1954 Supreme(SC) 164

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
M.C.Mahajan, CJI., B.K.Mukherjee, N.H.Bhagwati, S.R.Dass, T.L.Venkatarama Ayyar, Vivian Bose, JJ.
Sakhawant All
Versus
State Of Orissa
Case No. : 81 of 1953
Date of Decision : 11/25/54

Headnote:Articles 14, 19 (I) (g)-Orissa Municipal Act (XXIII of 1950), sections 1(3), 1(5),16(1) (ix)-Disqualification under section 16 (I) (is) of the Act-Non1ination paper filed before and in contemplation of the Act coming into force in the Municipality Disqualification applies-Disqualification does not contravene article 14 or article 19(I)(g).

       The appellant who was a legal practitioner residing within the limits of the Kendrapara Municipality in the State of Orissa and practicing as a mukhtar in the criminal and revenue courts there filed his nomination/paper for election as a Councillor of the Municipality. His nomination paper was rejected On the ground that he was employed as a legal practitioner against the Municipality in a case under S. 198 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, which was pending in the S.D.M.s Court. Section 16 of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 (Orissa Act 23 of 1950) provides inter alia.

       "(I) No person shall be qualified for election to a seat in a municipality, if such person ..... (ix) is employed as a paid legal practitioner on behalf of the municipality or as legal practitioner against the municipality…..”

       The appellant contended (1) that the Act had not come into operation in the Kendrapara Municipality till the 15th April, 1951, that the disqualification prescribed by Section 16 (I) (ix) could not consequently have been incurred by him on 15th March 1951 when he filed his nomination paper, that the rejection of his nomination paper therefore on that ground by the Election Officer on the 25th March, 1951 was illegal and no election could be held on the 20th April, 1951 as was sought to be done under the provisions of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 or the Municipal Election Rules, 1950, and (2) that in any event the disqualification prescribed under Section 16(1)(ix) of the Act violated his fundamental rights guaranteed under Article I4 and Article 19(I)(g) of the Constitution.

       Held (dismissing the appeal): Ordinarily the statute enacted by a State Legislature comes into force as soon as it received the assent of the Governor. Section I (3) of the Act however postpones the commencement of the Act which means that Section 3( I) came into operation immediately the Governor gave his assent to the Act.2 Section 1(5) is

       1. Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, (1951) S.C.R. 228: A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 128; Lachmandas Kewalram v. State of Bombay, (1952) S.C.R. 710: A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 235; Qasim Razvi v. State of Hyderabad, 1953) S.C.R. 589: A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 156; Habeeb Ahmad v. State of Hyderabad, (1953) S.C.R. 661 ; A.I.R. S.C. 287 applied.

       2. Section I of the Act runs as under:

       "(1) This Act may be called the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950.

       (2) It shall extend to the whole of the State of Orissa.

       (3) It shall come into force in such area or areas on such date or dates as the State Government may appoint from time to time.

       (5) Any notification, order or rule and any appointment to an office, may be made or election held under this Act, after it shall have received the assent of the Governor and shall take effect on this Act coming into force.

       nothing but a proviso to Section 1(3) and must be regarded also to have come into operation simultaneously with Section 1(3). Section 1 (5) having thus come into force at once on the Act having received the assent of the Governor on the 7th November, 1950, if elections were to be held under the Act before the rest of the Act came into force in any particular area, all incidental steps for the holding of such elections were certainly contemplated to be taken and those steps which would be thus taken in anticipation of the Act coming into force in a particular area were certainly authorised by the terms of Section 1 (5) by necessary implication, because no election could be held unless all the preliminary steps for holding the same were taken. The clear provisions of Section 1 (5) of the Act expressly empowered the State Government to hold elections and thereby validated all the preliminary steps taken for the purpose of holding such election, the only reservation made being that even though the election under the Act be held such election was not to take effect till the Act came into force in the particular area.

       (2) The contention that the disqualification prescribed in Section 16(1) (ix) violates the fundamental rights of the appellant under Article 14 and Article 19 (1) (g) is equally untenable. Article 14 forbids class legislation but does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. That classification however cannot be arbitrary but must rest upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect of which the classification is made. In other words the classification must have a reasonable relation to the object or the purpose sought to be achieved by the impugned legislation.

       The classification here is of the legal practitioners who are employed on payment on behalf of the Municipality or act against the Municipality and those legal practitioners or disqualified from standing as candidates for election. The object or purpose to be achieved is the purity of public life, which object would certainly be thwarted if there arose a situation when there was a conflict between interest and duty. The classification would certainly have a reasonable relation to the object or purpose sought to be achieved.

       The contention that besides this category there are also other categories where there would be a possibility of conflict between interest and duty and that in so far as they were not covered by the disqualifications prescribed by Section 16(1) of the Act the provision disqualifying the category to which the appellant belonged was discriminatory, is not sound. The legislation enacted for the achievement of a particular object or purpose need not be all embracing. It is for the legislature to determine what categories it would embrace within the scope of legislation and merely because certain categories which would stand on the same footing as those which are covered by the legislation are left out would not render legislation which has been enacted in any manner discriminatory and violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution.

       (3) The right of the appellant to practice the profession of law guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) cannot be said to have been violated also, because in laying down the disqualification in Section 16(l)(ix) of the Act the legislature does not prevent him from practising his profession of law but it only lays down that if he wants to stand as a candidate for election he shall not either be employed as a paid legal practitioner on behalf of the municipality or act as a legal practitioner against the municipality. There is no fundamental right in any person to stand as a candidate for election to the municipality. The only fundamental right which is guaranteed is that of practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business. There is no violation of the latter right in prescribing the disqualification of the type enacted in Section 16(1)(ix) of the Act. Even if it be taken as a restriction on his right to practice his profession of law, such restriction would be a reasonable one and well within the ambit of Article 19, Clause 5.