Judgment

SHELAT, J.- Prior to August 1953, the respondent was employed as a motor driver in Airways (India) Ltd. On the passing of the Air Corporation Act XXVII of 1953, and consequent thereupon of the taking over of the existing air companies including the Airways (India) Ltd., by the appellant-Corporation, he became the employee of the appellant-Corporation. On January 13, 1956, he was suspended on certain charges. On being found guilty of those charges after an enquiry had been held, he was dismissed by an order dated February 6, 1956.

2. The respondent filed a suit alleging that the enquiry had been conducted in breach of the procedure laid down by the Regulations made by the Corporation under Section 45 of the Act and that therefore, the dismissal was illegal and void. The Trial Court accepted the contention and granted a declaration that his service continued as the order dismissing him was null and void. That decree was upheld by the first appellate court. In a second appeal in the High Court, it was conceded that the Regulations apprised to the respondent s case, and that the procedure therein laid down for terminating his service was not complied with. The Corporation s contention however, was that the only relief to which the respondent was entitled to was damages and that a declaration such as the one granted by the Trial Court, could not be given. The High Court rejected that contention holding that the Corporation was under a statutory obligation to observe the procedure laid down in the Regulations and that that not having been done, the order of dismissal was illegal and void, and the respondent continued to be in the employment of the Corporation as if there was no termination of service. This appeal, founded on a certificate granted by the High Court is directed against its aforesaid judgment and decree.

3. It being an admitted fact that the respondent s service was terminated in breach of the procedural safeguards provided in the Regulations the question for determination whether in cases such as the one before us, a declaration; given by the Trial Court and upheld by the High Court could be granted.

4. It is a well settled principle that when there is a purported termination of a contract of service, a declaration, that the contract of service still subsisted, would not be made in the absence of special circumstances because of the principle that Courts do not ordinarily grant specific performance of service. This so even in cases when the authority appointing an employee was acting in exercise statutory authority. The relationship between the person appointed and the employer would in such cures be contractual, i.e. as between a master and servant, and the termination of that relationship would not entitle the servant to a declaration that his employment had not been validly determined. (See A. Francis v. Municipal Councilors of Kuala Lumpur, (1962 ) 3 All ER 633 and Barber v. Manchester Regional Hospital Board,(1958 ) 1 All ER 322).

5. "Cases of dismissal fall into three classes" said Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40 at p. 65 firstly, dismissal of a servant by his master, secondly, dismissal from office held during pleasure, and thirdly the dismissal from office where there must be something against a man to warrant his dismissal. It is in the third category of cases that an employee cannot be dismissed without first letting him know what is alleged against him and hearing his defence or explanation. He added that in a case of purely master and servant relationship the servant is not entitled to say that he was not by his master before his dismissal. Such a question of being heard or not can only arise where the authority employing the servant is under some statutory or other restriction as to the kind of contract which it can make with its servants or the grounds on which it can dismiss them. The question therfore, would be whether the relationship between the Corporation and the respondent was anyth