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1964 Supreme(SC) 204

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I., J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.
Uttamchand, Appellant
Versus
S. M. Lalwani, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 100 of 1964.
Advocates appeared
M/s. B. R. L. Iyengar and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, Advocates, for Appellant; Mr. N. C. Chatterjee, Senior Advocate (M/s. R. C Agarwal and M. S. Gupta, Advocates, with him), for Respondent.

Advocates:
A.G.Ratnaparkhi, B.R.L.Iyengar, M.S.Gupta, N.C.CHATTERJI, R.C.AGRAWAL

Judgment

GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I.:

This appeal by special leave raises a short question as to whether the lease executed by the respondent, Sardar Mal Lalwani in favour of the appellant, Uttamchand, can be said to be a lease of an accommodation within the meaning of S. 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955 (No. XXIII of 1955) (hereinafter called the Act). The appellant moved the Rent Controller to fix the rent payable by him under the lease in question in respect of the property demised to him under S. 9(1) of the Act. This application was resisted by the respondent on the ground that the lease in question did not fall within the protection of the Act as the property demised to the appellant was not accommodation within the meaning of S. 3, and the rent payable by the appellant to the respondent was, therefore, not payable for any accommodation to which the Act applied. The Rent Controlling Authority at Bhopal rejected the respondent s contention and, on the merits, held that Rs. 2,400/- per annum should be the reasonable annual rent payable under the lease.

2. The respondent then went in appeal to the District Judge at Bhopal and urged that the Rent Controlling Authority had no jurisdiction to fix the rent between the parties and, on the merits, the rent fixed was unduly low. The District Judge rejected the respondent s contention as to jurisdiction and held that the lease in question was governed by the provisions of the Act. In regard to the merits of the order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, The District Judge held that the rent had been fixed by the said Authority more or less arbitrarily without taking into consideration the definition of reasonable annual rent and so, he set aside the order under appeal and remanded the case to the Rent Controlling Authority, directing it to make an enquiry and give its finding as to the reasonable annual rent in accordance with the observations made in his judgment.

3. The respondent then moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in its revisional jurisdiction and he challenged the validity of the order of remand on the ground that the lease did not fall within the protection of the Act, and so, the appellant was not entitled to ask for the determination of a reasonable annual rent under S. 9(1) of the Act. This plea has prevailed in the High Court with the result that the respondent s revisional application has been allowed and the application made by the appellant for the fixation of a reasonable annual rent has been dismissed. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave; and the only point which Mr. B. R. L. Iyengar has raised on his behalf is that in coming to the conclusion that S. 9(1) of the Act did not apply to the lease in question, the High Court has misconstrued the character of the lease and has misjudged the effect of the relevant provisions of the Act.

4. The Act has been passed by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature in 1955 in order to provide for control of letting, and rent of residential and non-residential accommodation and for prevention of the eviction of tenants therefrom. S. 2(1) of the Act provides that accommodations described in cls. (a) to (d) will not be covered by the provisions of the Act. S. 2(d), for instance, provides for places of entertainment generally used as such, including land adjoining or near such places, which is used for entertainment of people or catering. In other words, places of entertainment specified by cl. (d) of S. 2 like other properties mentioned in cls. (a), (b) and (c) of the said section are outside the protection of the Act. S. 2 (2) authorises the Government to exempt from all or any of the provisions of the Act any accommodation which is owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution or by any nursing or maternity home the whole of the income derived from which is utilised for that institution or nursing home or maternity home.

5. Having thus provided for exemp




















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