Back
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A. M. AHMADI AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.
S.P. Vaithianathan Appellant
Versus
K. Shanmuganathan, Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 1994, D/-1-3-1994.
Held: It seems clear to us that before a prosecution is terminated as barred by section 53 of the Act, the accused must show that on the allegations made in the complaint it ex-facie appears that the act complained of was done under the provisions of the Act or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force where under powers are conferred on the police. It is true that under section 21 of the Act a police officer can be said to be on duty all the 24 hours. The prosecution launched against the respondent is in regard to the ill-treatment meted out to the appellant when the latter visited the former in response to the summons. It was no part of the duty tinder the Act, Code or any other law for the time being in force conferring power on the police to beat and torture the appellant when he presented himself before the respondent in response to the summons. By no stretch of reasoning can it be said that the respondents action of torturing the appellant was in discharge of any duty or function under the Act or under any other law. It is also difficult to say, if the allegations made are taken at their face value, that the respondents action was incidental to or in furtherance of his duties and functions under any law. It must be realised that/in order to avail of the benefit of section 53 of the Act, the respondent must show that he acted under the Act or any other law. Merely because the appellant was called through a summons issued under law, the conduct of beating and torturing the appellant on the latter appearing in obedience to the summons cannot establish any nexus between the official act of issuance of summons and the action of the respondent on the appearance of the appellant. Unless a relationship is established between the provision of law under which the respondent purports to act and the misdemeanour complained of, the provision of section 53 will not be attracted. In the present case the allegation in the complaint is that while the appellant was called by service of a summons presumably to inquire into allegations of illicit distillation, the respondent had merely used it as an excuse to secure his presence but in fact his real intention was to beat him up to prevent him from complaining against those who were paying him mamool (illegal gratification) money. Thus according to the appellant the respondent bore a grudge against him and, therefore, he misused his power, issued a summons, secured his presence and then tortured him. He has charged him for the commission of offences under sections 341, 342, 363, 364, 506 (II Part) and 307, I.P.C. These do not attract the provision of section 53 of the Act. (Para 5)
Judgment
AHMADI, J.:- Special leave granted.
2. The respondent was the Additional Superintendent of Police, Prohibition and Enforcement, Salem, at all material times. The appellant herein was in-charge of an arrack shop belonging to his uncle at Sivathapuram. On account of illicit distillation in that area, the sales at the said arrack shop fell sharply. Consequently he complained to the authorities to check illicit distillation. His complaints fell on deaf cars. The illicit distillation activities were ever on the increase because of the connivance of the respondent. The appellant, therefore, complained to the higher authorities about the respondents involvement and deliberate connivance at the activities of illicit distillers. The respondent on learning about the complaints and allegation of corruption was annoyed and bore a grudge against the appellant. The respondent, therefore, summoned the appellant to his office on March 20, 1985 at about 8.30 p.m. and beat him up severely and then took him in a jeep to the Prohibition and Excise wing where he was further tortured. The appellant contends that it was by sheer accident that he escaped alive. He then wrote to the respondents superiors about the illtreatment meted out to him but to no avail. He then filed criminal complaint in Court alleging commission of offences under Ss. 341, 342, 323, 363, 364, 506 Part II, and 307 of the Indian Penal Code.
3. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Salem issued process. Thereupon the respondent approached the High Court under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code) for quashing the issuance of process on three grounds, viz.,
(1) there was an inordinate delay of nearly two years in the lodging of the complaint and hence the learned CJM should not have entertained the complaint;
(2) the prosecution was untenable for want of sanction under S. 197 of the Code; and
(3) the prosecution was barred by limitation in view of the provision in S. 53 of the T.N. District Police Act, 1869, (hereinafter called the Act).
The High Court rejected the first and the second contentions but upheld the third contention and consequently quashed the order by which process was issued. The proceedings initiated against the respondent were consequently rendered untenable as barred by S. 53 of the Act. We are, therefore, required to examine the correctness of the finding recorded by the High Court on the third point.
4. Section 53 of the Act reads as under:
"Limitation of action-
All actions and prosecutions against any person which may be lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done, under the provisions of this Act, or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force conferring powers on the police shall be commenced within three months after the act complained of shall have been committed and not otherwise......."
On a plain reading of this provision it becomes clear all actions and prosecutions for anything done under the provisions of the Act or any other law in force conferring powers on the police must be commenced within three months after the act complained of is committed and not otherwise. There is no doubt that the said provision applies to prosecutions also in respect of any action taken or anything done under the provisions of the Act or under the provisions of any other law conferring powers on the police. Two questions, therefore, arise: (i) is the action of the respondent complained of done under the provisions of the Act? or (ii) is the said action done under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force conferring powers on the police? The High Court placing reliance on the decision of a learned single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh (1978) XXII MLJ Reports 412 came to the conclusion:
"......... whereas S. 53 of the Act does not provide for limitation in relation to particular categories of offences unlike S. 468 of the Cr. P.C., which provides for limitation in respect of prosecution, irrespe
An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers
Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance
Scan Me!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :
Back to top
