Important point
Scope of judicial review of administrative order is limited and consideration is limited to legality of decision-making process and not legality of the order per se and mere possibility of another view cannot be ground for interference.

Headnote:Delhi Police Act, 1978—Sections 47, 51 and 52—Order passed by Addl. Deputy Commissioner of Police directing respondent to remove himself beyond limits of NCT of Delhi for one year but permitting him to attend Courts at Delhi—High Court quashed the order in writ jurisdiction holding that pre-requisites for passing the order were not available as the Authority failed to indicate as to why one of the three options available was not being adopted—Appeal—Scope of judicial review of administrative order—Mere possibility of another view could not be a ground for interference—Grounds could be classified under three heads on which administrative action was subject to control by judicial review and grounds were illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety—To hold administrative action as “irrational” Court has to hold the decision so outrageous” as to be in total defiance of logic or moral standards—Test would be whether there was any infirmity in decision making process and not in decision itself—Material justifying externment could also throw light on options to be exercised—All relevant aspects were considered by Authority while passing externment order, and High Court was not justified in holding to contrary.
       Held : There can be doubt that the executive order has also to show when questioned that there was application of mind. It is the existence of material and not the sufficiency of material which can be questioned as the satisfaction is primarily subjective somewhat similar to one required to be arrived at by the detaining authority under the preventive detention laws. The scope of judicial review of administrative orders is rather limited. The consideration is limited to the legality of decision-making process and not legality of the order per se. Mere possibility of another view cannot be ground for interference. (Para 14)
       The present trend of judicial opinion is to restrict the doctrine of immunity from judicial review to those classes of cases which relate to deployment of troupes, entering into international treaties, etc. The distinctive features of some of these recent cases signify the willingness of the Courts to assert their power to scrutinize the factual basis upon which discretionary powers have been exercised. One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is ‘illegality’ the second ‘irrationality’, and the third ‘procedural impropriety’. These principles were highlighted by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (1984(3) All.ER. 935), (commonly known as CCSU Case). If the power has been exercised on a non-consideration or non-application of mind to relevant factors, the exercise of power will be regarded as manifestly erroneous. If a power (whether legislative or administrative) is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power till stand vitiated. (Para 16)
       The material justifying externment can also throw light on options to be exercised. If referring to the materials, the authority directing externment also indicates the option he thinks to be proper and appropriate it can not be said to be vitiated even though there is no specific reference to the other options. It is a matter of legitimate inference that when considering materials to adjudicate on the question of desirability for externment, options are also considered and one of the three options can be adopted. There can not be any hair splitting in such matters. A little play in the points is certainly permissible while dealing with such matters. In the case as noted above, all the relevant aspects were considered and High Court was not justified in holding to the contrary. (Paras 26 & 27)

Judgment

Arijit Pasayat, J.—Leave granted.

2. The true scope and ambit of Section 51 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 (in short the ‘Act’) falls for determination. Notice dated 20.5.2002, was issued by Deputy Commissioner of Police, (South-West) District, New Delhi, under Section 50 of the Act requiring the noticee to show cause as to why action in terms of Section 47 of the Act should not be taken against him. In the notice it was noted that since March 1997 he was engaged in several illegal acts in his activities and movement in the area of P.S. Dwarka, were causing alarm to the residents. List of 7 cases under various penal statutes on the basis of the records of the concerned police station was given. It was indicated that the witnesses including camera witnesses were not willing to give evidence in public against him because of the fear of danger to their person and properties. There was no written reply to the notice, but the noticee appeared and examined a witness to show that he was innocent. After the grant of further opportunities appellant No.5-Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police passed an order under Section 47 of the Act directing that the respondent should remove himself beyond the limits of NCT of Delhi for a period of one year w.e.f. 25.12.2002. He was permitted to attend the courts at Delhi on all the dates of hearing and thereafter immediately remove himself out of the limits of NCT of Delhi, but not to visit any place except courts premises. The relaxation was only for the date of hearing for the cases before the Courts. The contents of the order were explained to him and a copy was also delivered to him.

3. The order was challenged before the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi who rejected the appeal under Section 51 of the Act.

4. A writ petition was filed before the Delhi High Court. By the impugned judgment a learned Single Judge quashed the order observing that pre-requisites for passing an order under Section 47 of the Act were not available. For coming to such conclusion reliance was placed on a Division Bench Judgment of the Delhi High Court in Bhim Singh v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Anr. (2002 (2) JCC 1132). Learned Single Judge was of further view that in Bhim Singh’s case (supra) it was noted by the Division Bench that authority passing the order under Section 47 of the Act has to clearly indicate as to why one of the three options available was not being adopted. In the instant case, learned Single Judge held that there was no clear material or elaborate reasoning indicated to show that alternative options were examined and only one of them was adopted. Said order of the learned Single Judge is the subject-matter of challenge.

5. It was noted at the time of issuance of notice that though the externment order had worked out itself on account of afflux of time because of certain apparent divergence in views expressed by several Benches of the High Court, the matter needs to be examined.

6. In spite of notice no one appeared on behalf of the respondent.

7. In support of the appeal Ms. Mukta Gupta, Advocate, submitted that both learned Single Judge and the Division Bench in Bhim Singh’s case (supra) lost sight of Section 52 of the Act. The said provision provides the limited grounds on which the order under Section 47 can be questioned before any court. It was also submitted that a detailed order is not necessary to be passed while exercising powers under the Act to direct externment. Strong reliance was placed on decisions of this Court in Pandharinath Shridhar Rangnekar v. Dy. Commissioner of Police, The State of Maharashtra (1973 (1) SCC 372) and Gazi Sududdin v. State of Maharashtra and another (2003 (7) SCC 330) to buttress the plea.

8. It was also pointed out that a clearly divergent view was taken by another Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Dheeraj v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2001 V AD (Delhi) 672), which was not noted in Bhim Singh’s case (supra). In the said case a Division Bench of the High Court

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2005 Supreme(SC) 562

Important pointScope of judicial review of administrative order is limited and consideration is limited to legality of decision-making process and not legality of the order per se and mere possibility of another view cannot be ground for interference.

Cases Referred (6)

Important point
Scope of judicial review of administrative order is limited and consideration is limited to legality of decision-making process and not legality of the order per se and mere possibility of another view cannot be ground for interference.