JUDGMENT

SHINGHAL, J. :—This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Gujarat High Court dated January 27, 28 and 30, 1967. The two petitioners before the High Court were firms trading in certain commodities within the limits of the Municipal Borough of Broach. The grievance in one of the petitions was that the Municipality had collected certain amounts wrongfully, and the grievance in the other petition was that the Municipality had refused to refund some amounts even though they were refundable under its bye-laws. Both the petitions concerned goods which were "imported" within the octroi limits of the Municipality but came to be "exported" therefrom. The first petition was in respect of a consignment which was designated as a through consignment, and the second petition concerned goods in transit and goods for export other than those which could be called goods in transit. The amounts in dispute related to the levy of octroi under Section 73(1) of the 1447 Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, hereinafter called the Act, which provides as follows :

"73(1). Subject to any general or special orders which the State Government may make in this behalf and to the provisions of Sections 75 and 76, a Municipality may impose for the purposes of this Act any of the following taxes, namely :-

x x x x

(iv) an octroi on animals or goods or both, brought within the octroi limits for consumption, use or sale therein;"

The word "sale" was included within the ambit of octroi when the Act was amended in 1954. The High Court took note of the rules and the bye-laws and held that it was not possible to take the view that the rules contemplated that no refund was payable in case the goods had undergone a sale during the course of their stay in octroi limits. It accordingly came to the conclusion that in regard to goods meant for export in the sense defined in the rules, refund was claimable even if a sale transaction in the larger sense (i.e. in a sense other than a sale to a consumer or with the intention that the goods must pass into hands of the ultimate consumer) took place in regard thereto, provided that the other conditions were satisfied. The High Court then examined the correct interpretation of the word "sale" in clause (iv) of Section 73(1) of the Act and after considering this Court s judgment in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. India Ltd. v. Belgaum Borough Municipality, (1963) Supp (2) SCR 216 = (AIR 1963 SC 906) it held that the word "sale" could not be given the narrow meaning of a sale for consumption to the ultimate consumer because, in that sense, the Legislature would be guilty of having introduced a word which it was not necessary for it to introduce. The High Court made a reference to the definition of "sale" in Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act and held that the expression "sale" as used in the definition of "through consignments" in the rules had the same connotation as in the Sale of Goods Act and therefore "if a consignment is brought within the octroi limits and if the Municipal authorities are satisfied that the consignment has been brought in for the purpose of effecting a sale in the aforesaid sense, then the consignment does not become a through consignment". According to the High Court, it was not enough merely to prove that the consignment left the octroi limits within six hours after the goods were imported and that it was necessary to show that the goods were intended only to pass through in the sense that they were not meant for consumption, use or sale, and that in regard to such goods there was no intention of changing hands by way of sale or that there was no intention of breaking their bulk or detaining them beyond six hours or unloading them. In the view it took, the High Court issued some directions for compliance by the authorities concerned. The writ petitioners felt dissatisfied with the view taken by the High Court and applied for a certificate under Articles 132(1) and 133(1)(