SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Kuldip Singh and S. Saghir Ahmad, JJ.
Kartik Malhar - Appellant
versus
State of Bihar - Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 1363 of 1995
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 3368 of 1995
Decided on 15-11-1995
Held: Conviction can be recorded on the basis of the statement of single eye witness provided his credibility is not shaken by any adverse circumstance appearing on the record against him and the court, at the same time, is convinced that he is a truthful witness. The Court will not then insist on corroboration by any other eye witness particularly as the incident might have occurred at a time or place when there was no possibility of any other eye witness being present. Indeed, the courts insist on the quality, and nor on the quantity of evidence. (Para 4)
(ii) Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 302 - Conviction under - Appeal - Killing by Pharsa - Three eye witnesses produced - Two turned hostile - Solitary eye witness being wife of deceased - Concurrent finding that she was present at the spot from the very beginning She had seen the whole of incident - She accompanied informant to police station - Report lodged in her presence - Her statement fully corroborated - Conviction based solely on her testimony - Sustainable. (Vadivelu Thevars case; AIR 1957 SC 614: Relied on)
Held, that it is open to the courts to record a conviction on the basis of the statement of a single witness provided the evidence-of that witness is reliable, unshaken and consistent with the case of the prosecution. The case of the prosecution cannot be discarded merely on the ground that it was sought to be proved by only one eye witness, nor can it be insisted that the corroboration of the statement of that witness was necessary by other eye-witnesses. The instant case, it may be pointed out, does not strictly fall within the category of those cases where only one witness is present and the case of the prosecution is sought to be proved by the statement of that witness alone. Here, three of the witnesses were produced by two of them turned hostile leaving the third alone and, therefore, on the principles already discussed, if the remaining eye witness is found to be trustworthy, it becomes the duty of the Court to convict the accused. (Para 11)
Further Held: The High Court and the Sessions Judge both have considered all the circumstances of the case and have come to the conclusion that Fulmani was present at the spot from the very beginning and had seen the whole of the incident. She was also found to have accompanied the informant, Marhu Malhar (P.W.1), to the police station where the report was lodged in her presence. She was the first to object to the beating of her husband in the first round. She also noticed that the appellant went back to his house and came again at the spot with a “Pharsa" by which he gave the fatal blows to the deceased. Though two of the alleged eye witnesses had turned hostile, her statement was fully corroborated by other circumstances of the case including the medical evidence. (Para 14)
S. Saghir Ahamd, J. - Leave granted.
2. The well-known maxim that "Evidence has to be weighed and not counted" has been given statutory placement in Section 134 of the Evidence Act which provides as under:
"134. No particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact."
3. This section marks a departure from the English Law where a number of statutes still prohibit convictions for certain categories of offences on the testimony of a single witness. This difference was noticed by the Privy Council in Mohamad Sugal Esa Mamasan Fer Alslan v. The King1, wherein it was laid down as under:
“It was also submitted on behalf of the appellant that assuming the unsworned evidence was admissible the court could not act upon it unless it was corroborated. In England, where provision has been made for the reception of unsworned evidence from a chi1d, it has always been provided that the evidence must be corroborated in some material particularly implicating the accused. But in the Indian Act there is no such provision and the evidence is made admissible whether corroborated or not. Once there is admissible evidence a court can act upon it; corroboration unless required by statute goes only to the weight and value of the evidence. It is a sound rule in practice not to act on the uncorroborated evidence of a child, whether sworn or unsworned but, this is a rule of prudence and not of law.”
The Privy Council decision was considered by this Court in Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras2, in which it was observed as under:
"On a consideration of the relevant authorities arid the provisions of the Evidence Act, the following propositions may be safely stated as firmly established:
(1). As a general rule, a court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness out ways the testimony of a manner of other witnesses of indifferent character.
(2). Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute, courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon for example, in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character.
(3). Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general role can be laid down in a matter like this a much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes;
In view of these considerations, we have no hesitation in holding that the contention that in a murder case, the court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much too broadly stated. Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act has categorically laid it down that no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof of any fact. The legislature determined as long ago as 1872 presumably after due consideration of the pros and cons, that it shall not be necessary for proof or disproof of a fact to call any particular number of witnesses."
This Court further observed as under:
"It is not, seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence where determination of guilty depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the Legislature were to insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in proof of the crime would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is loud by the court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person o
followed : Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras
Ramratan v. State of Rajasthan
Guli Chund v. State of Rajasthan
Vahula Bhushan v. State of T.N.
Jagdish Prasad v. State of M.P.
State of Haryana v. Manoj Kumar
Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi Admn.)
Jayaram Shiva Tagore v. State of Maharashtra
Anil. Phukan v. State of Assam
followed : Gull Chaiid v. State of Rajasthan
Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras
Dalhir Kaur(Mst) v. Stall of Punjab
Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.