JUDGMENT

FAZAL ALI, J.:—This appeal by special leave is directed against an order passed by the Delhi High Court on August 25. 1980 affirming an order of eviction of the appellant made by the Rent Controller. The facts of the case lie within a very narrow compass and the appeal involves a pure point of law which is already covered by decisions of this court to which we shall presently refer.

2. The tenant, Ravi Dutt Sharma, was inducted into the suit premises as far back as 1945. The landlord Ratan Lal Bhargava applied under Section 19 (1) (a) of the Slum Clearance Act (Slum Act for short) before Competent Authority for permitting him to institute a suit for eviction of the appellant but that application was dismissed on July 28, 1973. An appeal against this order was dismissed by the Financial Commissioner on October 4, 1974. Thereafter the respondent filed a suit for eviction of the tenant under S. 14 (1) (e) read with S. 25 (B) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (Rent Act for short) on April 13, 1979. Under the provisions of the Rent Act as amended in 1976 it is incumbent upon the defendant-tenant to apply for leave to defend a suit for eviction before entering contest. The tenant applied for such leave but the same was rejected and an order of his eviction was passed on September 14, 1979. A revision by the tenant to the High Court was dismissed and that has led to the appeal to this Court.

3. In the special leave petition Smt. Pushpa Rani filed a suit for eviction against her tenant. Swaran Kaur and others, which also was allowed by the Rent Controller and a revision therefrom has been dismissed by the High Court. Hence the petition for special leave against the judgment of the High Court has been filed and that was directed to be heard along with the Civil Appeal. It is unnecessary to give the facts involved in the case in which special leave has been asked for because the point of law for consideration is one and the same.

4. Admittedly the houses for which eviction has been asked for in these two cases are located within the slum areas as defined under the Slum Act. It was contended on behalf of the tenants that the suits for eviction by the landlords were not competent in view of want of permission from the Competent Authority under the Slum Act. Under Section 19 (1) (a) of the Slum Act it is incumbent on the landlord to obtain permission from the Competent Authority before instituting a suit for evicting a tenant and without such permission the suit is not maintainable.

5. This argument was countered by the respondent on the ground that by virtue of the Amending Act of 1976 (referred to as the Amending Act for short), a new procedure has been substituted for two types of eviction of tenants - one of which was covered by S. 14 (1) (e) and the other by S. 14 (A). In the instant case we are mainly concerned with eviction applications covered by S. 14 (1) (e) and the special procedure provided in Chapter III-A introduced by the Amending Act. It was contended by the respondent that by virtue of the Rent Act a special protection was given to a particular class of landlords who fell within the provisions of S. 14 (1) (e) of the Rent Act (personal necessity) and in such cases a procedure different from the procedure followed in other cases had been prescribed. Sections 25 (A) and 25 (B) sought to simplify the procedure by insisting on the tenant to obtain permission to enter defence. In other words, so far as suits for eviction on the ground of personal necessity were concerned, the case for eviction was put at par with suits under Order 37, Code of Civil Procedure, where the Court was satisfied that the tenant had an arguable case, leave to defend would be granted, otherwise the order of eviction would be passed straightway.

6. Learned counsel for the tenants then argued that, Sections 25 (A) and 25 (B) were ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution and were inconsistent with the Slum Act which was an existing statute and, theref