1965 Supreme(SC) 335
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.B.Gajendragadkar, C.J.I., K N Wanchoo, M Hidayatullah, P Satyanarayana Raju, V R Ramaswami, JJ.
ROHTAK HISSAR DISTRICT ELECTRICITY SUPPLY CO. LTD.
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTER PRADESH AND OTHERS.
Civil Appeal Nos. 164 of 1965 and 1105 of 1964
decided on December 3, 1965.
Important Points
Subject
Labour Law - Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)
Act Referred
Headnote
(B) Power of Government to amend Schedule - Addition of items relating to conditions of employment, such as age of superannuation or welfare schemes, is within the competence of the appropriate Government under Section 15.
(C) Scope of Standing Orders - Provisions introducing appeals to outside authorities or assigning finality to decisions of external officers are outside the purview of the Act, as Standing Orders are intended to regulate conditions of service through internal domestic arrangements.
(D) Lay-off Compensation - Where Standing Orders provide benefits more favorable to the workman than those under the Central Act, the more favorable benefits shall prevail.
Facts of the case:
An employer submitted draft Standing Orders for certification. The Certifying Officer modified several provisions based on fairness and reasonableness. The employer challenged these modifications before the Appellate Authority and subsequently before the Supreme Court, arguing that the certifying authorities exceeded their jurisdiction, that the orders conflicted with industrial dispute laws, and that the consent of employees should have been decisive.
Findings of Court:
The court held that the certifying authority has the power to examine fairness and reasonableness regardless of employee consent. It ruled that Standing Orders cannot include matters outside the Schedule or create appeal mechanisms to external authorities. It modified the notice period for lay-offs in cases of sudden catastrophes and struck down provisions regarding mandatory pensions not agreed upon by the employer.
Issues: Whether there is a conflict between the Standing Orders Act and the Industrial Disputes Act; whether the certifying authority can modify orders despite employee consent; whether the government can add items to the Schedule; and whether Standing Orders can provide for appeals to outside authorities.
Ratio Decidendi: The Standing Orders Act aims to define employment conditions to prevent disputes, while the Industrial Disputes Act resolves existing disputes; thus, they operate in different fields. The 1956 amendment expanded the jurisdiction of certifying authorities to ensure fairness. Standing Orders are limited to the Schedule and internal arrangements; they cannot trespass into the domain of external adjudication or create new statutory rights without agreement.
Result: Appeal allowed in part.
Legal Category Hierarchy
-
labour and industrial law
-
industrial employment (standing orders) act
-
certification of standing orders
- fairness and reasonableness
- model standing orders
- scope of schedule
-
certification of standing orders
-
industrial disputes act
- lay-off and retrenchment compensation
-
employment conditions
- superannuation and retirement
- welfare schemes
-
industrial employment (standing orders) act
JUDGMENT
Gajendragadkar, C.J.I. - This appeal has been brought to this Court by special leave and it challenges the validity of certain others passed by the certifying authorities in respect of the draft Standing Orders which the appellant, the Rohtak Hissar Districts Electric Supply Co., Ltd., had submitted to them for certification. Five respondents have been impleaded to this appeal; they are the State of U.P., Certifying officer for Standing Orders and Labour Commissioner, U.P., Kanpur, and three representatives of the employees respectively. At the hearing before us, the employees representatives have not appeared and appeal has been contested by respondent No. 1 alone.
The appellant is a Joint Stock Company incorporated under the Companies Act, and it has its registered office at Allahabad. The principal object for which this Company has been incorporated is to carry on the business of generation and distribution of electricity. In accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (No. 20 of 1946) (hereinafter called the Act), the appellant prepared draft Standing Orders in consultation with its employees and submitted the same to the Certifying Officer on the 24th December, 1950, for certification. At that time, the workmen employed by the appellant had not formed any Union, and so, the Labour Department held proceedings for the election of the three representatives from the said workmen. Normally, a union representing the workmen would have been competent and qualified to represent the workmen in the certification proceedings; but since there was no Union in existence, the Labour Department had to adopt the expedient of asking the workmen to elect three representatives. That is how respondents 3 to 5 came to be elected as the representatives of workmen. In the certification proceeding, these representatives took no objection the draft Standing Order submitted by the appellant. In fact, the said draft Standing Orders were submitted to the Certifying Officer on the basis that they had been agreed to by the appellant and its workmen.
The Certifying Officer, however, examined the fairness and reasonableness of the provisions contained in the said draft Standing Orders and made several changes in them. The draft Standing Orders with the changes made by the Certifying Officer were accordingly certified on 21st November, 1962.
Against the said order passed by the Certifying Officer, the appellant filed an appeal before the Industrial Tribunal, U.P., Allahabad, which had been appointed the Appellate Authority under the Act. It was urged by the appellant before the Appellate Authority that the Certifying Officer was in error in making modifications in the draft Standing Orders submitted to him for his certification, but the Appellate Authority did not accept the appellants contention and, in substance, confirmed the order passed by the Certifying Officer. In the result, the appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by the Appellate Authority on 29th June, 1963. It is against this appellate order that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave.
Along with this appeal, Civil Appeal No. 1105 of 1964 has been placed before us for hearing and final disposal. This appeal arises between the appellant M/s Amitabh Textile Mills, Ltd., and its workmen and it raises substantially the same points as arise in Civil Appeal No. 164 of 1965. Mr. K. K. Jain, who appeared for the appellant in this appeal, has stated before us that the decision in this appeal will follow our decision in Civil Appeal No. 164 of 1965. That is why we do not propose to refer to the facts in this appeal nor deal with it separately.
The first point which Mr. Setalvad has raised before us in Civil Appeal No. 164 of 1965 is of a general character. He contends that the Model Standing Orders which have been followed as a pattern by the certifying authorities in the present certification proceedings, are themselves inva