SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R.S. SARKARIA, N.L. UNTWALIA AND P.S. KAILASAM, JJ.*
Noor Mohd. Khan Chouse Khan Soudagar and another, Appellants
Versus
Fakirappa Bharmappa Machenahalli and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeals Nos. 2372-2373 of 1968
Decided on 28-4-1978.
Advocates appeared
M/s. S. S. Javali and M. Veerappa, Advocates for Appellants; M/s. Naunit Lal and K. Vasdev. Advocates (for No. 1) in both the Appeals and M/s. K. Ramkumar and K. Jayaram, Advocates (for No. 4) in C. A. No. 2372 of 1968, for Respondents.
Civil Procedure Code – Section 47 - Mysore Land Reforms Act 1961 – Claim of compensation - Possession for land – Jurisdiction - High Court has allowed both the appeals by its common judgment and held that respondent No. 1, in view of the provisions of the Karnataka Act, cannot be evicted and no actual delivery of possession can be given against him unless the requirements of the said Act are followed. In so doing High Court has followed the decision of this Court in relation to the corresponding provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, hereinafter called the Bombay Act. Hence these appeals - Argued for the appellants and strenuously assailed the judgment of the High Court - Appearing for the first respondent, combated his argument. Although respondent No. 4 was also represented before us by an Advocate, no argument was advanced on his behalf, as the dispute in these appeals is mainly between the appellants and the first respondent – Held, After remand by the High Court when the matter was being heard by the trial court, the respondent applied for amendment of written statement claiming protection under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, and prayed that the suit should be stayed by the Civil Court and the matter referred to the Tribunal for decision as the Tribunal was empowered to decide whether a person is a tenant or not - On behalf of the respondent, it was contended that the respondent is a tenant within the meaning of the word tenant ad defined in S. 2 (34) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. This Court held that as S. 107 of the Act exempted the application of the provisions of the Act except S. 8 to corporation, the question whether the respondent is a tenant or deemed to be a tenant does not at all arise because the tenancy has come to an end. Though the plea of the defendant was that he was a tenant, this Court went into the provisions of the Act and found that in the case of Corporation only S. 8 is applicable and other provisions were not applicable and as the lease belonged to the local authority the respondent cannot claim any protection. Repelling the contention on behalf of the respondent that S. 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act excluded the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in suits for possession where the defendant claimed to be a tenant as utterly unsound this Court held that S. 133 cannot apply to lands which were held by a person on lease from the local authority or where the lease had expired and the local authority sues for possession, a mere statement of the defendant that he is a tenant would not take away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The plea that the Act is not applicable by the plaintiff has to be decided by the Civil Court. In doing so the Civil Court can take into account the fact that the lease had expired or that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the landlord concerned - Equally as in the case reported in Civil Court can go into the question whether the defendant had established that he is a statutory owner and in doing so, can determine whether the defendant was a tenant on the relevant dates. On a consideration of the cases referred to above, it is clear that it was incumbent on the High Court to decide the several questions that arise for consideration - Order accordingly
JUDGMENT
UNTWALIA, J.(for himself and on behalf of R. S. Sarkaria J.):— These two appeals by special leave are from the common judgment of the Karnataka High Court. In the year 1945, a suit for partition and possession was filed by the original respondent No. 2 (since deceased and his heirs substituted). In the said suit all the co-sharers were impleaded as defendants 1 to 7. The 4th respondent in these appeals was defendant No. 1 and the predecessors-in-interest of the appellants were defendants 5 and 6. Each branch had 1/7th share. A preliminary decree was passed by the trial Court on December 13, 1954, which was eventually confirmed by the High Court in a second appeal decided on January 16, 1963. After the passing of the preliminary decree in the year 1954, in accordance with the law prevalent in the State of Karnataka (then known as Mysore State), an execution case being L. D. 117 of 1956 was filed by the plaintiff-decreeholders and the appellants in the Court which had passed the preliminary decree for final partition and possession; the same had to be made and given by the Collector. In the execution case was impleaded respondent No. 1 in these appeals as judgment-debtor No. 20 because he had been inducted as a lessee of a portion of the suit properties during its pendency in or about the year 1948 by respondent No. 4. The effect of impleading respondent No. 1 as a judgment-debtor was as if he was impleaded as a party to the suit before the final partition. On May 29, 1961, the executing court directed the Collector partition the suit property and to give possession of their respective allotted lands to the various co-sharers including the appellants. The Collector made the final allotment of the various lands to the different co-sharers. The disputed land over which respondent No. 1 had been inducted by respondent No. 4 was allotted to the share of the appellants sometime after May 29, 1961 and before May 29, 1965. On 29-5-1965, in pursuance of the direction of the Execution Court and the Collector, the Tahsildar went to effect the delivery of possession but proposed to deliver only symbolical possession of the disputed land and declined to deliver actual possession, as he found respondent No. 1 to be in actual cultivating possession of it. The Execution Court was moved in the matter and by its order dated June 8, 1965, it directed the Tahsildar to deliver actual possession, The said order was confirmed in appeal on July 31, 1965 by the First Appellate Court. Respondent No. 1 filed Execution Second Appeal No. 86 of 1965, presumably because the order dated 8-6-1965 of the Execution Court was one under S. 47 of the Civil P. C. In this appeal, the High Court made certain conditional orders of ad interim stay. The conditions were not complied with by respondent No. 1. Thereupon, the appellants made an application again to the Execution Court for directing actual delivery of possession. The first respondent contested the application filed by the appellants on the ground that he being a tenant of the land had made an application under the Mysore Land Reforms Act. 1961 which had come into force on October 2, 1965, hereinafter to be called the Karnataka Act, seeking a declaration that he was a tenant within the meaning of that Act. The Execution Court, by its order dated August 8, 1967, again directed the Tahsildar to deliver actual possession and its order was confirmed by the First Appellate Court on August 31, 1967. Execution Second Appeal No. 78 of 1967 was filed by respondent No. 1 in the High Court on September 21, 1967.
2. The High Court has allowed both the appeals by its common judgment dated February 9, 1968 and held that respondent No. 1, in view of the provisions of the Karnataka Act, cannot be evicted and no actual delivery of possession can be given against him unless the requirements of the said Act are followed. In so doing the High Court has followed the decision of this Court in Bhimaji Shankar Kulkarni v. Du
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