1984 Supreme(SC) 316

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.N. BHAGWATI, V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.
Surinder Singh, Appellant
Versus
]Hardial Singh and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 463 of 1982, D-29-10-1984.
Advocate appeared
Mr. H. L. Sibbal, Sr. Advocate, M/s. D. N. Mishra and Mr. K. K. Lahiri, Advocates with him, for Appellant; Mr. Shanti Bhushan, Sr. Advocate, Mr. Jitendra Sharma and Mr. Manjit Singh Khaira and Ms. Deepa Bhushan, Advocates with him, for Respondents.

Headnote:allegations of corrupt practice must be proved strictly as a criminal charge - Nature and extent of interference by the supreme Court with the findings of the high Court - Oral evidence the witness belonging to rival political party - Allegations of corrupt practice must be strictly pleaded - candidate extending protection to his supporters alleged to have been involved in criminal offences and the candidate picking up quarrel for him with local police inspector — whether consent to the acts of his supporter - Amelioration of grievances of the public is innocuous and cannot be construed against a candidate - Distribution election meeting - Disturbing election meeting

       as held in Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh, AIR 1985 SC 89, the allegations of corrupt practice are quasi-criminal charges and the proof that would be required in support of such allegations would be as in criminal charge. The charges of corrupt practice have been dealt with by the Supreme Court in election appeal for over 20 years. The first importannt case was disposed of by a five judge Bench in Mohan Singh v. Bhanwar Lal, AIR 1964 SC 1366, where it was held that the onus of establishing a corrupt practice is undoubtedly on the person who sets it up and the onus is not discharged on proof of mere preponderance of probability, as in the trial of a civil suit, the corrupt practice must be established beyond reasonable doubt by evidence which is clear and unambiguous. In Guruji Shrihari Baliram v. Vithalrao, AIR 1970 SC 1891, the same view was reiterated by stating that, it is trite to say that the burden of proving everyone of the ingredients of the corrupt practice alleged is on him who alleged it. If he fails to establish any of them to the satisfaction of the court he must fail. The principle of #19;beyond reasonable doubt#20; and not merely on #19;preponderance of probability#20; was discussed in Mahant Shreo Nath v. Choudhary Ranbir Singh, 1970(3) SCC 647(2). In Abdul Hussain v. Shamsual Huda, AIR 1975 SC 1612, it was pointed out that when elections are challenged on grounds with a criminal taint, the benefit of doubt in testimony matters belongs to the returned candidate. In Razik Ram v. Jaswant Singh Chouhan, AIR 1975 SC 667, it was observed that a charge of corrupt practice cannot be established by mere balance of probabilities and, if, after giving due consideration and effect to the totality of the evidence and circumstances of the case, the mind of the court is left rocking with reasonable doubt not being the doubt of a timid, fickle or vacillating mind as to the veracity of the charge, it must hold the same as not proved. To the same effect are decisions in Surya Kant v. Imamul Hai Khan, AIR 1975 SC 1053 = 1975(1) SCC 531; Nizamuddin Ahmed v. Narbada Prasad, AIR 1975 SC 1909; D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan, AIR 1976 SC 1599; Bir Chandra Barman v. Anil Sarkar, AIR 1976 SC 603; Ramji Prasad Singh v. Ram Bilas Jha, AIR 1976 SC 2573; Lakshmi Raman Acharya v. Chandan Singh, AIR 1977 SC 587; Amolok Chand v. Bhagwandas Arya, AIR 1977 SC 813; Ramanbhai Nagjibhai Patel v. Jashwant Singh Udesingh, AIR 1978 SC 1162; Haji C.H. Mohammad Koya v. T.K.S.M.A. Muthukoya, AIR 1979 SC 154. A Yaunus Kunju v. R.S. Unni, 1984 SC 960, it was held that there is total consensus of judicial opinion that a charge of corrupt practice under the Act has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and the standard of proof is the same as in a criminal case. In Manmohan Kalit v. Yash, AIR 1984 SC 1161, also similar view expressed.

       This provision makes it abundantly clear that an appeal to this ocurt under the Act is to be treated as a civil appeal and the jurisdiction to be exercised is as extensive as in the case of an appeal from a matter disposed of in exercise of original civil jurisidictio of the High Court, as held in Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh, AIR 1985 SC 89 In the series of decisions of the Supreme Court, such as, Narmada Prasad v. Chagenlal, AIR 1969 SC 395 = 1969 (1) SCR 499; Prabodh Chand v. Mohinder Singh, AIR 1971 SC 257; Sumitra Devi v. Sheo Shankar Prasad Yadav, AIR 1973 SC 215= 1973 (2) SCR. 920; Chanda Singh v. Shiv Ram, AIR 1975 SC 403; Vital Nagaraj v. R. Dayanand Sagar, AIR 1975 SC 349 = 1975 (2) SCR. 384; Laxmi Narain v. Chander Singh, AIR 1977 SC 587= 1977 (2) SCR. 412, depending on the facts thereof, it hasbeen observed that the trial judge#18;s assessment was entitled to great weight and respect and was, therefore, not to be ordinarily interfered with. None of these cases, however indicated that the Supreme Court would not go into the matter if the facts and circumstances warranted a detailed examination or a fresh assessment. The decisio of Rambhai v. Dabhi Ajitkumar, AIR 1965 SC 669 = 1965 (I) SCR. 712, was also referred to and the ratio of all these decisions makes the position clear that an appeal laid before this Court whether under a statutte conferring a right of appeal or as a result of grant of leave under Article 136 of the constitution opens up the normal civil appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to be exercised. The Supreme Court would be justified in recording the correct findings on ample and abundant materials which have been overlooked and ignored by the High Court, as held in Bhanu Kumar v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1871 SC 2025 = (1971) 3 SCR. 522. Interference is warranted where there is grave or palpable error in the appreciation of the evidence on the basisi of which the findings were arrived at as held in Sumitra Devi#18;s case (supra); and where the Supreme Court is satisfied that the judgment of the High Court is against the weight of evidence on record and preponderance of probabilities, as held in Mohd. Yasin Shah v. Ali Akbar Khan, AIR 1976 SC 1866; Laxminarayan v. Returning Officer, AIR 1974 SC 66. In S. Raghbir Singh Gill v. S. Gurcharan Singh Tohra, AIR 1980 SC 1362, it was pointed out that if something is radically wrong with the approach of the learned Judge trying the election petition it would be the Supreme Court to rectify the error. The jurisdiction to exercise in an appeal under the Act, appears to be as wide as in any other civil appeal. Section 116C(1) clearly indicates that the appeal to the Supreme Court has to be disposed of by exercising the same jurisdiction as is exercised in an appeal against the original judgment of the High Court. In this view of the matter, as held in the case of Surinder Singh (supra), there can be no rule, whether statutory or evolved by the Supreme Court by long usage, that it would not interfere with the finding of fact reached at the trial stage. Ordinarily a finding reached on assessment of the evidence particularly when it is oral would not be interfered with but where the Court is satisfied that on account of a wrong approach to matter, injustice has been done to one of the parties before it, it would not only be within the powers of the Court but it would be its obligation to rectify the mistake and do justice to the party.

       

       – In the case of Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh, AIR 1985 SC 89, relying on the decision in A. Younus Kunj v. R.S. Umni, AIR 1984 SC 960, it was observed that evidence even if accepted as a whole would not be sufficient to establish the charge of corrupt practice on this score. The Supreme Court in the later case has rightly indicated that oral evidence, particularly coming from a tainted source cannot form the sole basis of proof of corrupt practice.

       

       – As held in Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh, AIR 1985 SC 89, the allegations of corrupt practice have to be strictly pleaded with material particulars and evidence beyond the ambit of plea would not be permitted to be led.

       

       – The fact that protection had been extended by the appellant to his supporter and members of his family even by raising quarrel with the local police inspector would not lead to a backward presumption of consent for the acts of his supporter. Consent is the life line to link up the candidate with the action of the other person which may amount to corrupt practice and unless it is specifically pleaded and clearly proved– in view of the fact that all ingredients have to beyond reasonable doubt– the appellant cannot be charged for the actions of his supporter and his group as held in Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh, AIR 1985 SC 89.

       

       – a candidate is entitled to canvass for votes. One who is in the field to be an electoral representative is also entitled to nourish his constituency. As pointed in the case of Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1971 SC 2025, amelioration of grievances of the public is innocuous and cannot be construed against a candidate. The Supreme Court in the case of Surinder Singh v. Hirdial Singh, AIR 1985 SC 89, agreed that while nourishing is a legitimate activity, it is a paramount importance that nourishing should not transgress the limit so as to corrupt the electoral process. The appellant was already in the field as a candidate for the legislature and was entitled to help the people in his constituency in a legitimate way. In this case a voter has applied to the State Electricity Board for removal of electric wires overhanging first floor of his house and the application as well as the demand against him to deposit app. Rs. 1000 with the Board were pending since long. He made grievances to the contesting candidate who exercised his influence for removal of the wire immediately. The required deposit was made in the name of the voter. Once the allegation that the candidate himself had deposited the said amount is discarded, his taking up the cause of the said voter for early shifting of electric wires overhanging, his house would not amount to “bribe” and no corrupt practice being committed.

       

       – distribution the meeting is not covered under sub–section (2) of Section 123 of the and is clearly an electoral offence dealt with by Section 127 of the Act, as held in Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh, AIR 1985 SC 89, but such allegations must be specifically pleaded with material particulars and evidence beyond the ambit of plea would not be permitted to led. Also held that disturbing the election meeting by itself did not constitute undue influence.

       

       – distribution the meeting is not covered under sub–section (2) of Section 123 of the Act and is clearly an electoral offence death with by Section 127 of the Act, as held in Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh, AIR 1985 SC 89, but such allegations must be specifically pleaded with material particulars and evidence beyond the ambit of plea would not be permitted to led. also held that disturbing the election meeting by itself did not constitute undue influence.