JUDGMENT

SHARMA, J.—(On behalf of himself, Venkataramiah C.JI., Natarajan and N. D. Ojha, JJ.) :- The petitioners in all these cases claim the right to engage in trading business on the pavements of roads of the city of Delhi. They have asserted that they have been pursuing their trade with the permission of the municipal authorities for some time, but recently there has been illegal interference by them. Some of the petitioners have moved this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution and others impugn adverse judgments of the Delhi High Court dismissing their claim.

2. As the petitioners have challenged the correctness of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Pyarelal v. N. D. M. C. (1967) 3 SCR page 747 these cases were placed for hearing before a larger Bench.

3. The petitioners, in their applications before this Court, have alleged that they were allowed by the respondents to transact their business by occupying a particular area on the pavements, on payment of certain charges described as Tehbazari. It is contended that the municipal authorities by their refusal to permit the petitioners to continue with their trade are violating their fundamental right guaranteed under Arts. 19(l)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. They have also complained of mala fides, arbitrariness and discriminatory conduct attracting Art. 14 of the Constitution.

4. The respondents, besides denying the facts alleged by the petitioners, contended that nobody has got a legal right to occupy exclusively a particular area on the road pavements for pursuing a trading business, and nobody can claim any fundamental right in this regard whatsoever. It has been strenuously urged that the roads are meant for the use of general public for passing and re-passing and they are not laid to facilitate the carrying on of private business.

5. The main argument on behalf of the petitioners was addressed by Mr. Tarkunde, who appeared for petitioner Sodan Singh in S.L.P. No. 15257 of 1987. Several learned advocates representing the other petitioners, besides adopting the main argument, made brief supplementary submissions. The place where petitioner Sodan Singh claims to have the right to squat for selling ready-made garments is within New Delhi. Several other petitioners have similar claims against the New Delhi Municipal Committee. The remaining petitioners allege that they have been pursuing their squatting business within Delhi, as defined in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, which is administered by the respondent Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Separate arguments have been made on behalf of the New Delhi Municipal Committee and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi.

6. Mr. Tarkunde urged that petitioner Sodan Singh is a poor hawker making his both ends meet by selling ready-made garments on an area of 8 X 24 near Electric Pole No. 12, Janpath Lane, New Delhi as illustrated in the attached map Annexure- A to the petition. Earlier he was permitted to hawk from time to time by the respondent under licences as per Annexure A-2, but now the privilege is being denied to him and his goods were removed forcibly from the pavement and were later released only on payment of cost of removal charges. In the counter affidavit of the respondent the allegations have been denied and it has been pointed out that the photo copy of the licence AnnexureA-2 itself shows that the petitioner was permitted to sell Channa and Moongphali on a Vehngi on and around Bus-stop No. 430 on Pt. Pant Marg; and he was at no point of time allowed to occupy a fixed place for carrying on business in readmade garments. We do not propose to go into the facts of this or the other petitions and would leave the individual cases to be dealt with by the Division Bench in the light of the general principle which will be discussed in this judgment.

7. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi was established by a notification issued under S. 3 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, and the provisions of that