SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.
Atma Ram Mittal, Appellant
Versus
Ishwar Singh Punia, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 3081 of 1988 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 16342 of 1985), D/- 22-8-1988.
Advocates appeared
Mr. R. K. Jain Sr. Advocate and Ms. Abha Jain, Advocate with him, for Appellant; Mr. K. C. Sharma and Mr. R.K. Virmani, Advocates, for Respondent.
Haryana Urban (Control) of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 – Section 1(3) – Appellant-landlord filed a suit for possession in the Civil Court of Hissar in Haryana – Respondent is the tenant in the shop situated at Raj Guru Market which had been rented out to the respondent – Suit was filed on the basis that the respondent was in arrears of rent and the tenancy of the respondent had been terminated by giving him notice – Suit was filed for recovery of possession on the termination or expiry of the period of tenancy – It was filed because of Section 1(3) of the Haryana Urban (Control) of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 – Act was passed with the object to control the increase of rent of certain buildings and rented land situated within the limits of urban areas and the eviction of tenants therefrom – For our present purpose, it would suffice if we bear in mind two relevant provisions –Held, Judicial time and energy is more often than not consumed in finding what is the intention of the Parliament or in other words, the will of the people – Blackstone tells us that the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs most natural and probable – And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law – See Commentaries on the Laws of England said that each word, phrase or sentence was to be construed in the light of purpose of the Act itself – But words must be construed with imagination of purpose behind them said Learned Judge Hand, long time ago – It appears, therefore, that though we are concerned with seeking of intention, we are rather looking to the meaning of the words that the legislator has used and the true meaning of what words as was said by Lord Reid in Black-Clawson International – Court are clearly of the opinion that having regard to the language we must find the reason and the spirit of the law – Appeal allowed.
Judgment
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. :- Special leave granted. The appeal is disposed of herein after hearing counsel for both the parties.
2. The appellant-landlord filed a suit for possession in the Civil Court of Hissar in Haryana. The respondent is the tenant in the shop situated at Raj Guru Market which had been rented out to the respondent in 1978. The suit was filed on the basis that the respondent was in arrears of rent from 1st December, 1981 to 31st May, 1982 and the tenancy of the respondent had been terminated by giving him notice. The suit was filed for recovery of possession on the termination or expiry of the period of tenancy. It was filed because of Section 1(3) of the Haryana Urban (Control) of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Act was passed with the object to control the increase of rent of certain buildings and rented land situated within the limits of urban areas and the eviction of tenants therefrom. For our present purpose, it would suffice if we bear in mind two relevant provisions. Section 1(3) of the Act provides as follows :
"Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building the construction of which is completed on or after the commencement of this Act for a period of ten years from the date of its completion."
3. Section 13 of the Act deals with the eviction of tenants and sub-section (1) thereof provides that the tenant in possession of a building or a rented land shall not be evicted therefrom except in accordance with the provisions of that section. The section thereafter enumerates the statutory grounds for eviction upon which eviction is permitted which incidentally are more or less similar statutory grounds all over the country.
4. On or about 15th February, 1983, the respondent-tenant filed his written statement. In November, 1984, the respondent-tenant moved an application for dismissal of the suit of the appellant stating that the shop in question was constructed in June, 1974 as such the period of ten years had elapsed by June, 1984 in terms of Section 1(3) of the Act, and, as such, the immunity from the application of the Act had expired. The suit under the Act is not maintainable and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court stands barred. The learned Sub-Judge, Hissar, held that the decree was not necessary to be passed within the exemption period of ten years under Section 1(3) of the Act. The learned Sub-Judge accordingly dismissed the respondents application. Aggrieved thereby, the tenant-respondent referred a revision to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The High Court held that as the suit had not been decreed within the period of ten years, the building in question came within the operation of the Act and as such the Rent Act was applicable and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. In the premises, the learned Judge of the High Court dismissed the suit pending before the Sub-Judge. Aggrieved thereby the appellant has come up in appeal to this Court.
5. More or less identical provisions of the U. P. Act had come up for consideration before this Court in the case of Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, (1984) 3 SCC 352: The only point that was urged before this Court in that decision was whether the premises which was not ten years old on the date of the suit and was exempted from the operation of the new Rent Act, could be governed by it if ten years expired during the pendency of the litigation. The relevant provisions of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 provided as follows:
"20. Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified grounds.- (1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building, notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of a notice to quit or in any other manner:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall bar a suit for the eviction of a tenant on the determination of his tenancy by eff
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