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1993 Supreme(SC) 239

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
BEFORE KULDIP SINGH AND N.M. KASLIWAL, JJ.
G. ANNAMALAI PILLAI
Versus
DISTRICT REVENUE OFFICER AND OTHERS
Civil Appeal No. 4792 of 1984{From the Judgment and Order dated September 14, 1984 of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal No. 96 of 1981}
Decided on 17-3-1993
Advocates appeared:
Sanjeev Madan and Ms Asha Jain Madan, Advocates, for the Appellant;
A.T.M. Sampath, Advocate, for the Respondents.

Advocates:
A.T.M.SAMPATH, ASHA JAIN MADAN, SANJIV MADAN

Headnote:

Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 – Section 8(3) – Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands Record of Tenancy Rights Act, 1969 – Property Case – Praying that he be registered as a tenant in the tenancy records – Whether lease deed in dispute – Consideration in this appeal – Special leave is against the judgment – It is not disputed before us that the land in dispute was owned by Janarthanan, respondent 5 before us – Claiming to be a cultivating tenant, on the basis of the lease deed, Annamalai Pillai filed an application before the Tehsildar under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands Record of Tenancy Rights Act, 1969 praying that he be registered as a tenant in the tenancy records. Janarthanan contested the said proceeding on the ground that the land was his property, his father had no right or title to deal with the same and the lease deed executed by his father was contrary to the provisions of Section 8 of the Act – He further contended that he had no knowledge of the execution of the lease deed by his father and on attaining majority he avoided the same – Tehsildar held that there was no valid lease and as such he dismissed the application of Annamalai Pillai –Held, Court held that the life estate holder was entitled to create a valid tenancy and the tenant was entitled to take the benefit of the Tenants Protection Act – It was further held that the right accrued to the tenant could legally extend beyond the lifetime of the life estate holder and would bind the successor – Reason is obvious – Life estate holder has a right to lease the property – He does not deal with the property on behalf of the successor – Though the lease itself may be valid only during the lifetime of the life estate holder, the authority to lease could not be questioned – If once initially there was a valid tenancy then the successor is bound by the tenancy rights acquired by the tenant during that period – In the present case unlike life estate holder the father of respondent 5 had no authority to lease the property without complying with the provisions – Because of the inherent illegality in the execution of the lease deed it was liable to be cancelled at the option of the minor on attaining majority – On the exercise of option the lease became void ab initio – Dismiss the appeal.

JUDGMENT

KULDIP SINGH, J.—The short question for consideration in this appeal is whether lease deed in dispute, which was voidable in terms of Section 8(3) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (the Act) when validly avoided, was effective from the date of the lease deed so as to make the transaction void and unenforceable from the very inception.

2. It is not disputed before us that the land in dispute was owned by Janarthanan, respondent 5 before us. His father Purushothaman by a registered deed dated December 12, 1971 leased the land in dispute for a period of five years to G. Annamalai Pillai. On the date when the lease deed was executed Janarthanan was a minor, his date of birth being September 27, 1957. Claiming to be a cultivating tenant, on the basis of the lease deed, Annamalai Pillai filed an application before the Tehsildar under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands Record of Tenancy Rights Act, 1969 praying that he be registered as a tenant in the tenancy records. Janarthanan contested the said proceeding on the ground that the land was his property, his father had no right or title to deal with the same and the lease deed executed by his father was contrary to the provisions of Section 8 of the Act. He further contended that he had no knowledge of the execution of the lease deed by his father and on attaining majority he avoided the same on September 15, 1978. The Tehsildar held that there was no valid lease and as such he dismissed the application of Annamalai Pillai. On appeal the Revenue Divisional Officer reversed the findings of the Tehsildar and came to the conclusion that Annamalai Pillai was a contractual tenant and as such was entitled to be registered as a cultivating tenant. Janarthanan preferred a revision before the District Revenue Officer who set aside the order of the appellate authority and restored the order of the Tehsildar holding that the Annamalai Pillai was not a cultivating tenant. The writ petition and the writ appeal filed by Annamalai Pillai were dismissed by the Madras High Court. This appeal by way of special leave is against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court dated September 14, 1984 rendered in writ appeal.

3. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act which are relevant are reproduced hereunder:

"(2) The natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the court,-

(a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable property of the minor, or

(b) lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five years or for a term extending more than one year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority.

(3) Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him."

4. Respondent 5 was to attain majority on September 27, 1975 and the lease was to subsist up to December 11, 1976. Since the tenure of the lease in this case was to go more than one year beyond the date on which the minor was to attain majority the provisions of Section 8(2)(b) were attracted.

5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We have been taken through the orders of the Revenue authorities, judgment of the learned Single Judge and of the Division Bench of the High Court in writ appeal. The Division Bench of the High Court, in a lucid judgment, answered the question - posed by us in the beginning - in the affirmative and against the appellant-Annamalai Pillai on the following reasoning:

"We have already seen that clause (3) of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, specifically makes the transaction voidable. The lease executed by the guardian in this case is prohibited and in that sense it was without any authority. On the legal efficacy and the distinction between valid, void and voidable agreements, we find the following passage in Salmond on Jurispru










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