Judgment

SHARMA, J.:- This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court: (reported in 1983 Lab IC 1548 (All) dismissing the appellants writ petition challenging an award of the Industrial Tribunal.

2. The appellant was working as an Assistant Cashier in the Rampur Zila Sahkari Bank Ltd., when a reference of an industrial dispute was made under S. 4-A of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the U. P. Act). The provisions of the U. P. Act relevant to the present case are similar to those of the Central Act, that is, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 4-A of the U. P. Act, like the corresponding S. 10 of the Central Act, empowers the State Government to refer industrial disputes to Labour Courts or Tribunals. During the pendency of the reference the appellant was put under suspension and served with a charge-sheet in February 1976, which was followed by a domestic inquiry leading to the dismissal of the appellant from service on 16-8-1976. The U. P. Act in Ss. 6-E and 6-F incorporates provisions similar to those in Ss. 33 and 33-A of the Central Act. The appellant filed a complaint under S. 6-F of the U. P. Act before the Industrial Tribunal, and the same was treated as a dispute referred to it, and was finally disposed of by the Award which was impugned before the High Court.

3. The Tribunal, in the first instance, examined the case of the appellant on the question whether principles of natural justice had been followed in the ,domestic inquiry, and after hearing the parties, decided the issue by its order dated 23-2-1979 in favour of the workman. Proceeding further the Tribunal asked the management to justify the order of punishment on merits. Accordingly, the parties led their evidence and the Tribunal recorded a finding that the charges levelled were established by the materials on the record and the workman, therefore, was not entitled to any relief.

4. As stated earlier, the appellant challenged the award before the Allahabad High Court by filing a writ petition. By a well discussed judgment, which is now under challenge before us, the High Court dismissed the writ application.

5. Mr. Ramamurthi, the learned counsel appearing in support of the appeal, has raised before us the following two points:

(i) After recording its conclusion that the domestic inquiry was vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice, the Tribunal was under the duty of announcing its award in favour of the appellant; and since there was no application filed on behalf of the employer for permission to justify the punishment by leading evidence, the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in asking the management to do so.

(ii) In any event, the appellant was entitled to his salary for the period 16-8-1976 (that is, the date of his dismissal) to 20-7-1980, the date of the Award of the Tribunal.

6. Mr. Ramamurthi contended that after the conclusion reached by the Tribunal that the domestic inquiry held by the employer was illegal, question of justification of the impugned punishment by fresh, materials could arise only if the management had applied to the court for permission to justify the punishment and, in the absence of such a prayer, the Tribunal did not have the power to call upon the employer to do so. In order to proceed further with the Reference for the above purpose, it was essential to have a pleading in this regard, along with an express prayer by the employer, and the Tribunal was not entitled to adopt an advisory role by informing the employer of its rights, namely the right to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charges. The learned counsel heavily relied on the decision of this Court in Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. (1978) 3 SCR 1165 which was governed by the Central Act. As rightly urged on behalf of the appellant, a. relevant decision under the Central Act must be held to apply to a case under the U. P. Act. since the provisi