SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
M.H. BEG AND Y.V. CHANDRACHUD JJ.
Ram Jag and others, Appellants
Versus
The State of U.P., Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No. 110 of 1970, D/- 21-12-1973.
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 147, 149, 302, 325 and 323 - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 136 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 404, 410, 417, 418, 422 and 423 - Murder Offence - Illicit Intimacy – Appeal Against Conviction - Whether High Court was right in accepting evidence of three eye-witnesses and therefore this Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 136 of Constitution ought not to re-appreciate that evidence in order to determine whether it can sustain conviction of appellants - Whether High Court is dealing with one class of appeals or other it must equally have regard to fundamental principles of Criminal Jurisprudence that unless statute provides to contrary - Whether High Court has applied principles correctly - Whether First Information Report was lodged after an undue delay so as to afford enough scope for manipulating evidence - Whether delay is so long as to throw a cloud of suspicion on seeds of prosecution case must depend upon a variety of factors which would vary from case to case - Whether there was delay in filing First Information Report is of a different order - Whether view taken by Sessions Court in regard to presence of Ram Shanker was not a reasonable view to take – Held, High Court also failed to appreciate true implication of Rampher s evidence in Sessions Court that assailants were dacoits or Looteras and that they had searched his pockets as well as pockets of his companions - Appellants are alleged to have assaulted Hausla Prasad and his companions not with motive of thieving but for alleged motive that Hausla Prasad was in illicit intimacy with Sheshkali, daughter of Gaya Prasad who was principal accused but who died during proceedings - If that be true motive, it is hardly likely that Gaya Prasad and his companions would search pockets of Rampher and his troupe - In concluding portion of its judgment High Court has observed that injured persons must have been present at spot and as occurrence took place in "broad day-light", there was no reason why their evidence should not be accepted, "even though they might have one reason or other to falsely implicate one or other to be accused"- It was wrong to conclude that incident had taken place in broad day-light and it was even more wrong that High Court did not warn itself of danger of accepting evidence of witnesses who had reasons to implicate appellants falsely - High Court was not justified in interfering with order of acquittal passed by learned Sessions Judge - Appeal allowed.
Judgment
CHANDRACHUD, J. :- The appellants, eleven in all, were acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge Gonda, but the order of acquittal was set aside in appeal by the High Court of Allahabad (Lucknow Bench). The High Court has convicted the appellants under Section 302, 325 and 323 read with Section 149 and under Section 147 of the Penal Code. They have been sentenced of life imprisonment for the offence of murder and to shorter terms for the other offences is directed against that judgment. The charge against the appellants is that on the evening of September 17, 1966 they formed an unlawful assembly and in prosecution of the common object of that assembly they caused the death of Hausla Prasad and injuries to Rampher, Dwarika and Lakhu.
2. On September 17, 1966 which was a Kajri Tij day Rampher and the deceased Hausla Prasad had gone to a temple which is at a distance of about 8 miles from the village of Jhampur where they lived. They left the temple late in the afternoon along with Dwarika and Lakhu who they met at the temple. Soon after they crossed a river near the village of Singha Chanda they are alleged to have been attacked by the appellants. Dwarika brought a bullock-cart from a village called Gauhani and thereafter the four injured persons proceeded to the Tarabganj police station. On the way Rampher dictated the First Information Reports to a boy called Gorakhnath and soon thereafter the report was lodged at the police station at about 12.30 at night.
Hausla Prasad succumbed to his injuries just before the party reached the police station. He had 12 injuries on his person, Lakhu had a swelling, Rampher had received 6 injuries while Dwarika had received 9 injuries. The injuries received by these persons including Hausla Prasad were mostly contused lacerated wounds and abrasions.
3. The prosecution examined Rampher, Dwarika, Lakhu. Ram Shanker and Ram Kripal (P.Ws. 2 to 6) as eye-witnesses to the occurrence. The learned Additional Sessions Judge held that these witnesses were not worthy of credit and acquitted the appellants. The High Court was not impressed by the evidence of Ram Shankar and Ram Kripal but accepting the evidence of Rampher, Dwarika and Lakhu it convicted the appellants of the offences of which they were charged.
Learned counsel for the State, when called upon, raised a fundamental objection to our entertaining the various questions raised on behalf of the appellants. He contends that the sole question in the appeal is whether the High Court was right in accepting the evidence of the three eye-witnesses and therefore this Court, in the exercise of its powers under Article 136 of the Constitution ought not to re-appreciate that evidence in order to determine whether it can sustain the conviction of the appellants.
4. The question as regards the power of this Court in criminal appeals by special leave from the judgment of High Courts setting aside acquittals has been discussed in numerous cases but the precise scope of the power is still being debated as a live issue. In case after case, counsel have contended that this Court does not under Article 136 function as yet another court of appeal and therefore on matters of appreciation of evidence, the final word must rest with the High Court. Considering the staggering mass of work which is gradually accumulating in this Court, such a rule will bring welcome relief. But it is overstating the rule to say that the verdict of the High Court on questions of fact, including assessment of evidence, cannot ever be re-opened in this Court.
The true position is that if the High Court has set aside an order of acquittal, this Court in an appeal under article 136 from the judgment of the High Court will examine the evidence only if the High Court has failed to apply correctly the principles governing appeals against acquittal. In a series of decisions. High Court had taken the view that upon an appeal from an acquittal, the appellate Court is not entitled to interfere
Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab
relied on : Ramablwpala Reddy v. State of A. P.
Ramabhupala Reddy v. State of A.P.
followed : Shivaji Genu Mohite v. State of Maharashtra
explained : Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra
relied on : Surajpal Singh v. State
referred to : Ajiner Singh v. State of Punjab
Aher Rnja Khima v. State of Saurashtra
Balhir Singk v. State of Punjab
Bhagwan Das v. State of Rajasthan
affirmed : Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan
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