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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. RAMASWAMY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.
Dahiben widow of Ranchhodji Jivanji and others, Appellants
Versus
Vasanji Kevalbhai (dead) and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 1578 of 1974
Decided on 7-4-1995.
Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 - Section 7 - Tenancy and claim - Jurisdiction inasmuch - Plaintiffs had issued a notice to defendants Section Bombay Tenancy terminating tenancy and claiming that land was required for personal cultivation possession was demanded by notice on expiry meantime Act came into force whose Section stated that Act would not apply to any area within limits inter alia of municipal borough of within distance of two miles of limit of borough suit land being admittedly situate within this periphery Act did not apply when enacted to area in question- However an amendment was made by Bombay which substituted a new Clause deleting that part of earlier Clause which made Act inapplicable an area of two miles within limits of municipal borough named in clause - Now amendment were to apply retrospectively that is from date coming into force Act civil Court in which suit for eviction was filed would admittedly cease to have jurisdiction; and vice versa- This point has been answered differently by four adjudicating authorities below one reversing decision of or on appeal being preferred to latest decision is that of Letters Patent Bench of Gujarat High Court which has held amendment as retrospective –Held, Court have therefore see whether insofar amendment at hand is concerned could it be reasonably said that same operates retrospectively- It here what was observed by Constitution Bench in case becomes relevant- Bench observed that insofar as Clause Section Act is concerned same would have in context retrospective operation in sense that it would apply to land which could be covered by notification to be issued by Government from time to time so as to take those lands out operation Act granting protection- This observation is de hors what was stated in later part of judgment in which Bench referred cancellation of notification- If notification taking away substantive rights of tenants can have retrospective operation no objection can be taken according advanced on basis of cancellation that same could not take away right which had accrued to landlords as a result of first notification Bench found no force in argument and observed that if landlords had obtained an effective decree and had succeeded in ejecting tenants as a result of that decree which might have become final between parties decree might not have been reopened and execution taken might not have refused- But second notification had come to be issued during pendency of suit because of which it was held that Court was bound to apply law as it was found of its judgment because was no question of taking away of any vested rights in landlords- In present case position is precisely what was found inasmuch as amendment in question had come into force when suit appellant was pending before trial Court which goes to show that no vested rights to get possession had accrued landlord-plaintiff Having come to aforesaid conclusion it is further stated that no useful purpose would be served by requiring to take up case of appellants inasmuch as respondents having been clod again with rights available to protected tenant decree of eviction cannot be against m on basis of termination of ir tenancy by notice which had come to be issued by appellants provisions of Tenancy Act relying upon which present proceeding was initiated against respondents demanding possession - Appeal dismissed
JUDGMENT
HANSARIA, J. :—In this appeal we are basically concerned with the interpretation of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (for short the Act) as amended by Bombay Act No. 33 of 1952. Being concerned with a legislation beneficial to tenants, the Courts are required to give a liberal interpretation; and if we can foretell our conclusion, according to us, the amendment of 1952 would relate back to the Act as enacted. In any case, the amendment would apply to the suit which was pending when the amendment had come into force. In view of this conclusion of ours, the appeal shall have to be dismissed, as the amendment has given benefit to the tenants, who are respondents in this appeal.
2. The facts which need be noted for the disposal of the appeal are that the appellants filed a suit on 25-4-1949 for possession of the land under the occupation of the defendants. The suit had come to be filed after the plaintiffs had issued a notice to defendants 1 and 2 on 19-10-1947 under Section 7 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 terminating the tenancy and claiming that the land was required for personal cultivation. The possession was demanded by the notice on the expiry of 31st March, 1949. In the meantime, the Act came into force whose Section 88(1)(c) stated that the Act would not apply to any area within the limits, inter alia, of the municipal borough of Surat and within a distance of two miles of the limit of the borough. The suit land being admittedly situate within this periphery the Act did not apply, when enacted, to the area in question. However, an amendment was made by Bombay Act 33 of 1952 which substituted a new Clause (c) deleting that part of earlier Clause (c) which made the Act inapplicable to an area of two miles within the limits of municipal borough named in the clause. Now, if the 1952 amendment were to apply retrospectively, that is, from the date coming into force of the Act, the civil Court in which the suit for eviction was filed would admittedly cease to have jurisdiction; and vice versa. This point has been answered differently by the four adjudicating authorities below, one reversing the decision of the other on appeal being preferred to it. The latest decision is that of the Letters Patent Bench of the Gujarat High Court which has held the amendment as retrospective.
3. As the dispute is about the restrospectivity of the amendment, it is not necessary to note in detail the case of the parties as put forward in the plaint and written statement. Suffice to say that according to the plaintiffs the land in question was leased to the ancestors of the defendants for 51 cultivating seasons that is from 1894 to 1945. Thereafter, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs executed a registered lease in favour of the defendants on 12-1-1942 for five years, because of which the lease would have expired on 11-1-1947. The Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 having come into force in the meantime, the defendants became protected tenants and because of the insertion of Section 23 in that Act subsequently the duration of the lease got statutorily extended for 10 years, that is, till 11-1-1952. The land was purchased by the plaintiffs on 4-8-1947, whereafter a notice was issued on 9-10-1947 terminating the tenancy and demanding possession on the expiry of the lease on 31st March, 1945. The defendants not having delivered vacant possession, the present suit was filed on 25-4-1949. The defendants took the stand that they being protected tenants and Section 89(2)(b) on the Act having saved this right, the suit for eviction did not lie; in any case, it did not lie in the civil Court. In the present appeal, we are only concerned with the question of jurisdiction inasmuch as the Letters Patent Bench has not expressed any opinion on the merits of other point raised in this appeal.
4. The defendants case that despite what has been provided in Section 88(1)(c) of Act, they continued to be protected tenants cannot be accepted in
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