Judgement

SUBBA RAO, J. : This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the Punjab High Court confirming that of the Subordinate Judge, Delhi, striking out the defence of the appellant under S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, hereinafter called the Code.

2. Kanhaya Lal Bhargava, the 1st respondent, filed a suit on April 27, 1962, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Delhi, against Messrs Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills Private Limited, the appellant, and one Ram Sarup for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 45,112.94. Pending the suit, on October 27, 1964, the 1st respondent filed an application in the said Court under O. XI, R. 21 of the Code, read with O. XXIX. R. 3, thereof for striking off the defence or in the alternative for directing Jugal Kishore, a director of the Appellant-company, to appear in Court on December 14, 1964. On December 3, 1964, the Court made an order therein directing the said Jugal Kishore to be present in Court on December 14, 1964, to answer material questions relating to the suit. The appellant took a number of adjournments to produce the said Jugal Kishore on the ground that the latter was ill. On February 3, 1965, the Court gave the appellant a final opportunity to produce the said Jugal Kishore. Even so, the appellant took two more adjournments to produce him, but did not do so on the ground that he was ill. Finally on February 25, 1965, the Court issued a notice to the 1st defendant, appellant herein, to show cause why his defence should not be struck off. On March 16, 1965, after hearing the arguments the Court held that Jugal Kishore had failed to comply with the orders of the Court and was persistent in his default in spite of chances given to him; and on that finding, it struck off the defence of the appellant. The High Court, on revision, held that Jugal Kishore did not appear in Court in spite of orders to that effect and that the learned Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to strike out the defence of the appellant. It further negative the contention of the appellant that it was not in its power to compel Jugal Kishore was appear in Court on the ground that he was the director of the company and was under its control and, therefore, the appellant company could not be heard to say that one of the directors did not obey the orders of the Court. Hence the present appeal.

3. The argument of Mr. S. N. Andley, learned counsel for the appellant, may be briefly stated thus: The Code of Civil Procedure provides express power for a Court to strike out defence against a party under specified circumstances and, therefore, Section 151 thereof cannot be invoked to strike out the defence in other circumstances, for to do so will be to override the provisions of the Code. Order XXIX, R. 3 of the Code does not empower the Court to require the personal appearance of a director other than a director who signed and verified the pleading within the meaning of O. XXIX, R. 1, thereof.

4. Mr. Sen, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that the Court had ample jurisdiction to strike out the defence of a party if he was guilty of abuse of the process of the Court. In the instant case, he contended, Jugal Kishore, one of the permanent directors of the appellant-company had adopted a recalcitrant attitude in defying the orders of the Court to be present for interrogation and, therefore, the Subordinate Judge rightly, after giving every opportunity for him to be present, struck off the appellant s defence.

5. Section 151 of the Code reads:

"Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court."

The words of the section appear to be rather wide. But the decisions of this Court, by construction, limited the scope of the said section. In Padam Sen v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1961) 1 SCR 884 at p. 887, the question raise