JUDGMENT

FAZAL ALI, J.:— We would first take up Civil Appeal No. 379 of 1980 which is directed against an Order dated March 28, 1979# passed by the Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ petition of the appellant and arises in the following circumstances.

#Reported in (1980) 1 Ren CJ 126 (All).

2. The appellant owns a house bearing No. 113. Amroha Gate, Fruit Market, Moradabad in a portion of which he had inducted respondent No. 3 (Vishwa Nath Kapoor) as a tenant while retaining some portion for himself, when he (appellant) was serving as a Judicial Officer in the State of Uttar Pradesh. In the year 1968. the appellant retired as a District Judge as a result of which he had to vacate his official residence, which necessitated the present eviction proceedings against respondent No. 3. The application for eviction was filed on 2-1-1973 under Section 21(1)(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 1972 Act) in which the appellant prayed that the portion occupied by respondent No. 3 may be released on the ground of personal requirement as after retirement he wanted to occupy the entire house. The appellant further claimed that due to shortage of accommodation he had to stay with his son elsewhere. The eviction proceedings were contested by the respondent on the following grounds :-

(a) that since the appellant was already living with his son there was no particular urgency or personal necessity for him to occupy the rented portion also,

(b) that the appellant had in his occupation a part of the house which was retained by him even after inducting him (respondent) as a tenant and which was sufficient for his needs, and

(c) that the appellant after keeping his household effects in the portion retained by him had locked up the same and was, therefore, not in actual occupation of the house as required by Explanation (iv) to Section 21(1)(b).

3. In the same token, it was submitted as a point of law that the essential ingredient of Explanation (iv) to Section 21(1)(b) was that the building must have been in occupation of the landlord for residential purposes which alone would be a conclusive proof of personal necessity. It was also contended as a question of fact that as the appellant-landlord was not in actual occupation of the premises, Explanation (iv) would not be attracted in the instant case. To buttress this argument it was submitted that the landlord never occupied or possessed the premises but had locked up the same and was residing elsewhere. This plea of the respondent-tenant did not find favour with the Prescribed Authority or the High Court.

4. The dominant question, therefore, turns upon the import and interpretation of Explanation (iv) to Section 21(1)(b), particularly the nature and meaning of the word occupation as used it, Explanation (iv). The crux of the matter, therefore, was as to whether or not the case of the appellant squarely fell within the four corners of Explanation (iv) and whether the word occupation included actual residence of the landlord even though he may not have been residing there. We might mention that while the eviction proceedings were pending before the Prescribed Authority the 1972 Act was amended by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 (for short to be referred to as the 1976 Act) which came into force with effect from 5th July 1976 and which deleted Explanation (iv). The Prescribed Authority, relying on Explanation (iv), held that the need of the landlord was fully made out and accordingly passed an order of eviction against the tenant, partly releasing some portion in appellants favour. The appellant then filed an appeal before the District Judge which was heard by an Additional District Judge who accepted the offer of the tenant and modified the Order of the Prescribed Authority by further releasing some other portion in his favour. The appellant then filed a writ petition before the High Court which upheld the decision of