by the following sentence, "There has been no second Shakespeare". It seems plain to us that the meaning conveyed by the word second in this sentence cannot be attributed to the word second as used in the sub-section.

5. Then as regards the word "offence" in the expression "second offence", we find no justification for confining it to an offence constituted by the same type or kind of conduct as the previous offence. The sub-section does not say "second offence" of the same type; the latter words are not there. The object of the sub-section clearly is to prevent repetition of offences. That is why for the offence subsequently committed a heavier sentence is provided. We cannot imagine what object would have been served by seeking to stop the repetition of the same type of conduct only. The Act no doubt intends to prevent the doing of various acts by punishing them. That object is better served by imposing a heavier penalty when a person repeats any of such offensive acts. The gravamen of the charge of a second offence is the repetition of any