JUDGMENT

K. RAMASWAMY, J.- This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the High Court, Bombay, dated 13-6-1979 in Writ Petition No. 587 of 1979. The Government of Maharashtra published in the State Gazette the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) (for short the Act) on 11-10-1972, acquiring the lands including House No. 594/B admeasuring about 25 x 25 for public trust "Saibaba Sansthan, Shirdi", the validity of which was challenged by the appellants in the writ petition. The Division Bench rejected their writ petitions in limine. Thus this appeal.

2. It is contended for the appellants that the specification of the "public purpose" in the notification is vague and acquisition for Saibaba Sansthan is not for a public purpose. For the first time before the High Court, the respondents had disclosed in their counter-affidavit, namely, that the land was needed for joining two temples, i.e., Saibaba and Dwaraka Mai Mandir. Even that also is of no public purpose, since those two temples have been in existence for well over years without any need for them to be connected. There is no specification either in the notification or in the counter-affidavit to disclose the purpose behind the proposed acquisition denying to the appellants an opportunity to effectively object to the acquisition. Right of objection statutorily given to the owner of the land under Section 5-A of the Act should not be made illusory by vague statement of public purpose. It is, therefore, a colourable exercise of the power and also is vitiated on the ground of vagueness.

3. It is also contended that by running the business of selling flowers in the house proposed to be acquired for the pilgrims and the small hotel being run there, they would also serve the public purpose of catering to the pilgrims. The acquisition would result in denying their livelihood, offending their right to life. Attempts were made to purchase the property from the appellants by negotiation which were turned down by the Charity Commissioner by his finding that the purchase does not serve any public purpose. Therefore, the exercise of the power by the State under Section 4 is mala fide amenable to judicial review under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution. It is also further contended that for the construction of a huge Dharamshala, a resting room and Prachar Hall, the area under acquisition is too small. The total extent is only 60 sq. m. in all and no useful purpose will be served by acquiring such a small piece of land for a large project.

4. These contentions have been refuted by Shri Ganpule, the learned Senior Counsel for the second respondent-Sansthan. The questions, therefore, are whether the public purpose specified is vague and liable to be quashed on that ground and whether notification published under Section 4(1) of the Act is vitiated by mala fides or colourable exercise of the power. The notification mentions thus:

"Whereas it appears to the Commissioner, Poona Division that lands specified in the Schedule II hereto are likely to be needed for public purpose, viz., for public trust Saibaba Sansthan, Shirdi. It is hereby notified under the provision of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 that the said lands are likely to be needed for the purpose specified above."

The question, therefore, is whether this notification is vague and the public purpose mentioned therein is liable to be quashed on that ground. The leading judgment of this Court in this behalf is the ratio laid down in Somavanti v. State of Punjab{(1963) 2 SCR 774}. The facts therein were that the State of Punjab exercised the power under Section 4(1) and issued the notification followed by the declaration under Section 6 that the land was likely to be needed by the Government for a public purpose, namely, for the "setting up of a factory" (elaborated later on) for manufacturing various ranges of refrigeration compressors and ancillary equipments. It was