Judgment

RANGANATHAN, J.:- We grant special leave and proceed to dispose of the appeal after hearing both counsel.

2. The point raised in the appeal is a very short one. The lands, belonging to the petitioners were among those sought to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by means of a notification under Section 4 issued on 22nd June, 1982. This was followed up by a declaration under Section 6 dated 15th March, 1983. The petitioners challenged both the notification and the declaration in writ petition No. 947 of 1983 before the High Court. The notification under Section 4 was challenged on the ground of mala fides and the declaration under Section 6 on the short ground that the petitioners objections had not been heard before the making of the declaration. When this writ petition came up for hearing, a statement was made on behalf of the Government that the notification under Section 6 was being withdrawn. On this statement being made, the writ petition was withdrawn and disposed of accordingly. Thereafter the petitioners were heard under Section 5A of the Act and a fresh declaration under Section 6 was issued on 4th April, 1985.

3. The petitioners again filed a writ petition in the High Court, being writ petition No. 1143 of 1985, the judgment in which forms the subject matter of the present appeal. In this writ petition they again challenged the notification under Section 4 as vitiated by mala fides and non-application of mind. The High Court has found no merit in this contention and rejected the same. We see no reason to interfere with this conclusion of the High Court.

4. However, another question was also raised by the petitioners, namely, that the withdrawal of the earlier declaration dated 15-3-1983 had the automatic effect of also rendering the notification under Section 4 dated 22-6-1982 ineffective and infructuous. On the strength of the decision of this Court in State v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, (1966) 3 SCR 557), it was contended that, once a declaration under section 6 was issued, the notification under Section 4 exhausted itself. It made no difference, it was said, that the notification issued under S. 6 had been withdrawn. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ajit Singh v. State, AIR 1972 Bom 177 in support of this proposition. This contention, however, was rejected by the High Court and hence the present appeal.

5. We are of opinion that the decision of the High Court is correct and should be upheld. The Bench has rightly pointed out that Ajit Singhs case (supra) had failed to take note of the decisions of this Court in Girdhari Lal Amrit Lal v. State, (1966) 3 SCR 437, State v. Haider Bux, (1976) 3 SCC 536 and State v. Bhogilal Keshavlal, (1980) 2 SCR 284 and, therefore, does not represent the correct law.

6. In Vishnu Prasad Sharmas case (AIR 1966 SC 1593) (supra) the question for consideration of this Court was whether there could be successive declarations in respect of various parcels of land covered by a notification under Section 4(1). Considering the scheme of the Act as it then stood, the Court held that the Act envisaged a single declaration under Section 6 in respect of a notification under section 4 and that, when once a declaration under Section 6 particularising the area in the locality specified in the notification under Section 4(1) is issued, the remaining non-particularised area stands automatically released. The Court also referred to the provisions of Section 48 of the Act in this context. The following observations appear in the judgment of Sarkar J. (at p. 1596 of AIR).

"........it seems to me that if the correct interpretation is that only one declaration can be made under S. 6, that also would exhaust the notification under S. 4; that notification would no longer remain in force to justify successive declarations under S. 6 in respect of different areas included in it. There is nothing in the Act to support the view