JUDGMENT

DESAI, J. (Minority view):- I have very carefully gone through the opinion prepared by my learned brother Varadarajan, J. But I regret my inability to agree with the same.

2. All the relevant facts and the grounds on which the order of detention was made, against the petitioner have been succinctly set out by my learned brother and therefore, it is not necessary to recapitulate them here. However, the only ground examined by my learned brother is that the order of detention is vitiated on account of taking into consideration grounds Nos. 1 and 2 which were stale and not proximate to the time when detention order was made and therefore, they are irrelevant, and would vitiate the order of detention, Grounds Nos. 1 and 2 relate to the events that occurred an March 20, 1978 and August 9, 1980. The order of detention is made on May 6, 1983. In between there are four other incidents involving the detenu dated July 13, 1982, July 26, 1982, September 8, 1982 and Jan. 10, 1983. The order of detention is grounded on the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority that with a view, to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of Satna City, it was necessary to detain the detenu. When criminal activity of a person leads to such a drastic action as detention without trial, ordinarily a single stray incident may not unless contrary is shown be sufficient to invoke such drastic power of preventive detention. Ordinarily, drastic power of preventive detention without trial is invoked when the normal administration of criminal justice would fail to prevent the person so acting in a manner set out in sub-sec. (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980. In order to avoid the charge that a stray incident seized upon to invoke such drastic power of preventive detention, the authority charged with a duty to maintain public order or assure security of the State, may keep a close watch on the activities of the miscreant for some time and repeated indulgence into prejudicial activity may permit an inference that unless preventive detention is resorted to, it would not be possible to wean away such person from such prejudicial activity. Therefore, when in 1983, an action was proposed to be taken under sub-sec. (2) of S. 3, the Detaining Authority examined the history of the criminal activity of the detenu and took into account a continuous course of conduct which may permit an inference that unless interdicted by a detention order, such activity cannot be put to an end the power under sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 is exercised. Obviously, if there is a big time lag between the last of the events leading to the detention order being made and the remote earlier event, the same cannot be treated as showing a continuity of criminal activity. But if events in close proximity with each other are taken into account for drawing a permissible inference that these are not stray or spasmodic events but disclose a continuous prejudicial activity, the reference to earlier events cannot be styled as stale or remote which would vitiate the order of detention. In this connection, one may refer to Gora v. State of West Bengal (1975) 2 SCR 996. This Court after a review of the earlier decisions observed that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test to be blindly applied by merely counting the number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. The question is whether the past activities of the detenu are such that the detaining authority can reasonably come to the conclusion that the detenu is likely to continue in his unlawful activities. This view was affirmed in Smt. Rekhaben Virendra Kapadia v. State of Gujarat (1979) 2 SCC 566. In a recent decision. In Fitrat Raza Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1982) 2 SCC 449 this Court held that when both the incidents are viewed in close proximity, the propensity of the petitioner to resort to prejudicial activity becomes manifest and the Court