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1985 Supreme(SC) 67

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
D.A. DESAI AND AMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.
The City Corporation of Calicut, Appellant
Versus
Thachambalath Sadasivan and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal Nos. 13 and 14 of 1971, D/- 26-2-1985.

Headnote:

Calicut City Municipal Act, 1961 - Kerala Municipal Corporation Act, 1964 - Land for Soaking Coconut Husks - Validity of Licence Fee - Respondents in these two appeals filed Original Petitions challenging validity of licence fee levied by appellant - City Corporation of Calicut to be paid for use of land or premises for soaking of coconut husks - Appellant Corporation by its resolution levied licence fees in respect of various items subsequently restyled including for use of premises and land for soaking coconut husks - Respondents are admittedly carrying on trade of soaking coconut husks and they had not taken out a licence for carrying on trade - Commissioner of appellant Corporation issued a notice to each of respondents calling upon him to show cause why within three days of receipt of notice, respondents should not be prosecuted for using premises for soaking coconut husks without obtaining a licence as required by law - Respondents challenged validity and legality of aforementioned notices issued by Corporation and served upon them in aforementioned two writ petitions on diverse grounds, inter alia contending that if licence fee is levied as a fee, no service is rendered or special advantage or favour is conferred by Corporation on respondents for collecting such fee and that there is no quid pro quo and that relevant provisions of Act do not enable Corporation to levy such a fee – Held, It is thus well-settled by numerous recent decisions of this Court that traditional concept in a fee of quid pro quo is undergoing a transformation and that though fee must have relation to services rendered, or advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough - It is not necessary to establish that those who pay fee must receive direct benefit of services rendered for which fee is being paid - If one who is liable to pay receives general benefit from authority levying fee the element of service required for collecting fee is satisfied - It is not necessary that person liable to pay must receive, some special benefit or advantage for payment of fee - Applying ratio of these decisions it is incontrovertible that appellant- Corporation is rendering numerous services to persons within its areas of operation and that therefore levy of licence fee as fee is fully justified - Soaking coconut husk emit foul odour and contaminates environment - Corporation by rendering scavanging services, carrying on operations for cleanliness of city, to make habitation tolerable is rendering general service of which amongst others appellants are beneficiaries - Levy as a fee is thus justified - In this view of matter it is not necessary to consider alternative submission that levy as a tax is legal - Appeals allowed.

Judgment

DESAI, J. :- The respondents in these two appeals filed Original Petitions Nos. 2892-3073 of 1965 challenging the validity of the licence fee levied by the appellant The City Corporation of Calicut to be paid for use of the land or premises for soaking of coconut husks. The appellant. Corporation by its resolution dated January 25, 1963 levied licence fees in respect of various items set out in Schedule IV of the Calicut City Municipal Act, 1961 subsequently restyled as Kerala Municipal Corporation Act, 1964 (Corporation Act for short) including for use of premises and land for soaking coconut husks. The respondents are admittedly carrying on the trade of soaking coconut husks and they had not taken out a licence for carrying on the trade. The Commissioner of the appellant Corporation issued a notice to each of the respondents calling upon him to show cause why within three days of the receipt of the notice, the respondents should not be prosecuted for using premises for soaking coconut husks without obtaining a licence as required by law. The respondents challenged the validity and legality of the aforementioned notices issued by the Corporation and served upon them in the aforementioned two writ petitions on diverse grounds, inter alia contending that if the licence fee is levied as a fee, no service is rendered or special advantage or favour is conferred by the Corporation on the respondents for collecting such fee and that there is no quid pro quo and that the relevant provisions of the Act do not enable the Corporation to levy such a fee. Alternatively, it was contended that if it is levied as a tax, it is beyond the taxing powers of the Corporation.

2. The Corporation filed its counter-affidavit and sought to justify the fee as a licence fee or in the alternative it was contended that the Corporation had the power to levy a tax of the nature levied by it.

3. Both the petitions came up before a learned single Judge of the High Court who held that the levy of the impugned licence fee is not legal in the absence of conferment of special benefits on the petitoners and other persons who soak coconut husks. The alternative. submission that the Corporation had the power to levy it as a tax was negatived observing that the power to levy the various taxes conferred on the Corporation under Chapter V of the 1964 Act does not comprehend the impugned levy and accordingly held that as a tax it was not valid and legal. Accordingly both the writ petitions were allowed and the impugned notices were quashed. The Corporation after unsuccessful Writ Appeals Nos. 107-108 of 1967 filed these appeals by special leave.

4. Mr. A. S. Nambiar, learned counsel who appeared for the appellant-Corporation urged that the levy of licence fee as fee is fully justified and the High Court was in error in rejecting it as such on the ground that the respondents do not enjoy any special service or benefit for paying the fees on the traditional views of law more or less then prevailing that for a fee there must necessarily be quid pro quo. He submitted that the trend revealed by recent decisions of this Court would show that traditional view about fee has undergone a sea change and that the demarcating line between tax and fee has become so blurred as to become almost invisible. It was alternatively submitted that even according to traditional view the Corporation has placed enough evidence on record to show that the respondents have been and are receiving special service or benefit in return for the fees levied and paid. It is not necessary to examine the alternative submission save saying in passing that the respondents do enjoy certain benefits from the functions discharged by the Corporation. The first limb of the contention must prevail in view of the three recent decisions of this Court.

5. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Mohd. Yasin (1983) 3 SCC 229 after a review of the earlier decisions it was observed as under :

"What do we learn from these








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