JUDGMENT

K.N. SAIKIA, J.:—The appellants were contesting alienations under the provisions of the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920, hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act, and their suits were at appellate stage in the High Court when the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Amendment Act, 1973 (Punjab Act No. 7 of 1973), hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act came into force on 23rd day of January, 1973. The High Court dismissed the appeals taking the view that no contest to alienations was permissible after the Amendment Act came into force. Hence these eight appeals by special leave.

2. Earlier the suit Dharam Singh v. Ujaggar Singh, disputing the customary adoption of the defendant and the gift deed made in his favour and claiming title to the property mutated by that right was filed on 22-8-1966 and Judgment of the trial Court was dated 16-10-1968. On appeal the District Judge, Ludhiana by Judgment dated 12-1-1970 remanded the case and after remand the Judgment was delivered by trial Court on 26-8-1971; the appeal therefrom was filed on 29-9-1971 and the District Judge delivered Judgment on 28-2-1973. Meanwhile the Amendment Act came into force on 23-1-1973. The second appeal was filled on 25-3-1973 and it was dismissed on 3-4-1973 and it was dismissed on 3-4-1973. Special Leave Petition filed in this Court on 1-5-1973 and special leave being granted on 21-8-1973 arose Civil Appeal No. 1263 of 1973; Ujaggar Singh v. Dharam Singh.

3. The main question in the above appeal before this Court was whether the Amendment Act of 1973 would or would not apply to the pending proceedings. The appellants contention was that it would not. 0. Chinnappa Reddy, J. and E. S. Venkataramiah, J. as he then was, while dismissing the appeal on 2811-1986 held:

In view of Section 7 of the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act as amended in 1973, there is no substance in this appeal. We also notice that it has been the consistent view of the Punjab High Court that Section 7 has retrospective effect and that it also applies to pending proceedings."

4. Again in Civil Appeal No. 1135 of Chinnappa Reddy, and K. Jagannatha Shetty, JJ. while rejecting the contention that the Amendment Act did not apply to the pending proceeding, and dismissing the appeal on 16-7-1987 held

"The view taken by the High Court in regard to the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Amendment Act, 1973 in the present case has consistently been taken by the High Court right from 1973 and we do not think we will be justified in taking a different view at this stage".

5. In Bara Singh v.Kashmira Singh, Civil Appeal No. 1934 of 1972 reported in (1987) 2 JT (SC) 234, A. P. Sen and V. Balakrishna Eradi, JJ. regarding the same question of applicability of Section 7 of the Amendment Act to the pending proceedings orders on 4-1-1987:

"Our attention is drawn to the view taken by this Court in Ujaggar Singh v. Dharam Singh (Civil Appeal No. 1263 of 1973, decided on November 28, 1986) to the effect that the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) was is retrospective in operation and that it also applies to pending proceedings. We find that the view appears to run counter to the express provisions of sub-s. (2) of S. 1 of the Amendment Act which provides that the amendment shall be deemed to have come into force only on January 3, 1973. It cannot be disputed that S. 3 of the Amendment Act which makes S. 7 of the Act applicable to all immovable property i.e. whether ancestral or non-ancestral affects substantive rights of the parties. When the legislature has clearly indicated that Amendment Act shall be prospective in operatin, it follows that S.7 as amended cannot apply to pending proceedings instituted much earlier. We therefore feel that the view expressed in Ujagar Singh v. Dharam Singh, requires reconsideration.

Let the papers be placed before Honble the Chief Justice of India for the case bieng placed before a Bench of three Judges

6. This is how nine connected appeals Singh v. Kashmir