Judgment

BEG, J.:- This is an appeal under Sec. 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The appellant s election, held on 11-4-1970, to the Madras Legislative Council from the Madras District Graduates Constituency was set aside by a learned Judge of the Madras High Court who decided all the issues except one in favour of the appellant. The only issue decided against the appellant, which is now before us, was framed as follows:

"Whether the first Respondent was not qualified to stand for election to the Graduates Constituency on all or any of the ground set out by the petitioner in paragraphs 7 to 9 of the election Petition ?"

2. Paragraph 7 to 9 of the election petition against the appellant are lengthy, prolix and argumentative. The case and the contentions of the Respondent G. Panneerselvam, the petitioner before the High Court, which were accepted by the High Court, may be summarised as follows:

3. Firstly the whole purpose of Article 171 of the Constitution was to confer a right of "functional representation" upon persons possessing certain educational or other qualifications so that the Appellant Narayanaswami, who had only passed the High School Leaving Examination and was not a Graduate, could not be elected as all to the Legislative Council from the Graduates Constituency; secondly, it would be absurd and destructive of the very concept of representation of especially qualified persons that an individual who does not possess the essential or basic qualification of the electors should be representative of those who are to be represented because of this special qualification of theirs; and thirdly, the Constitution, being an organic instrument for the goverance of the land must be interpreted in a particularly broad and liberal manner so as to give effect to the underlying principles and purposes of the system of representation sought to be set up by it and not in such a way as to defect them. Hence, the educational qualification of the electors should be read into the system of representation set up by the Constitution for Legislative Councils as a necessary qualification of candidates in such constituencies.

4. Authorities are certainly not wanting which indicate that Courts should interpret in a broad and generous spirit the document which contains the fundamental law of the land or the basic principles of its Government. Nevertheless, the rule of "plain meaning" or "literal" interpretation, described in Maxwell s Interpretation of Statutes as "the primary rule", could not be altogether abandoned today in interpreting any document. Indeed, we find Lord Evershed, M. R. saying: "The length and detail of modern legislation, has undoubtedly reinforced the claim of literal construction as the only safe rule". (See Maxwell on "Interpretation of Statutes" 12th Edition p. 28). It may be that the great mass of modern legislation, a large part of which consists of statutory rules, makes some departure from the literal rule of interpretation more easily justifiable today than it was in the past. But the object of interpretation and of "construction" (which may be broader than "interpretation") is to discover the intention of the law makers in every case (See: Crawford on "Statutory Construction" 1940 Ed para 157, pp. 240-242). This object can, obviously, be best achieved by first looking at the language used in the relevant provisions. Other methods of extracting the meaning can be resorted to only if the language used is contradictory, ambiguous, or leads really to absurd results. This is an elementary and basic rule of interpretation as well as of construction processes which, from the point of view of principles applied, coalesce and converge towards the common purpose of both which is to get at the real sense and meaning, so far as it may be reasonably possible to do this, of what is found laid down. The provisions whose meaning is under consideration have, therefore, to be examined before applying any method of