Judgement

KHANNA J. :- This judgment would dispose of civil appeals Nos. 35 and 989 of 1968 which have been filed on certificate against the common judgment of the Punjab High Court where by petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by the appellants and others challenging the validity of the land acquisition proceedings were dismissed.

2. We may now set out the facts giving rise to appeal No. 35. On September 3, 1957 the Chief Commissioner of Delhi issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in respect of the land measuring about 3.000 acres mentioned in the schedule attached to the notification. The material part of the notification reads as under.

"Whereas it appears to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi that land is likely to be required to be taken at the public expense for a public purpose namely for the execution of the Interim General Plan for the Greater Delhi, it is hereby notified that the land described in the Schedule below is likely to be required for the above purpose."

The notification was published in the Delhi Gazette on September 12, 1957. Large tracts of land belonging to the appellant and situated in villages Carhi Jaharia Maria and Zamurdupur were covered by the above notification. Declaration dated February 15, 1961 under Section 6 of the Act in respect of the land of the appellant and some other lands covered by the above notification was published on February 23, 1961. On or about February 24, 1961 the appellant filed petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the notification under Section 4 of the Act on various grounds, to which reference would be made hereafter. The Union of India, the Delhi Development Authority and the Chief Commissioner were impleaded as respondents in the petition and affidavit was filed on their behalf by Shri K. L. Rathee, Housing Commissioner, Delhi Administration in opposition to the petition.

3. It was argued on behalf of the appellant in the High Court that the acquisition of the land was not for a public purpose that the so-called public purpose was merely a colourable device for freezing huge areas of land and that there could not be successive declarations under Section 6 of the Act in respect of the lands covered by one notification under Section 4 of the Act. A Division Bench of the High Court consisting of Falshow C.J. and Mehar Singh J. (as he then was) repelled the various contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants and in the result dismissed the writ petitions.

4. Mr. Iyengar on behalf of the appellant has at the outset contended before us that the so-called public purpose, namely, "for the execution of the Interim General Plan for the Greater Delhi" is vague and as such the notification is liable to be quashed. Reliance in this context has been placed by the learned counsel upon the case of Munshi Singh v. Union of India, (1973) 1 SCR 973 : (AIR 1973. SC1150). In this connection we find that the judgment of the High Court shows that the appellant did not challenge the notification in question or the acquisition proceedings on the ground that the public purpose mentioned in the notification was vague. As such, the appellant, in our opinion, cannot be allowed to agitate this question for the first time in appeal. Apart from that we are of the view that the public purpose mentioned in the notification namely, for the execution of the Interim General Planfor the Greater Delhi is specific and does not suffer from any vagueness. It is significant that the land covered by the notification is not a small plot but a huge area covering thousands of acres. In such cases it is difficult to insist upon greater precision for specifying the public purpose because it is quite possible that various plots covered by the notification may have to be utilised for different purposes set out in the Interim General Plan. No objection was also taken by the appellant before the authorit