1. Motor driver employed by State caused death by rash and negligent driving while returning vehicle from repair shop — Suit for damages against State for vicarious liability. (Para 2 )
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1962 Supreme(SC) 46
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
B.P.Sinha, C.J.I., J.C.Shah, J.L.Kapur, J.R.Mudholkar, M.Hidayatullah, JJ.
State Of Rajasthan
Versus
Vidya Wati
Case No. : 263 of 1958
Date of Decision : 2/2/62
Advocates Appeared: Andley S.N. : Kapur S.K. : Kasliwal G.C. : Khanna H.R. : Menon P.D. : Nath Rameshwar : Vohra P.L.
Advocates:
G.C.KASLIVAL, H.R.KHANNA, P.D.MENON, P.L.VOHRA, RAMESHWAR NATH ROY, S.K.KAPOOR, S.N.ANDLEY
G.C.KASLIVAL, H.R.KHANNA, P.D.MENON, P.L.VOHRA, RAMESHWAR NATH ROY, S.K.KAPOOR, S.N.ANDLEY
The State is vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its employees committed in the course of employment, unless the act is an exercise of sovereign power. Non-sovereign functions, such as driving a vehicle, do not grant the State immunity from liability.
Headnote:(A) Constitution of India - Article 300 - Vicarious liability of the State for tortious acts of its employees - Extent of liability - The State may sue or be sued in relation to its affairs in the like cases as the corresponding Indian States might have been sued if the Constitution had not been enacted (Paras 5, 13).
(B) Sovereign Immunity - Distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign functions - Acts done in the conduct of undertakings which might be carried on by private individuals are not exercises of sovereign power - Driving a vehicle back from a repair shop is dissociated from the exercise of sovereign powers (Paras 3, 10, 11).
(C) Legal Evolution of State Liability - Liability traces back to the legal position of the predecessor trading company - The predecessor company was not a sovereign and could not claim immunity for negligence of its servants (Paras 8, 9, 12).
(D) Welfare State - In a Republican form of government and a welfare state, there is no justification for the State to be immune from the consequences of tortious acts of its employees committed in the course of employment (Para 15).
Facts of the case:
A temporary employee of the State, serving as a motor driver, negligently drove a government vehicle while returning it from a repair shop, resulting in a fatal accident. The legal heirs of the deceased sued the driver and the State for damages. The trial court dismissed the claim against the State, citing sovereign immunity, but the High Court reversed this decision and awarded compensation.
Findings of Court:
The act of driving a vehicle from a repair shop is not an exercise of sovereign power. The State is vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its employees committed in the course of their employment, provided the act is not an exercise of sovereign power.
Issues: Whether the State is liable for the tortious acts of its employees under Article 300 of the Constitution and whether the specific act of driving a vehicle from a repair shop constitutes an exercise of sovereign power.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that Article 300 refers back to the legal position before the Constitution. Tracing this back to the predecessor trading company, it was established that such a company was not a sovereign and was liable for the negligence of its servants. The distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign functions is crucial; acts that could be performed by private individuals do not attract sovereign immunity. In a modern welfare state, the State is liable for the torts of its servants acting within the scope of employment.
Result: Appeal dismissed with costs.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. State's immunity from suit under Article 300 — Whether the maintenance and operation of a government vehicle constitutes the exercise of sovereign powers. (Para 3 )
3. Distinction between sovereign functions and activities that could be performed by private individuals — State's liability as a welfare state employer in non-sovereign activities. (Para 3 , 4 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 14 , 15 )
4. The State is vicariously liable for tortious acts of its employees committed in the course of employment, unless the act was an exercise of sovereign power. (Para 10 , 12 , 15 )
5. Appeal dismissed with costs. (Para 16 )
6. How is the distinction made between sovereign powers and non-sovereign activities for determining State liability in tort?
Sovereign powers include acts like military action or seizing prize property. Non-sovereign activities are undertakings that could be carried on by private individuals, such as operating transport or repairing vehicles, for which the State is vicariously liable. (Para 10 , 11 )
7. What is the effect of Article 300 of the Constitution regarding the State's liability to be sued?
Article 300 provides that the State may be sued in relation to its affairs in cases as the corresponding Provinces or Indian States might have been sued before the Constitution. (Para 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 )
8. Does the State enjoy sovereign immunity for the tortious acts of its employees in a modern Republican or Socialistic State?
No. In a welfare state engaging in diverse industrial and public activities, there is no justification for immunity. The State is liable for torts committed by servants within the scope of employment. (Para 10 , 15 )
B.P.SINHA, C.J.I.
(1) THIS appeal, on a certificate granted by the High court of Rajasthan under Art. 133(1)(c) of the Constitution, raises a question of considerable importance, namely, the extent of the vicarious liability of government for the tortious acts of its employees, acting in the course of their employment as such. The Trial court dismissed the claim for compensation as against the State of Rajasthan, which was the second defendant in the suit for damages for tortious act of the first defendant. Lokumal, who is not a party to this appeal. On appeal by the plaintiffs against the judgment and decree of the Trial court, the High court of Rajasthan passed a decree in favour of the plaintiffs allowing compensation of Rs. 15,000.00 against the State of Rajasthan also, which is the appellant in this court.
(2) THE facts of this case may shortly be stated as follows. The first defendant Lokumal, was a temporary employee of the appellant State, as a motor driver on probation. In February, 1952, he was employed as the driver of a government jeep car, registered as No. RUM 49, under the Collector of Udaipur. The car had been sent to a workshop for necessary repairs. After repairs had been carried out, the first defendant, while driving the car back along a public road, in the evening of 11/02/1952, knocked down one Jagdishlal, who was walking on the footpath by the side of the public road in Udaipur city, causing him multiple injuries, including fractures of the skull and backbone, resulting in his death three days later, in the hospital where he had been removed for treatment. The plaintiffs who are Jagdishlals widow and a minor daughter, aged three years, through her mother as next friend sued the said Lokumal and the State of Rajasthan for damages for the tort aforesaid. They claimed the compensation of Rs. 25,000.00 from both the defendants. The first defendant remained ex-parte. The suit was contested only by the second defendant on a number of issues. But in view of the fact that both the courts below have agreed in finding that the first defendant was rash and negligent in driving the jeep car resulting in the accident and the ultimate death of Jagdishlal, it is no more necessary to advert to all the questions raised by way of answer to the suit, except the one on which the appeal has been pressed before us. The second defendant, who was the respondent in the High court, and is the appellant before us, contested the suit chiefly on the ground that it was not liable for the tortious act of its employee. The Trial court, after an elaborate discussion of the evidence, decreed the suit against the first defendant ex-parte, and dismissed it without costs against the second defendant. On appeal by the plaintiffs, the High court of Rajasthan (Wanchoo C.J., and D. S. Dave J.) allowed the appeal and decreed the suit against the second defendant also, with costs in both the courts. The State of Rajasthan applied for and obtained the necessary certificate `that the case fulfils the requirements of Art. 133(1)(c) of the Constitution of India`. The High court rightly observed that an important point of law of general public importance, namely, the extent of the liability of the State, in tort, was involved.
(3) IN support of the appeal, counsel for the Appellant raised substantially two questions, namely, (1) that under Art. 300 of the Constitution, the State of Rajasthan, was not liable as the corresponding Indian State would not have been liable if the case had arisen before the Constitution came into force; and (2) that the jeep car, the rash and negligent driving of which led to the claim in the suit was being maintained `in exercise of sovereign powers` and not as part of any commercial activity of the State. The second question may shortly be disposed of before we address ourselves to the first question, which is the more serious of the two raised before us. Can it be said that when the jeep car was being drive
