Judgment

SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. :- This is an appeal by special leave directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi dated the 21st September, 1973 in Second Appeal No. 294/72. The High Court dismissed the Second Appeal of the appellant and confirmed the decision of the Rent Control Tribunal and ordered eviction. Before the High Court three contentions were urged namely :

1. the petition for eviction was not maintainable in the absence of a notice to quit while determining the tenancy,

2. there was no subletting or parting of possession by the appellant- tenant in favour of R.C. Abrol & Company Pvt. Ltd., and

3. if there was such sub-letting, it had been made with the written consent of the landlord so was not actionable.

2. The Rent Control Tribunal confirmed the findings against the appellant in all the three contentions and the High Court also affirmed the findings of the Rent Control Tribunal. We must note that no contention was raised before us as far as point No. 1, namely notice was not served. The only contention before us was that there was no sub-letting or parting of the possession by the appellant-tenant in favour of R.C. Abrol & Company Pvt. Ltd. and secondly it was urged that if there was sub-letting that had been made with the written consent of the landlord. The Clause 14 of the lease deed in the instant case which provides, inter alia, the terms and conditions is as follows : -

"Clause 14 - That the lessee undertakes not to sub-let the premises to any other party without the written permission of the lessor, and that the lessees contractors M/s. R.C. Abrol & Co. will share the premises with the permission of the lessor".

3. This is in consonance also with the provisions of Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the Act) and sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 16 of the said Act. The first question, therefore, is whether there was any sub-letting and secondly if so was the same with the consent in writing of the landlord. All these questions are essentially questions of facts and were held against the appellant by the Rent Control Tribunal which was the final Court of facts, applying the correct propositions of law. This conclusion has been affirmed by the High Court. Before us it was pointed out by Sree Shankar Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant, that it was not necessary that the consent to sub-letting should be in writing and what he contended was that it was necessary to have the consent and the manner of proving consent was provided in writing. In other words, he contended that the provision which required that the consent should be in writing meant it was mandatory so far as it enjoined consent but it was directory so far as it said that such consent should be in writing. Apart from the statute in this case, we find it difficult to accept this argument in view of the specific clause in the statute hereinbefore. In South Asia Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. S. Sarup Singh AIR 1966 SC 346 Justice A. K. Sarkar as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed that the object of interpreting a statute was to ascertain the intention of the legislature in enacting it. An interpretation defeating the object of a statute is, therefore, not permissible.

4. In paragraph 11 of the judgment at page 350 the learned Judge observed as follows :-

"I notice that the lease gave no express right to the lessee to assign with or without the consent of the lessor. The lessee no doubt had that right under the Transfer of Property Act. It may be that under the clause the lessees assignee would be included in the expression "lessee" as used in the lease; that is the entire effect of the clause. But this would be so whether the lessor had consented to the assignment or not. Therefore this clause does not lead to the conclusion that the lessor had consented to the assignment. It is of no assistance in the present case. I am also inclined to the view that the consent contemplated by Section