1. Application for directions to sell trust cattle and lease trust lands for economy — Dispute over jurisdiction under Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure. (Para 1 , 3 , 4 )
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1965 Supreme(SC) 245
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.I., K.N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH AND S.M. SIKRI, JJ.
Chairman Madappa, Appellant
Versus
M.N. Mahanthadevaru and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 957 of 1963. 879
Advocates appeared
M/s. V. Krishnamurti and R. Gopalakrishnan, Advocates, for Appellant, Mr. B. D. Jain, Advocate, for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
Section 92(1)(f) of the CPC does not prohibit trustees or managers from performing ordinary administration of trust property, nor does it invalidate scheme provisions allowing the court to give administrative directions without a formal suit under Section 92.
Headnote:(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 92(1)(f) - Public Trust - Ordinary administration of trust property - Jurisdiction of Court to give directions under a settled scheme - Whether a separate suit under Section 92 is necessary for acts of ordinary administration such as sale of cattle and leasing of lands - Section 92(1)(f) does not circumscribe the right of trustees or managers to carry out ordinary administration for the benefit of the trust (Paras 10, 11).
(B) Settlement of Scheme - Power to seek directions - If a scheme provides for seeking directions from the Court for its carrying out, such directions for ordinary administration can be obtained without filing a separate suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras 6, 9).
Facts of the case:
A scheme for the management of a religious institution provided that managers could apply to the District Court for directions to carry out the scheme. One manager applied for the sale of cattle and the leasing of lands to increase income and reduce expenditure. The other manager objected, contending that such orders could only be passed in a suit filed under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, specifically Clause (f) of Section 92(1).
Findings of Court:
The court found that the directions sought were in the nature of ordinary administration of the trust. The provisions of the scheme explicitly allowed for seeking directions from the court, and such directions do not violate the procedure prescribed under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Issues: Whether the court had jurisdiction to give directions for the sale of cattle and leasing of lands under the provisions of the management scheme, or whether a formal suit under Section 92(1)(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure was mandatory.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 92(1)(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allows the court to authorize the sale or lease of trust property, is intended to provide court authority where prohibitions exist or administration requires general improvement; it does not limit the power of trustees or managers to perform acts of ordinary administration for the trust's benefit. Where a scheme specifically allows for court directions to facilitate administration, such directions can be sought and granted without a full suit under Section 92.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
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2. Whether the court had jurisdiction to grant directions for ordinary administration under the trust scheme or if a separate suit under Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure was mandatory. (Para 2 , 4 , 5 )
3. Directions for ordinary administration, such as selling movable property or leasing land to maximize income, fall within the court's power if reserved by the trust scheme. (Para 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 )
4. Section 92(1)(f), Code of Civil Procedure does not curtail the power of trustees to perform ordinary administration or the court to give directions under a trust scheme. (Para 10 , 11 )
5. Appeal dismissed; the lower court's jurisdiction to provide directions for the ordinary administration of the trust was upheld. (Para 12 )
6. Can a trust scheme provide for modifications or directions without a separate suit under Section 92 CPC?
Yes. A suit for settling a scheme is analogous to an administration suit. If the scheme contains a clause allowing modifications or directions for administration, such requests can be made via application without the necessity of a separate suit under Section 92. (Para 6 )
7. Does Section 92(1)(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure prohibit trustees from carrying out ordinary administration of trust property?
No. Section 92(1)(f) does not circumscribe the right of trustees or managers to perform ordinary administration, such as selling movable property or leasing land for the trust's benefit, as requiring a suit for every such act would make administration impossible. (Para 10 , 11 )
8. What is the purpose of the relief provided under Section 92(1)(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure?
It is intended to provide court authority for the lease, sale, mortgage, or exchange of trust property in situations where there may be a prohibition in the trust deed or other circumstances requiring court sanction. (Para 11 )
Judgment
WANCHOO, J.: This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Mysore High Court. Brief facts necessary for present purposes are these. There is a muth in village Devanur. A suit was brought in 1942 under S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code for framing a scheme for the management of the muth. A decree was passed on March 17,1948 by the High Court by which a scheme was settled and two persons were appointed as joint managers thereunder. In 1959 the two managers were the appellant Madappa who was the chairman and the respondent Mahanthadevaru. On May 12, 1959, respondent made an application to the Additional District Judge, Mysore in which he said that there were more than 100 heads of cattle, belonging to the muth. But the estimated income of the properties was barely sufficient to meet the cost of worship of the deity and that no funds were available to maintain the cattle. He also said that it was unnecessary and expensive to incur the feeding charges and pay for the staff needed to take care of the cattle. He therefore, prayed for an order for the sale of cattle as a measure of economy and practical utility. Further it appears that there were some lands belonging to the muth, which were being cultivated through servants. It was suggested in this application that the lands might be leased out for cultivation for one. year by public auction for cash consideration in order to increase the income of the muth.
2. On this application, notice was issued to the appellant. He objected that the application had been made without consulting him. He also objected to the sale of the cattle, his reason being that their upkeep did not involve any expenditure and that they were necessary for the supply of milk to the muth and also as the chief source of manure for the lands. He also added that it would be sacrilegious to sell them away. He further objected to the leasing out of the lands of the muth year by year on the ground that according to the existing practice, lands of the muth were being cultivated and the crops harvested by the people of the village and there was no expenditure to the muth in that behalf. It appears that thereafter there were consultations between the two mangers in order to meet the charge that the respondent had not consulted the appellant before making the application. But the two mangers were unable to agree.
3. Thereupon the Additional District Judge heard both parties and by his order dated June 7, 1960, directed that keeping hundreds of cattle with no proper arrangements to look after them would result in great loss to the muth. He therefore, ordered that ten milch cows might be retained for the use of the muth for the purpose of milk and the remainder sold by public auction. As to cultivation of lands, the Additional District Judge was of the view that by the methods of carrying on cultivation with the co-operation of villagers the muth stood to lose. He, therefore, ordered that the right of cultivation of lands belonging to the muth be sold for cash from year to year.
4. Thereupon the appellant went in revision to the High Court. Apart from challenging the correctness of the order made by the Additional District Judge, the appellant further confended that the Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to make such an order in view of provisions of S. 92 (1), Cl. (f) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court held in view of paragraphs (11) and (12) in the scheme that the Additional District Judge had jurisdiction to pass the order which he did. Further it refused to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Additional District Judge in the matter. The appellant then obtained special leave from this Court; and that is how the matter has come up before us.
5. The only point urged on behalf of the appellant is that in view of S. 92 (1), Cl. (f) of the Code of Civil Procedure the Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to make the order which he did. The respondent on the other h
