JUDGMENT

AHMADI, J.:- A large number of writ petitions were filed in this Court by persons claiming a right to trade on the pavements situate within the areas under the control of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) and the New Delhi Municipal Committee (NDMC) in different parts of the city of Delhi. These writ petitions filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution and certain appeals brought under Art. 136 of the Constitution against adverse judgments of the Delhi High Court were referred to a Constitution Bench of this Court for deciding on the grievance of the pavement-traders that the Municipal Authorities were violating their fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19(1)(g) and/or 21 of the Constitution by refusing to permit them to trade on streets and footpaths in different localities of the city of Delhi. The Constitution Bench by its judgment dated 30th August, 1989 in Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee (1989) 4 SCC 155 came to the conclusion that the right to carry on trade or business mentioned in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution on street pavements, if properly regulated, cannot be denied on the ground that the street pavements are meant exclusively for pedestrians and cannot be put to any other use. Proper regulation is, however, a necessary condition, for otherwise the very object of laying roads would be defeated. While conceding that all public streets and roads in the country vest in the State, the Constitution Bench held that the State holds them as trustee on behalf of the public and the members of the public are entitled as beneficiaries to use them for trading as a matter of right subject of course to similar rights possessed by every other citizen including pedestrians. The right of a pavement-hawker is, however, subject to reasonable restrictions under Cl. (6) of Art. 19 of the Constitution and the State as trustee is entitled to impose all necessary limitations on the character and extent of user by such pavement-hawkers. The Constitution Bench, however, clarified that there cannot be a fundamental right of a citizen to occupy a particular place on the pavement where he can squat and engage in trading business. Nor can the hawker assert a fundamental right to occupy permanently specific places on any pavement. It recognised the right under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution but negatived the submission based on Art. 21. It held that the right to carry on any trade or business and the concept of life and personal liberty enshrined under Art. 21 have no connection whatsoever and, therefore, Art. 21 has no application. In paragraph 17 (of SCC) : (para 16 of AIR) Sharma, J. speaking for the majority observed as under:

"So far as right of a hawker to transact business while going from place to place is concerned, it has been admittedly recognised for a long period. Of course, that also is subject to proper regulation in the interest of general convenience of the public including health and security considerations. What about the right to squat on the roadside for engaging in trading business? As was stated by this Court in Bombay Hawkers union v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 528 the public streets by their nomenclature and definition are meant for the use of general public; they are not laid to facilitate the carrying on of private business. If hawkers were to be conceded the right claimed by them, they could hold the society to ransom by squatting on the busy thoroughfares, thereby paralysing all civil life. This is one side of the picture. On the other hand if properly regulated according to the exigency of the circumstances, the small traders on the sidewalks could considerably add to the comfort and convenience of general public by making available ordinary articles of everyday use for a comparatively lesser price."

Kuldip Singh, J. who wrote a separate judgment concurred with the view taken by the majority for reasons of his own.

2. It is, therefore, settled law that every citizen has