SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
KULDIP SINGH & S. SAGHIR AHMAD, JJ.
Kartik Malhar
Versus
State of Bihar
Criminal Appeal No. 1363 of 1995
(Arising out of S.L.P. (CRL.) No.3368 of 1995)
Decided on 15-11-1995.
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - Section 12 - Regular Employees - Regular Service - Termination Of Services - High Court vide its judgment granted two reliefs to writ petitioners, i.e., (i) to grant them wages as ad hoc employees on a par with regular employees; and (ii) directing Corporation to frame a scheme to envisage absorption of writ petitioners to regular service - Since there were no clear-cut directions to keep writ petitioners on roll pending preparation of scheme and consideration of absorption, some orders came to be passed by Orissa State Financial Corporation terminating services of some of writ petitioners but some orders were recalled on making fresh appointments - On contempt petitions being moved, High Court viewed matter with some seriousness and came to conclusion that termination of services of some of writ petitioners was "revengeful", and that belated compliance of orders of restoring them back to their jobs, attracted special costs to be awarded to contempt petitioners - Measure fixed for purpose was Rs 2500 each - These special costs were ordered to be borne by officers of Corporation and not by Corporation itself - These multiple views are subject-matter of these appeals – Held, Proceedings were rather given a turn more to awarding damages/costs and that too without converting figure arrived into that of fine as a measure of punishment - What directly has not been achieved, should not be allowed to be achieved indirectly - Order of High Court, thus, in putting blame on officers personally, appears to us to be erroneous, deserving to be upset - Liability would, thus, not remain personal to officers but would be that of Corporation towards payment of special costs which course rules framed by High Court permit - Petitioners/appellants, prays for disposal of these matters as withdrawn since in his view it would be apt for petitioners/appellants to seek appropriate relief from High Court which is in seisin of matter and so is Committee appointed by High Court to go into desirability and feasibility of scheme - Mr Ganguli prays for and is granted permission to move High Court for purpose – Appeal Disposed Of.
S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J. :
1. Leave granted.
2. The well-known maxim that "Evidence has to be weighed and not counted" has been given statutory placement in Section 134 of the Evidence Act which provides as under:-
"134. No particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact."
3. This section marks a departure from the English Law where a number of statutes still prohibit convictions for certain categories of offences on the testimony of a single witness. This difference was noticed by the Privy Council in Mohamad Gugal Esa Mamasan Ger Alalan v. The King (A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 3) wherein it was laid down as under:
"It was also submitted on behalf of the appellant that assuming the unsworned evidence was admissible the court could not act upon it unless it was corroborated. In England, where provision has been made for the reception of unsworned evidence from a child, it has always been provided that the evidence must be corroborated in some material particularly(ly?) implicating the accused. But in the Indian Act there is no such provision and the evidence is made admissible whether corroborated or not. Once there is admissible evidence a court can act upon it; corroboration unless required by statute goes only to the weight and value of the evidence. It is a sound rule in practice not to act on the uncorroborated evidence of a child, whether sworn or unsworned but, this is a rule of prudence and not of law."
4. The Privy Council decision was considered by this Court in Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras (A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 614) in which it was observed as under:-
"On a consideration of the relevant authorities and the provisions of the Evidence Act, the following propositions may be safely stated as firmly established:
(1) As a general rule, a court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness out ways the testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character.
(2) Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute, courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon for example, in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character.
(3) Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in a matter like this a much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes.
In view of these considerations, we have no hesitation in noticing that the court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much too broadly stated, Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, has categorically laid it down that no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof of any fact. The Legislature determined, as long ago as 1872 presumably after due consideration of the pros and cons that it shall not be necessary for proof or disproof of a fact, to call any particular number of witnesses."
This Court further observed as under. -
"It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence where determination of guilty depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the Legislature were to insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in proof of the crime, would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on su
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