2005 Supreme(SC) 472

2005(2) Supreme 589
Supreme Court of India
(From Karnataka High Court)
N. Santosh Hegde, B.P. Singh & S.B. Sinha, JJ.
Manager, R.B.I., Bangalore —Appellant
versus
S. Mani and Ors. —Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 6306-6316 of 2003
Decided on 14-3-2005
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Mahendra Anand, Sr. Advocate, H.S. Parihar, Kuldeep Parihar and D.K. Sharma, Advocates.
For the Respondents : N.G. Phadke and S.N. Bhat, Advocates.

Important points
1. In law, 240 days of continuous ser­vice by itself does not give rise to claim of permanence as Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act provides for grant of compensation if the workman is sought to be ­retrenched in violation of the conditions ­referred to therein.2. A direction for reinstatement for non-compliance of the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act would restore to the workmen the same status which he held when terminated.3. Ticca Mazdoors employed by the ­Reserve Bank of India are not regarded as regular Mazdoors.

Headnote:(i) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947—Section 25F—Termination of service—Ticca Mazdoors appointed by Reserve Bank of India—Interviews for appointment as regular Mazdoors—Respondents allegedly submitting certificates which were forged and fabricated—Criminal prosecutions—Acquittals by criminal Courts—Request for reemploy­ment not accepted—Industrial Dispute—Award of Industrial Tribunal directing their reinstatement in Bank’s service holding that the respondents having completed 240 days of service, their terminations having been brought about without complying with provisions of Section 25F of the Act, were illegal—Writ petitions—High Court modifying the award of Tribunal held that back wages be paid from 23-7-1993 instead of their respective dates of retrenchment—Whether impugned judgment of the High Court is sustainable—(No).

       Held : Pleadings are no substitute for proof. No workman, thus, took an oath to state that they had worked for 240 days. No document in support of the said plea was produced. It is, therefore not correct to contend that the plea raised by the Respondents herein that they have worked continuously for 240 days was deemed to have been admitted by applying the doctrine of non-traverse. It any event the contention of the Respondents having been denied and disputed, it was obligatory on the part of the Respondents to add new evidence. The contents raised in the letters of the Union dated 30th May, 1988 and 11th April, 1990 containing statements to the effect that the workmen had been working continuously for 240 days might not have been replied to, but the same is of no effect as by reason thereof, the allegations made therein cannot be said to have been proved particularly in view of the fact that the contents thereof were not proved by any witness. Only by reason of non-response to such letters, the contents thereof would not stand admitted. The Evidence Act does not say so. The Appellant, therefore, cannot be said to have admitted that the Respondents had worked for more than 240 days. (Paras 19 & 20)

       As noticed hereinbefore, in this case also the Respondents did not adduce any evidence whatsoever. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in drawing an adverse inference. The initial burden of proof was on the workmen to show that they had completed 240 days of ­service. The Tribunal did not consider the question from that angle. It held that the burden of proof was upon the Appellant on the premise that they have failed to prove their plea of abandonment of service. (Paras 26 & 27)

       Only because the Appellant failed to prove their plea of abandonment of service by the Respondents, the same in law cannot be taken to be a circumstance that the Respondents have proved their case. The circumstances relied upon, in our opinion, are wholly irrelevant for the purpose of considering as to whether the Respondents have completed 240 days of service or not. A party to the lis may or may not succeed in its defence. A party to the lis may be filing representations or raising demands, but filing of such representations or raising of demands cannot be treated as circumstances to prove their case. (Paras 32 & 33)

       The Division Bench unfortunately in its judgment did not take into consideration the relevant questions. It proceeded on a pre-supposition that the Bank intended to reinstate the workmen. (Para 38)

       (ii) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947—Section 25F—Ticca Mazdoors appointed by Reserve Bank of India—Status of—Ticca Mazdoors are not regarded as regular Mazdoors—Service of Ticca Mazdoors being not permanent in nature can be dispensed with subject to compliance of the statutory or contractual requirements if any—Their status is not higher than that of a temporary workman or a probationer. (Paras 9 and 10)

       (iii) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947—Section 25F—Termination of service for producing false certificate—Effect of judgment of acquittal—Held, a judgment of acquittal passed in favour of employees by giving benefit of doubt per se would not be binding upon the employer. (Para 12)

       (iv) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947—Section 25F—Retrenchment—Proof of continuous service of 240 days—Burden of proof—Non production of documents, attendance register, by the ­employer—Tribunal erred in drawing adverse inference—Initial burden of proof was on the workmen to show that they had completed 240 days of service.­ (Paras 21, 26 & 27)