SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1976 Supreme(SC) 341

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.N. BHAGWATI AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI JJ.
Prem Ballab and another Appellants
Versus
The State (Delhi Admn.), Respondent.
Criminal Appeal no. 287 of 1971.
D/- 15-9-1976
Advocates appeared
Mr. A. N. Mulla, Sr. Advocate, Miss Uma Mehta, Mr. B. K. Mehta, Mr. S.K. Bagga and Mrs. S. Bagga Advocates, for Appellants; Mr. S. M. Anand, Advocate and Mr. R. N. Sachthey, Advocate, for Respondent : Mr. D. Mookerjee Sr. Advocate, (M/s. B. P. Maheshwari, Suresh Sethi and M. K. Jain, Advocates with him). for Intervener.

Advocates:
A.N.Mulla, B.P.MAHESHVARI, D.MUKHERJI, M.K.JAIN, R.K.MEHTA, R.N.SACH, S.Baggar, S.K.Bagga, S.N.ANAND, Suresh Sethi, UMA MEHTA

Headnote:(i) Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 :-5. 7 (i) & Sec. 16 (i) (a) (1) - Absence of independent witness - Conviction whether can be based on interested witness alone.

       Held, that there in no rule of taw that conviction cannot be based on the sole testimony of a Food Inspector. It is only nut of a caution that the courts insist that the testimony of a food Inspector should be corroborated by some independent witness. This is a necessary caution which has to be borne in mind because the Food Inspector may in a sense be regarded as an interested witness, but this caution is a rule of prudence and not a rule of Jaw, if it were otherwise, it would be: possible for any guilty person to escape punishment by resorting to the device of bringing punch witness. The conviction of the appellants cannot, therefore, be assailed as infirm on the ground that it rested merely on the evidence of Bhanot (the Food Inspector) and Bhatnagar (another Food Inspector) Para 3.

       (ii) Prevention of Food Adulteration Act - Sec 2 (i)-No prescription of using colouring material – Adulteration of Linseed oil with Colouring material -Standard of quality whether falling below the prescribed standard C1 (i) of Sec 2 (i) whether attracted CI(J) whether excluded- Clause under Sec 2 (i) not mutually exclusive merely because an article of food is covered by one clause of Sec 2 (i) it does not exclude the applicability of another clause of the Section. An article of food may be deemed to be adulterated under more than one clause of Sec 2 (i)

       (Paras 4 & 5 )

       (III) Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, See 16 (1) – Adulteration of food stuff – imprisonment of six months is the minimum.

       (iv) Probation of Offenders Act, See 4 - Offences under the Food Adulteration Act – Accused whether can be given the benefit of the provision.

       The imperatives of social defence must discourage the applicability of probation principles - No chances can be taken by society whit a man whose anti-social activities, in the guise of a respectable trade, jeopardise the health and well being of numerous innocent consumers. The adulteration is a social risk. It might be dangerous to leave him free to carryon his nefarious activities by applying the probation principle to him.

       (Para 8 )

Judgment

BHAGWATI, J. :- This appeal, by special leave, is directed against a judgment of the High Court of Delhi confirming the conviction of the appellants under Section 7 (i) read with Section 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

2. The prosecution case was that at all material times the 1st appellant was the owner of a grocery shop situate at Maharani Bagh, New Delhi and the 2nd appellant was employed as a salesman in the shop. On 23rd June, 1969 Bhanot, a Food Inspector went to the shop of the 1st appellant and finding the 1st appellant there as a salesman, took from him a sample of mustard oil for analysis after paying its purchase price. He divided the sample into three parts and sent one part to the Public Analyst for analysis, handed over the other part to the 2nd appellant and retained the 3rd part with him. The Public Analyst reported that the sample was misbranded as Linseed oil and was adulterated due to the presence of artificial dye. On the strength of this report, the appellants were charge-sheeted under Section 7 (i) read with Section 16 (1) (a) (i) before the Judicial Magistrate, Delhi. The defence of the 1st appellant was that the 2nd appellant was at no time engaged by him as the salesman and no mustard oil was purchased by Bhanot from the 2nd appellant. The 2nd appellant also claimed that he was never an employee of the 1st appellant and while he was going to his house after purchasing sarson oil for his personal use, he was caught by two or three persons near Maharani Bagh and a sample was taken from the oil which he was carrying and his signatures were obtained by threat on certain papers. The learned Judicial Magistrate accepted the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution and rejected the defence version and held that the appellants were guilty of the offence of selling linseed oil containing artificial dye which was an offence punishable under Sec. 7 (i) read with Section 16 (1) (a) (i). The learned Judicial Magistrate accordingly convicted the appellants and sentenced each of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for nine months and to pay a fine of Rupees 1000/-. The appellants preferred an appeal, but the appeal was rejected by the learned Sessions Judge and the conviction was confirmed with only a slight modification in the sentence. The sentence was reduced from nine months to six months rigorous imprisonment. This led to the filing of a revision application in the High Court by the appellants, but the revision application was also unsuccessful. Hence the present appeal by special leave obtained from this Court.

3. The first contention raised on behalf of the appellant in support of the appeal was that the conviction was bad inasmuch as it rested solely on the evidence of Bhanot and one other Food Inspector, namely Bhatnagar, who happened to come there at the time of taking the sample and there was no independent witness to support the prosecution case. Now, it is true that the prosecution could not produce any independent witness to depose to the taking of the sample by Bhanot from the 2nd appellant at the shop of the 1st appellant but that by itself cannot be regarded as sufficient to warrant rejection of the prosecution case out of hand. The sample was taken by Bhanot in the presence of one Keshav Dutt Sharma and a punchnama evidencing the transaction was prepared and signed by Keshav Dutt Sharma on the spot. But in the witness box Keshav Dutt Sharma turned hostile and denied that he was present at the time of taking the sample. Of course, he could not deny that the endorsement B to B on the Punchanama was in his handwriting and he had put his signature at the foot of it, but his explanation was that one Food Inspector came to the shop where he was working and asked him either to give a sample of the ice-cream he was selling at the shop or to give his signature on the punchanama. This explanation is palpably dishonest and cannot be accepted by any court. Moreover, it




















Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top