JUDGMENT

KRISHNA IYER, J. (with Murtaza Fazal Ali & D. A. Desai, JJ.): - Tersely expressed, this bunch of cases challenges the vires of a recent amendment made by the SC under Article 145 in the matter of review petitions whereby the judges will decide in circulation, without the aid of oral submissions whether there is merit in the motion and, in their discretion, choose to hear further arguments in Court.

2. Is orality in advocacy - that genius of Indo-Anglian Justice - an inalienable and ubiquitous presence in the court process, or does it ambit of abbreviated appearance and - more pertinent to the point here - discretionary eclipse, at least when it has been preceded by a sufficient oral session ? Secondly, is hearing on Bench in public, in contrast to considering the matter in conferential circulation, the only hall-mark of judicial justice, absent which the proceeding always violates the norms of equality implicit in Article 14, the limits of reasonableness bedrocked in Article 19, the procedural fairness rooted in Article 21? And, finally, by resort to operational secrecy, does rationing or burking of oral hearing travesty the values of our Justice System?

3. These basic problems of the forensic process, of pervasive impact and seminal import, fall for consideration in these writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. The charge is that the novel expedient of substitution of oral arguments by written submissions and orders in circulation dispensing with public sitting, save where - and that may be rare - the judges in their discretion choose to hear arguments in court, is a dangerous deviance from the fundamentals of the Judicial Process. Apprehending may be, the futuristic repercussions of a decision on these question, even though now restricted to review petitions, in other fields of hearing at a later time, the SC Bar Association has intervened and argued to impugn the amended rule through its President, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, in supplementation of parties submissions. We have allowed even other advocates to make brief contributions, because, when this Court considers issues of moment and pronounces thereon, the law so declared binds all, and it is ensouled in democratic propriety that the voice of reason and instruction be received from every permissible source in the nation, if processed according to cursus curiae. This participative principle lends peoples legitimation to the judicial process and strengthens the credentials of the rule of law.

4. The composite question, which setles the fate of these petitions, emerges this way. Article 137 provides for review of judgments or orders of this Court, subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rule made under Article 145. We are here concerned with a rule made by this Court. The rule-making power under Art. 145 is geared to regulating generally the practice and procedure of the Court. In particular, Article 145 (1) (b) and (e) authorise such judicial legislation in the shape of rules as to "the procedure for hearing appeals and other matters pertaining to appeal" and also "as to the conditions subject to which any judgment pronounced or order made by the Court may be reviewed and the procedure for such review". Such rules, like any other law, are subject to the imperatives of Part III and become non est if violative of the proscriptions and prescriptions of the Constitution vide Premchand Gargs case 1963 Supp (1) SCR 885. Even the SC, in the scheme of our Republic, is no imperium in imperio.

5. The substantive power of review and the procedure for its exercise are essential for any judicial system if unwitting injustice is to be obviated to the extent pragmatically possible, without being blinded by any claim to impervious infallibility in the first judgment. Even judges, more than other mortals, to correct injustice if the error is discovered within working limits. Thus, the root principle of judicial review is profound. Judge Learned Hand comme