SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.N. SHINGHAL AND D.A. DESAI, JJ.
Paramjit Singh and others, Appellants
Versus
Ram Rakha and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeals Nos. 2902-2903 of 1977, D/- 22-3-1979.
Advocates appeared
Mr. Y. S. Chitale, Sr. Advocate and Mr. M. N. Phadke, Sr. Advocate (in C.A. No. 2903 of 1977) (Mr. P. C. Bhartari, Advocate with them), for Appellants; Mr. G. L. Sanghvi, Sr. Advocate (M/s. S. K. Bagga and Mrs. S. Bagga, Advocates with him), for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2; Mr. R. S. Sodhi, Advocate, for State of Punjab.
Constitution of India, 1950 – Articles 226, 16 – Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959 – Rules 10, 3, 9, 8, 6 – Promotion – Respondents 1 and 2, filed a writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution against State of Punjab, Inspector General of Police, Punjab, and six others including the present appellants, praying for a direction to confirm them in Punjab Police Service. Respondents 1 and 2 alleged that they were promotees to cadre of Deputy Superintendent of Police of February 1961 and January 1961 respectively having been brought on G List by an order of State of Punjab and Inspector General of Police, Punjab, respondents 3 and 4 herein – Appellants and respondents 5 to 8 were recruited to same cadre by direct appointment commencing from May 1961 to May 1965 – Grievance of respondents 1 and 2 in petition filed by them was that recruitment to Punjab Police Service is made from two sources, namely, 80% by promotion and 20% by direct appointment but this quota rule is not adhered to at time of confirmation in service and, therefore, even though they were members of service since a period earlier to appellants and respondents 5 to 8, they were not confirmed though latter were confirmed and as seniority in the cadre of Deputy Superintendent of Police is reckoned under Rule 10 according to date of confirmation, the failure to confirm them in post available to them, in breach of the relevant rules, has denied to them equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 16 of Constitution to be considered for nomination to Indian Police service which is done according to seniority-cum-merit. – Held, General seniority rule which was held applicable in that case was that seniority should be determined on basis of length of service in that grade or a service in an equivalent grade irrespective of whether latter was under Central or Provincial Government in India or Pakistan. – It is in context of these rules the question whether quota rule should be applied at stage of initial recruitment or at stage of initial recruitment or confirmation came up for consideration. – Unlike rule in present case seniority was not dependent on confirmation but seniority was dependent upon continuous officiation in the cadre. – In this background this Court held that the quota has to be enforced at the time of initial recruitment in officiating capacity and not at the time of confirmation. – Situation in case under discussion is materially different. – Therefore, it cannot be said that ignoring the rule a proposition of universal application has been laid down that whenever there is a quota prescribed for recruitment to a cadre it can only apply at the time of initial recruitment and not at the time of confirmation. – Everything will depend upon the whole body of rules and harmonious construction has to be put upon the rules so as to avoid the possibility of a rule becoming unreasonable. this Court while saying in Subramans case that quota rule has to be adhered to and enforced at the time of initial recruitment reaffirmed the observation in Mervyn Continhos case (AIR 1967 SC 52) that there is no inherent invalidity in introduction of quota system and to work it out by rule of rotation. – When it is said that the confirmation shall follow the quota rule it is in terms being stated that the rotational system should be followed at the time of confirmation so as to make quota rule effective and seniority rule reasonable because all the three are interlinked. – Undoubtedly, the decision in Subramans case was in terms affirmed in Patwardhans case (AIR 1977 SC 2051) but the scheme of rules in Patwardhans case was more or less similar to the one that was examined by this Court in Subramans case. – Contention overlooks the latter part of Rule 8 (a) which provides that in case of promotees the Government may by special order in each case permit periods of officiating appointments to the Service to count towards the period of probation. – It appears that both promotees and direct recruits to Service would be on probation. – But the latter part of Rule 8 (a) comprehends Inspectors being promoted on officiating basis. – Unless there is a temporary addition to the strength of the cadre such officiating appointment by promotion would not make the promotee a member of the service in view of Rule 3. – In order to avoid any injustice to such promotees the Government may make an order to treat officiating service to count towards probation. – In the absence of such order the officiating service would not count towards probation and such appointment would not make the promotee a member of the service. – In that event his case would not be covered by the proviso to Rule 8 (a). – Contention cannot be accepted – High Court was, therefore, right in concluding that the quota rule would operate at both the stages. – Accordingly both these appeals fail and are dismissed but in circumstances of the case with no order as to costs – Appeals Dismissed
Judgment
DESAI, J.:- These two appeals by special leave arise from a common judgment rendered by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 560 and 564 of 1974 and Civil Writ No. 6781/74. The controversy raised in these appeals turns upon the construction of the Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959 (Services Rules for short). A few relevant facts as alleged by respondents 1 and 2 in Civil Appeal No. 2903/78 who moved Civil Writ No. 825 of 1972 in the High Court would highlight the problem posed in these appeals.
2. Respondents 1 and 2, Gurdip Singh and Dalip Singh, filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the State of Punjab, Inspector General of Police, Punjab, and six others including the present appellants, praying for a direction to confirm them in Punjab Police Service. Respondents 1 and 2 alleged that they were promotees to the cadre of Deputy Superintendent of Police of February 1961 and January 1961 respectively having been brought on G List by an order dated 23rd February 1961 of the State of Punjab and Inspector General of Police, Punjab, respondents 3 and 4 herein. Appellants and respondents 5 to 8 were recruited to the same cadre by direct appointment commencing from May 1961 to May 1965. The grievance of respondents 1 and 2 in the petition filed by them was that recruitment to Punjab Police Service is made from two sources, namely, 80% by promotion and 20% by direct appointment but this quota rule is not adhered to at the time of confirmation in the service and, therefore, even though they were members of the service since a period earlier to appellants and respondents 5 to 8, they were not confirmed though the latter were confirmed and as seniority in the cadre of Deputy Superintendent of Police is reckoned under Rule 10 according to date of confirmation, the failure to confirm them in the post available to them, in breach of the relevant rules, has denied to them equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 16 of the Constitution to be considered for nomination to Indian Police service which is done according to seniority-cum-merit.
3. The State of Punjab and Inspector General of Police, Punjab, on the one hand and the direct recruits on the other contested the writ petition, inter alia, contending that the quota applies at the stage of initial recruitment and not at the time of confirmation and there is no allegation that the quota rule was violated at the time of initial recruitment. It was further contended that no one can claim to be confirmed as a matter of right and, therefore, the writ petition is misconceived. Direct recruits to the post of Dy. Superintendent of Police, appellants and respondents 5 to 8 further contended that the petitioners were promoted on officiating basis against temporary posts and as there were no permanent posts available, they could not be confirmed till substantive vacancies in the permanent strength of the cadre were available and till confirmation their seniority having to be reckoned from the date of confirmation, they cannot claim to be senior to the direct recruits on the principle of continuous officiation.
4. The writ petition came up before a learned single Judge of the High Court who was of the opinion that the quota rule is linked with the seniority rule and in order to give a reasonable interpretation and in order not to make the seniority rule unreasonable, upon a proper construction it must be held that the quota rule would operate not only at the time of initial recruitment but also at the time of confirmation. In reaching this conclusion the learned single Judge relied upon two decisions of this Court in S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, (1967) 2 SCR 703 and Mervyn Continho v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (1966) 3 SCR 600 and some other decisions of other High Courts. The learned single Judge accordingly gave a direction that the writ petitioners respondents 1 and 2 herein, should be confirmed. Two appea
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