2005(3) Supreme 396
Supreme Court of India
(From Madras High Court)
B.P. Singh and S.B. Sinha, JJ.
Swamy Atmananda & Ors. —Appellants
versus
Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam & Ors. —Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 2395 of 2000
With
Civil Appeal No. 3740 of 2000
Decided on 13-4-2005
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : K. Sukumaran, K. Ramamoorthy, B.N. Rao, Sr. Advocates, Dr. A. Francis Julian, Sumit Kumar, Advocates for M/s. Arputham Aruna and Co. Advocates, M.A. Chinnasamy, Mrs. N. Shobha, Sriram Thalapathy, N.K. Arulmuruganandham, Vikas Mehta, Ms. Indu Malhotra, Ms. Mamata Choudhary, P. Neduchezian, C. Paramashivam, R. Ayyam Perumal, Sewa Ram, S. Vallinayagam, Satya Mitra Garg, Advocates.
Held : The principle of res judicata envisages that a judgment of court of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon the point would create a bar as regard a plea between the same parties upon some other matter directly in question in another court and that the judgment of the court of exclusive jurisdiction direct in point. The doctrine of res judicata is conceived not only in larger public interest which requires that all litigation must, sooner than later, come to an end but is also founded on equity, justice and good conscience. (Paras 30 and 31)
(ii) Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 11—Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973—Sections 53 and 53A—Non framing of issue as regard res judicata —First respondent ‘Tapovanam’, a registered society has been functioning since 1942—In year 1987, first appellant got a Trust registered—A claim was set up by him to the effect that all the institutions at Karur had been founded by him from his own funds—A question arose as regard the status of first appellant vis-a-vis the first respondent, Tapovanam as regard ‘educational agency’ in terms of the provisions of the Act—Suit was dismissed holding that appellant trust was not legally constituted and that appellant 1 was an agent of Tapovanam and Tapovanam was the owner and Educational Agency of the schools in question—Suit filed by Tapovanam for declaration that it was the absolute owner of suit properties—Suit was decreed on ground that finding in the earlier suit wherein first appellant having been held to be an agent of Tapovanam was binding upon appellants—Appeal filed by appellant alleging that no issue as regard applicability of principle of res judicata having been framed, impugned judgment is vitiated—Whether appellants can be said to have been prejudiced in any manner by reason of non framing of the issue as regard res-judicata—(No).
Held : A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. The status of the First Appellant vis-a-vis Tapovanam was, thus, the subject matter of determination in the earlier suit. A finding as regard relationship between the parties rendered in the said suit is binding upon the First Appellant herein. Similarly, the finding to the effect that the Second Appellant was constituted illegally and did not derive any right, title or interest over any property standing in its name is also binding upon the Appellants. The object and purport of principles of res judicata as contended in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to uphold the rule of conclusiveness of judgment, as to the points decided earlier of fact, or of law, or of fact and law, in every subsequent suit between the same parties. Once the matter which was the subject-matter of lis stood determined by a competent court, no party thereafter can be permitted to reopen it in a subsequent litigation. Such a rule was brought into the statute book with a view to bring the litigation to an end so that the other side may not be put to harassment. (Paras 27 to 29)
The Appellants did not object to the raising of the said plea by Tapovanam in the suit. As the said plea had adequately been raised in the plaint, in relation whereto the Appellants herein had adequate opportunity to traverse and furthermore both the parties having brought on records all the relevant documents the Appellants herein cannot be said to have been prejudiced in any manner by reason of non-framing of the issue as regard res judicata. (Para 33)
This is, therefore, not a case where there was not adequate pleadings. On the other hand, it is a case where the documents as also the judgment produced in the previous suit were brought on record. The judgment contained extensive details of statement of pleadings and issues which could be taken as enough to prove the plea of res judicata. Furthermore, the First Appellant in his written statement by necessary implication accepted that the plea as regard title over the properties as described in Schedule A of the plaint as also other issues raised by the Tapovnam in his suit would depend upon the findings of the High Court in the Second Appeal which was then pending. (Para 39)
If the parties went to the trial knowing fully well the real issues involved and adduced evidence in such a case without establishing prejudice, it would not be open to a party to raise the question of non-framing of particular issue. (Para 43)
(iii) Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973—Sections 53 and 53A—Civil Court’s jurisdiction—Plea of exclusion of—Dispute as to educational agency in relation to a private school has to be decided by a Civil Court having jurisdiction for its decision—Jurisdiction of Civil Court was not excluded by reason of Sections 53 and 53A of the Act.
Held : A dispute as to who is the real educational agency in relation to a private school is not a matter which in terms of the provisions of the said Act would be determined by an authority under the provisions of the said Act. Section 53A of the Act carves out an exception to Section 53 thereof. In terms of the said provision any dispute as to the educational institution is to be determined by a Civil Court having jurisdiction for its decision. (Para 51)
A party to a dispute may not join the other in referring the same to the Civil Court. The party may agree or may not agree therefor. A person having a grievance as against other must have a remedy. The maxim ‘ubi jus ibi remedium’ is not an empty formality. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court exemplifies the said doctrine. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be held to have been ousted unless it is so, expressly or by necessary implication, stated in the statute. In terms of Section 53A of the Act, a dispute as to educational agency is concededly required to be decided by a Civil Court. How the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is required to be invoked is a matter to be examined by the Civil Court. Unlike a private tribunal or a statutory tribunal which would not derive a jurisdiction unless a reference in terms of the provisions of the Act is made to it, the Civil Court enjoys a plenary jurisdiction. Furthermore, if and when a dispute arises before the competent authority as regard entitlement of an educational agency in relation to educational institutions, the same must also be referred to the Civil Court. Statutory authority in terms of Section 5 of the Act cannot be said to have any jurisdiction to determine such a dispute. (Para 51)
(iv) Interpretation of Statutes—Provisions excluding jurisdiction of Civil Courts—Rule of strict construction—Burden of proof to show that jurisdiction is excluded in any particular case is on the party raising such a contention.
Held : A statute, as is well-known, must be read in such a manner so as to give effect to the provisions thereof. It must be read reasonably. A statute must be construed in such a manner so as to make it workable. The wordings “referred by the persons interested” would, thus, mean a person who has a grievance as regard claim of other side relating to educational agency of the educational institutions. It can be done by filing a suit before the Civil Suit. The term “persons” which is plural has been used having regard to the fact that educational agency need not be a person alone but would also include a society registered under the Societies Registration Act or a body corporate in terms of the Companies Act. In any event, if such a dispute within the contemplation of Section 53A has to be decided by a civil court, it will not attract the bar under Section 53 which applies only to a question which is required to be dealt with or decided by any authority or officer mentioned in the Act. (Para 51)
(v) Words and Phrases—Cause of action—Means fact or facts, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court—It is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant—It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all material facts on which it is founded. (Para 27)
Certainly. The legal document discusses whether a dispute related to the right of parties to act as an educational agency of private schools falls under the jurisdiction of a civil court or a specialized authority. It clarifies that, despite certain provisions in the relevant law, the civil court's jurisdiction is not excluded when it comes to disputes over the title or management of immovable property or questions about the true educational agency.
Specifically, if there is a disagreement about who is the rightful educational agency of a private school, this matter must be decided by a civil court, unless the law explicitly states otherwise. The law's provisions do not prevent parties from approaching the civil court for resolution of such disputes, and the absence of a specific issue being formally framed does not bar the court from hearing the case if the parties have fully participated and all relevant evidence has been considered.
Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata (meaning a matter already judged cannot be litigated again) applies here, and previous judgments on related issues are binding on the parties in subsequent cases. The document emphasizes that the civil court's authority to decide disputes over property and educational agency remains intact unless the law explicitly states that such matters are to be handled exclusively by a different authority.
In simple terms, if there is a disagreement over who is the real educational authority of a private school, the civil court has the jurisdiction to decide it, and previous court decisions on related issues are binding. The law does not automatically exclude civil courts from hearing such disputes, and parties can approach the civil court to resolve their rights and ownership issues.
Judgment
S.B. Sinha, J.—The question as to whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court stands ousted in terms of Sections 53 and 53A of the Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) falls for consideration in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 13.10.1999 passed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in A.S.No. 568 of 1998 whereby and whereunder the appeal preferred by the Appellants herein from a judgment and decree dated 7.8.1998 passed in O.S.No. 1254 of 1994 by the Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirapally decreeing the plaintiff-Respondents’ suit, was dismissed.
Background Facts :
2. The First Respondent herein (hereinafter referred to as ‘Tapovanam’) is a registered Society. It was founded by Swamy Chidbavananda. It has been functioning since 1942. The said Swamy Chidbavananda used to propagate the ideals of Swamy Ramakrishna Param Hans and Swamy Vivekananda. It started functioning at Ooty and later shifted to Thiruparaithurari. A number of branches were established at various places, namely, Thiruvedagam, Courtallam, Chitraichavadi, Thirunelveli, Kodaikanal, Ramanathampuram, Rameshwaram, Salem and Karur. Educational institutions and ashrams as well as dispensaries were established at all these places. Swamy Chidbavananda during his life time acquired various properties by collecting funds from the public, which partook the character of Trust property.
3. The First Appellant herein was an employee in a mill at Coimbatore. He joined ‘Tapovanam’ as an ordinary member. He became Sanyasi in 1970 whereupon he was assigned a job at Thiruvedagam and later transferred to Karur in the year 1976. ‘Tapovanam’ established a number of educational institutions at Karur from donations collected from the public as also with the funds available through the trusts called Vairaperumal Trust and Tathinagireswarar Trust, the object whereof was to dedicate their properties to Tapovanam to enable it to establish educational institutions.
4. It is not in dispute that in the year 1987, the First Appellant herein got a Trust registered known as ‘Sri Ramakrishna Ashramam Trust’. A claim was set up by him to the effect that all the institutions at Karur had been founded by him from his own money as well as the money collected by him individually. He filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Karur, marked as O.S.No. 251 of 1991, for a declaration that he along with other members were the owners as well as founders of the educational agencies of the six educational institutions mentioned in the plaint. The said suit was dismissed as withdrawn whereupon he filed another suit, marked as O.S. No. 1368 of 1990 in the Court of the District Munsif at Karur, which was subsequently transferred to the Court of Subordinate Judge, Karur and renumbered as O.S.No. 459 of 1991, the subject-matter whereof was two educational institutions, namely, Sri Vivekananda Higher Secondary School for Boys and Sri Sarada Girls Higher Secondary School at Pasupathipalayam. In the said suit a question arose as regard the status of the First Appellate vis-a-vis the First Respondent herein (Tapovanam) as regard ‘educational agency’ in terms of the provisions of the said Act.
In the said suit the Trial Judge framed the following issues:
(i) Whether the Plaintiff No.1-trust was in management and whether it was in existence?
(ii) Whether it was legally constituted?
(iii) Whether the plaintiffs were the owners of the suit Schedule Institutions?
(iv) Whether the Defendant No.1 was not the Educational Agency of the Plaint Schedule Schools?
(v) Whether the Plaintiff No.2 functioned as an agent of the Defendant No.1?
(vi) Whether the Defendant No.1 had no right over the Plaint Schedule Schools?
(vii) Whether the suit was maintainable?
(viii) Whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to the declaration prayed for?
(ix) To what relief the Plaintiffs were entitled to?
5. The said suit was dism
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