JUDGMENT

DESAI, J.:— A hangover of the hey day of Article 31 permeates the controversy in these two appeals. The attempt is to salvage something from the debris of repealed Art. 31 by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. In Re Civil Appeal No. 922/71: Ramnath, the appellant, who is now dead took on lease a plot of land bearing No. 64 Block L, Daryaganj, Delhi admeasuring 590 sq. yards from Delhi Improvement Trust under Exh. A-4 dated February 10, 1942. The period reserved under lease was 90 years. The appellant paid Rupees 10,253/- as initial premium and had to pay recurring half-yearly rent in the amount of Rs. 102-8-6 under the agreed terms and conditions of the lease. On payment of Rs. 10,253/- the initial payment, the appellant was put in possession. in Re Civil Appeal No., 923/71: Appellant R. S. Ram Pershad since deceased took on lease two plots of land bearing No. 66-67 in Block L, Daryaganj, Delhi from the Delhi Improvement Trust. The appellant executed a registered lease deed dated March 9, 1943 in respect of plot No. 66 and with respect to Plot No. 67, the transaction was through an oral sale dated May 1, 1942. Each plot admeasured 590.1 sq. yards. The appellant was put in possession of both the plots.

2. The Chief Commissioner of Delhi issued the notification No. F.6 (3) 50 R & R dated December 15, 1950 under Section 3 of the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act 1948 (1948 Act for short) for acquiring the plots of both the appellants. An arbitrator was appointed as envisaged by Section 7 (1) (b) of the 1948 Act to assess the compensation. Both the appellants and the Union of India appeared before the arbitrator and the compensation was determined by the arbitrator.

3. Both the appellants preferred two separate appeals against the award of the arbitrator in the then High Court of Punjab at Delhi. On the formation of the High Court of Delhi both the appeals came up before the Division Bench on two different dates. The Division Bench following the decision of the Full Bench in the Union of India v. Smt. Mohinder Kaur ILR (1969) Delhi 1154 dismised the appeals but granted a certificate under Article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution. Hence both these appeals by certificate.

4. The only contention canvassed before the High Court was that the 1st and 2nd proviso to sub-clause (e) of sub-bection (1) of Section 7 of the 1948 Act are violative of Section 299 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 as it then stood and the compensation awarded by the aibitrator in consonance with the provisos is illusory and therefore both the provisos are constitutionally invalid. A Full Bench of the High Court in the decision hereinabove noticed negatived this contention but granted the certificate under Art. 133 (1) (c) on the ground that the decision in Union of India v. Smt. Mohinder Kaur was pending in appeal before the SC and as the High Court in rejecting the appeals of the present appellants followed the same decision, it was imperative that the certificate should be granted.

5. When the appeals came up before us for hearing, we enquired from Mr. K. C. Dua, learned counsel for the appellants as to what happened to the appeal preferred in Smt. Mohinder Kaurs case which enabled the appellants to obtain the requisite certificate under Article 133 (1) (c). There was no clear or straight answer to the querry and it appears that there was no such appeal and therefore on this short ground the certificate could have been cancelled. But as even the other side was not in a position to shed light on the question whether any appeal at all was preferred against the decision of the High Court in Smt. Mohinder Kaurs case (ILR (1969) Delhi 1154) (FB) and if so what fate it met, we persuaded ourselves not to cancel the certificate.

6. Mr. K. C. Dua, learned counsel, who appeared for the appellants in both the appeals, was rather on uncertain ground when he first stated that he does not wish to challenge the constitutio