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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
KULDIP SINGH N.M. KASLIWAL AND B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, JJ.State of M.P. and another, Appellants
Versus
Pramod Bhartiya and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 4049 of 1992
Decided on 8-10-1992.
Equal Remuneration Act (25 of 1976), S.2(G).
Equal pay for equal work, it is self-evident, is implicit in the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14, it flows from it. Because clause (d) Article 39 spoke of equal pay for equal work for both men and women it did not cease to be a part of Art. 14. To say that the said rule having been stated as a directive principle of State policy is not enforceable in a Court of Law is to indulge in sophistry. Parts IV and III of the Constitution are not supposed to be exclusionary of each other. The rule is as much a part of Article 14 as it is clause (1) of Art. 16. Equality of opportunity guaranteed by Article 16(1) necessarily means and involves equal pay for equal work. It means equally that it is neither a mechanical rule nor does it mean geometrical equality. The concept of reasonable classification and all other rules evoked with respect to Articles 14 and 16(1) come into play wherever complaint of infraction of that rule follows for consideration. In this context, it would be appropriate to refer to the definition of the expression same work or work of similar nature contained in clause (h) of Section 2 of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, enacted by Parliament Article 3(d) of the constitution and the obligation created by the Governing equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value to which India is a signatory. It would be evident from that definition that the stress is upon the similarity of skill, effort and responsibility when performed under similar conditions. Further, the quality of work may vary from post to post. It may vary from institution to institution. This reality cannot be ignored or overlooked. It is not a matter of assumption but one of proof. Since the plea of equal pay for equal work has to be examined with reference to Art. 14 the burden is upon the persons complaining of discrimination to establish right to equal pay, or the plea of discrimination, as the case may be. (Paras 1, 11, 12)
Where the Lecturers in the M.P. Higher Secondary Schools though complained of discrimination in pay scales on basis of material in counter-affidavit of Govt., but the material went only to show that (a) the qualifications prescribed for the Lecturers in the Higher Secondary Schools and the non-technical Lectures in Technical Schools were the same; (b) service conditions of both the categories of Lecturers were same; and (c) that the status of the schools was also the same yet there was a conspicuous absence of any clear allegation and /or material suggesting that function and responsibilities of both the categories of Lectures were similar much less was there any allegation or proof that qualitatively speaking, they performed similar functions. The material in counter affidavit of Govt., the Lecturers of Higher Secondary Schools could not be considered to have show that they were discriminated against in the matter of pay scale. It is not enough to say that the qualifications are same nor is it enough to say that the schools are of the same status. It is also not sufficient to say that the services are similar. What is more important and crucial is whether they discharge similar duties, functions and responsibilities. (Para 12)
PLEA OF EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK HAS TO BE EXAMINED WITH REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 14#23;THE BURDEN IS UPON THE PERSONS COMPLAINING OF DISCRIMINATION TO ESTABLISH THEIR RIGHT TO EQUAL PAY OR THE PLEA OF DISCRIMINATION
JUDGMENT
B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.:—Equal pay for equal work, it is self-evident, is implicit in the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14, it flows from it. Because clause (d) of Article 39 spoke of "equal pay for equal work for both men and women" it did not cease to be a part of Art.14. To say that the said rule having been stated as a directive principle of State policy is not enforceable in a Court of Law is to indulge a sophistry. Parts IV and III of the Constitution are not supposed to be exclusionary of each other. They are complementary to each other. The rule is as much a part of Article 14 as it is of clause (1) of Art. 16. Equality of opportunity guaranteed by Article 16(l) necessarily means and involves equal pay for equal work. It means equally that it is neither a mechanical rule nor does it mean geometrical equality. The concept of reasonable classification and all other rules evolved with respect to Articles 14 and 16(l) come into play wherever complaint of infraction of this rule falls for consideration. This is the principle affirmed in Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618 as well as in the subsequent decisions of this Court. It would be instructive to notice a few of them.
2. In Randhir Singh (AIR 1982 SC 879), Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Bench of three learned Judges said:
"We concede that equation of posts and equation of pay are matters primarily for the Executive Government and expert bodies like the Pay Commission and not for Courts but we must hasten to say that where all things are equal that is, where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differentially in the matter of their pay merely because the), belong to different departments. Of course, if officers of the same rank perform dissimilar functions and the power, duties and responsibilities of the posts held by them vary, such officers may not be heard to complain of dissimilar pay merely because the posts are of the same rank and the nomenclature is the same........Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Article 39(d), we are of the view that the principle equal pay for equal work is deducible from those Articles and may be properly applied to case of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer."
3. The above principle was followed and applied in P. K. Ramachandra Iyer, (1984) 2 SCC 141; Savita, 1985 Suppl SCC 94; Dhirendra Chamoli, (1986) 1 SCC 637; Surinder Singh, (1986) 1 SCC 639; Jaipal, (1988) 3 SCC 354: (AIR 1988 SC 1504) and in Federation of All India Customs and Excise Stenographers v. Union of India, (1988) 3 SCC 91. While it is not necessary to refer to all the decisions, a brief reference to the decision last mentioned may be in order. S. Mukherji, J. speaking for himself and R. S. Pathak, C.J. had this to say about the content of the rule (at p. 1300 of AIR 1988 SC 1291):
"In this case the differentiation has been sought to be justified in view of the nature and the types of the work done, that is, on intelligible basis. The same amount of physical work may entail different quality of work, some more sensitive, some requiring more tact, some less - it varies from nature and culture of employment. The problem about equal pay cannot always be translated into a mathematical formula. If it has a rational nexus with the object sought for, as reiterated before a certain amount of value judgment of the administrative authorities who are charged with fixing the pay scales has to be left with them and it cannot be interfered with by the Court unless it is demonstrated that either it is irrational or based on no basis or arrived mala fide either in law or in fact. In the light of the averments made in the facts mentioned before, it is not possible to say that the differentiation is based on no rational nexus with the object
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